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ABSTRACT 
 
The language surrounding the decision to go to war in American political 
discourse is often very divisive and draws upon numerous rhetorical traditions. Early 
research on the question of what types of arguments favoring war has been largely 
inconclusive. Alongside the facts concerning conflict are numerous orators drawing 
upon various discourses and intellectual traditions seeking to sway their audience either 
toward or away from conflict. One such study is the work of James Andrews who 
conducted case studies to develop an “American adolescence” theory suggesting that 
arguments of honor and principle were the most persuasive in convincing men to take up 
arms. This research, however, fails to convincingly answer this question.  
In this dissertation, I use a rhetorical framework to investigate the types of 
arguments used in early-American history that try to influence the decision to go to war. 
Primarily, this dissertation examines Andrews’ theory of principled arguments and 
employs a second variable, that is, arguments of expediency. I argue that principled 
arguments are not as successful as Andrews concludes and instead arguments of 
expediency are more commonplace than arguments of principle. Additionally, I argue 
that expedient rhetoric is a necessary component for mobilizing mass support for a war 
but expedient rhetoric is not necessary when arguing for inaction. Rather, principled 
arguments can also serve to motivate audiences toward inaction.  
To examine whether Andrews’ theory of principled arguments is largely correct, 
I first demonstrate that Machiavelli used arguments of expediency in an attempt to 
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convince the Medici to go to war. From this example, I conduct three case studies where 
arguments of principle and arguments of expediency are both present.  I find that in 
arguments prior to the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Mexican-
American War are largely a mixed bag. In the American Revolution and the War of 
1812, arguments of expediency are often capable in convincing men to take up arms. 
However, I demonstrate that in the Mexican-American War, arguments of principle may 
help to limit the severity of conflict. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
America has been an intellectual melting pot since its earliest days under British 
colonial rule. American thinkers have been accused of many things, but rarely have they 
ever been accused of being deeply principled philosophers.i As historians of America’s 
intellectual traditions have concluded, Americans drew from various and often 
competing intellectual traditions including liberalism, republicanism, protestant political 
theology, and ascriptive hierarchies.ii Each intellectual tradition also has its own 
language and rhetorical stance. For instance, liberals routinely make appeals to natural 
rights and reason, republicans appeal to virtue and honor, and protestant theorists use the 
language of covenants and jeremiads.iii What makes the language of American political 
thought difficult to analyze is that all of these discourses may appear within a single 
work.  
One area in which the rhetoric of the American intellectual tradition is often 
more decisive is in discourses surrounding the decision to go to war. Factors that decide 
whether or not a country enters war are of course based on numerous social, political, 
and economic facts. Alongside the facts, however, are numerous orators drawing upon 
various discourses and intellectual traditions seeking to sway their audience either 
toward or away from conflict. In this dissertation, I examine the types of arguments used 
in early-American history that influence the decision to go to war.   
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In his seminal study on the question of American war rhetoric, James Andrews 
framed the question as: “On what did orators favoring war rely in order to convince men 
to take up arms”?iv Drawing from various speeches supporting the decision to enter 
conflict, Andrews found that within the American context, authors typically appealed to 
lofty principles such as national honor and commerce. He concludes that these speeches 
draw on these idealistic principles because there is “… a kind of national adolescence, a 
gnawing anxiety, perhaps an inferiority complex, that unless America could hold its own 
in sheer brute strength she would not be respected or feared by the powers of the 
world…”v Andrews argues that these appeals worked well when the country was in its 
founding era but as the fledgling nation continued to grow, each speech appealing to 
honor and commerce seemingly loses its effectiveness. As the “adolescent stages” pass 
and international trade becomes sustainable, Andrews argues that the inherent costs 
associated with conflict largely serve as a deterrent to entering into conflict.vi  
From Andrews’ analysis, one would expect to find arguments that draw from 
basic principles, often rooted in the language of republican political thought, including 
honor, to be prevalent only during America’s earliest decades; thereafter, one would 
expect to find a shift in rhetorical strategy with fewer principled arguments urging the 
country to enter conflict. Andrews’ theory that war rhetoric would move principled 
arguments concerning honor to pragmatic arguments concerning commerce as the young 
country matured is both appealing and parsimonious. In this dissertation, I put Andrews’ 
“America’s adolescence theory” to the test using three case studies from American 
history: the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Mexican-American War. 
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The results of this research demonstrate that contrary to Andrews’ prediction, both 
principled and pragmatic arguments are used throughout American history. Just as 
Americans have been heterodox in the use of political ideologies, so too have they been 
heterodox in their use of rhetorical traditions. 
The primary interest of this dissertation is to examine the use of arguments of 
expediency versus the use of arguments of principle as it relates to Andrews’ original 
study. According to Andrews’ analysis, questions of honor and principle were enough to 
convince men to take up arms in the earliest years of the country with appeals to 
commercial concerns appearing in the 19th century. In this dissertation, I focus upon an 
added variable, that is, the use of arguments of expediency. Specifically, I examine 
whether and when arguments of expediency were used in the discussion of convincing 
Americans to enter into conflict. My secondary area of interest examines the way in 
which political theorists rely upon these same rhetorical tendencies, that is, arguments of 
principle and arguments of expediency, in their attempts to reach a larger audience. 
To begin, it is necessary to distinguish between principled arguments and 
arguments of expediency. Drawing sharp lines between these two forms of rhetoric can 
be difficult, and I draw upon the work of Stephen Lucas to make this distinction. Lucas 
contends that arguments of principle rely upon “… universal standards for the regulation 
and guidance of right conduct” that “stand beyond question or refutation.”vii These 
arguments from universal standards stand in stark contrast to arguments that are 
facilitated by “what is politic or expedient rather than from some “received” definition of 
what is right or just.”viii  While Lucas offers a starting point for distinguishing between 
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principled and expedient arguments, I find that his definition is lacking a concern for 
time. Consequently, I further expand the definition of expedient arguments to include 
arguments that demand that action must be taken quickly. Likewise, I emphasize that 
principled arguments rarely place the timing of making a decision as a high priority. I 
also make a slight extension of Lucas’ definition of principled arguments regarding an 
“uncompromising application of his universal standards.”ix Instead, I include among 
arguments of principled rhetoric that appeals to lofty ideals. This deviation from Lucas’ 
definition of principle allows me to include the use of honor as a fundamental motivation 
for going to war. Whereas Lucas judges principles as being fundamental truths, 
arguments concerning honor are relative to time and place. This additional pairing 
allows me to generalize this distinction to incorporate some cases that may not 
traditionally fit the “right or wrong” perspective required by Lucas’ definition. 
As Andrews’ initial discussion focuses upon the use of honor as a fundamental 
means of convincing individuals to take up arms during the earliest years of the republic, 
we would expect to find that honor remained relatively constant as a determinant for war 
in the first century of the country.x But if questions of honor or principle are not enough 
to explain why these early battles were fought, then an analysis of the role of expediency 
and audiences might be more fruitful for understanding when and why these American 
skirmishes may turn into war. Since the United States fought in wars where honor was 
not the sole justification, perhaps there is another explanation for why these early 
governments would choose warfare over peace. As a result, my research shows that there 
are cases of arguments advocating for and against conflict that are not explained by 
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Andrews’ theory. I view the use of arguments of expediency as a direct contrast to the 
principled arguments of honor. As Lucas explains, arguments of principle and expedient 
arguments are anything but mutually exclusive.xi However, attempting to classify 
arguments as being one or the other allows me to focus my analysis on the aims and 
context of these speech patterns. Moreover, treating these arguments in this way also 
helps to discern how political actors use particular forms of rhetoric for particular 
audiences regarding speeches aimed at fomenting or preventing conflict.  
This dissertation seeks to expand upon aspects of Andrews’ original article by 
conducting an analysis of political theory through a rhetorical framework. Because 
Andrews only examined arguments of principle, namely, arguments from honor, I had to 
look more broadly to the history of political thought to find a framework for 
conceptualizing the differences between principled and expedient arguments. I found 
such a framework in one of the most notorious and skilled rhetoricians in the history of 
modern political thought, Niccolò Machiavelli. In Chapter 1, I begin by drawing the 
distinction between principled and expedient arguments by examining Machiavelli’s 
argument for convincing the Medici to go to war in 16th century Florence. Machiavelli 
provides not only an example of the use of expediency in convincing the Medici that war 
is necessary but also provides a theoretical framework that serves as a justification for 
going to war. It is my intention to use this framework in my analysis of early American 
public discourse in regards to war and conflict. Using Machiavelli’s framework to 
distinguish between principled and expedient arguments, I examine three case studies of 
American public discourse: the American Revolution, the War of 1812, as well as the 
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Mexican American War. The first two case studies demonstrate the role arguments of 
expediency play in helping to motivate individuals to go to war. Given that both of these 
cases – the American Revolution and the War of 1812 – occur early in American history 
– they contradict Andrews’ theory that arguments of principled honor would be used to 
support conflict during America’s infancy. In my last case study, I examine whether 
principled arguments, made from outside the prevailing social group, have the ability to 
counteract the expediency of war rhetoric found throughout the states. In this case, 
Andrews would predict that only arguments of expediency, namely, arguments 
concerning commerce, would be used given that America would have matured beyond 
the need for principled arguments. Nevertheless, I find that opponents to the Mexican-
American war used highly principled arguments, again, contrary to Andrews’ theory. In 
sum, this dissertation examines three distinct cases where expedient or principled 
arguments are used to convince men to take up arms (or not), or in the case of 
Machiavelli, convincing the Medici to go to war. In each of these cases, I focus upon 
how each theorist uses arguments of expediency or arguments of principle to help 
persuade the masses. From these studies, I conclude that contrary to Andrews’ 
predictions, arguments of expediency have been used alongside of arguments of 
principle throughout American history. 
 Ultimately this dissertation seeks to build upon Andrews’ argument as to what 
types of rhetoric are most effective at “convincing men take up arms.” Whereas 
Andrews relies solely upon the use of arguments about honor and eventually commerce 
as being an effective means of promoting a war effort, I argue that principled arguments 
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are not as successful as Andrews concludes. What Andrews fails to account for is that 
arguments for or against a war fluctuate not only across decades but also within each 
individual conflict. From Andrews’ work, I argue that political theory in itself is an 
attempt to have an audience accept one particular viewpoint over many other views that 
are available. Because theorists rely upon their audience to determine the relative 
success of their arguments, I also examine the degree to which political theory relies 
upon arguments of expediency and principle as being helpful in determining how 
rhetoric is intertwined with political theory. This dissertation thusly advances the fields 
of rhetoric and political theory by examining the role of principled and expedient 
arguments in war discourse but also relates these arguments back to political theory.  
 
Rhetoric and War  
It is difficult to pinpoint an exact definition of rhetoric, as most definitions are 
varied and ambiguous in their application. According to Plato, the use of rhetoric has a 
negative influence on the audience and inhibits that ability to determine truth. As Plato 
explains, there is a distinction between dialectic and rhetoric, and rhetoric is a form of 
cookery because it makes the weaker case appear stronger.xii Aristotle treats the study of 
rhetoric and the dialectic as two sides of the same coin, allowing a speaker to use 
whatever means is necessary to convince an audience of the “best means” of action.xiii 
These classical definitions of rhetoric are early examples of the long and interwoven 
tradition of both political theory and rhetoric with both sides presenting rhetoric as a tool 
that orators can call upon to advance any position in an argument.  
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If we look toward more contemporary and more assessable definitions of 
rhetoric, language is once again given a neutral position that can be adopted for the 
purposes of an orator. As D’Angelo explains, rhetoric is “a science which attempts to 
discover general principles of oral or written discourse.” xiv However, this definition of 
rhetoric relies too strongly on systematically investigating rhetoric as nothing more than 
spoken or written discourse without acknowledging that studies of rhetoric should 
examine the intent of the message or its possible effects of swaying the emotions. 
Extending this examination of rhetoric as being more than spoken and written discourse, 
Kennedy defines rhetoric as “a specific cultural subset of a more general concept of the 
power of words and their potential to affect a situation in which they are used or 
received.”xv From Kennedy we learn that rhetoric requires the potential to affect a 
situation. Burke furthers this idea as “the use of language as a symbolic means of 
inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols.” xvi But perhaps, 
broadly defined, cooperation is too strong of an indicator. Cooperation implies that 
individuals will work together. Rhetoric involves symbols and the possibility of 
cooperation, but should cooperation be the necessary condition to determine whether or 
not rhetoric exists? As Kochin argues, “Rhetoric is systematic thought about how to 
move the audience to act or move it to refrain from acting.”xvii Borrowing from Kochin 
and Kennedy, this dissertation examines rhetoric as the ability to persuade an audience 
to act through both literature and oration. From this simple definition, there is the ability 
to discern the elements of conscious persuasion and manipulation of language that can 
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move an audience toward action or inaction given the specific context and nuances of 
speech.xviii  
As Kennedy explains, “Ultimately, what we call `rhetoric’ can be traced back to 
the natural instinct to survive and to control our environment and influence the actions of 
others in what seems the best interest of ourselves, our families, our social and political 
groups, and our descendants.”xix The study of rhetoric, then, is not in one particular 
approach to linguistic or literary studies, but rather it is a particular focus on what the 
author is attempting to achieve and the persuasive elements being utilized to achieve that 
purpose. Hence, the intersection between rhetoric and political theory should focus upon 
how theorists and rhetoricians use language to influence their environment. This focus 
on the ability of language to influence an environment, however, must be observed as a 
fluid relationship between the intent of the speaker but also the manner in which this 
speech is given. As Locke and Hobbes are two of the authors in the canon of political 
thought, their works only give a brief mention to the study of rhetoric. Both authors 
explain too eagerly that rhetoric is merely “sophistry” and can easily excite the masses. 
Each theorist also claims that their works are devoid of rhetoric because of its corrupting 
influence on reason and both authors encourage the audience to accept their conclusions 
from a rational calculation of the evidence presented throughout their arguments.xx 
However, if we disregard the proclamations of these theorists and instead focus upon 
their written works as they attempt to persuade their audiences, each author is guilty of 
the crime they claim to avoid.  
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Seemingly keying in upon this disparity between the practices and proclamations 
of these modern theorists, a large literature has begun to develop from the rhetorical 
study of political theory. Specifically, there are three main approaches to the study of 
rhetoric in political theory. The first approach to utilizing rhetoric in the study of 
political theory is to look at the contextual clues surrounding speech acts and writings of 
individuals to determine how and why their works can help persuade an audience to a 
particular goal. This literature focuses upon early political thought in the light of 
contemporary issues to examine how rhetoric and emotion can counteract rational 
thought.xxi This approach focuses upon the application of rhetorical studies and 
attempting to determine what a theorist’s primary motivations may have been.  
Following this first approach, there is a long history of scholarly work that 
analyzes the types of rhetorical arguments presented for specific moments or for brief 
periods of history.xxii As Murphy writes, “…presidential war rhetoric establishes the 
expediency of war; presidents portray the decision to go to war as a thoughtful one and 
the reasons for war are embedded within the narratives they present.”xxiii One recent 
example of this approach is the dissection of Machiavelli’s writings to show that Cicero 
and Quintilian influence his works heavily and that this humanist understanding has 
been hijacked by modern interpretations of Machiavelli.xxiv Following in this same vein 
of thought, Skinner analyzes Hobbes’ Leviathan to argue that Hobbes relies upon a 
humanist understanding of rhetoric and continues to rely upon rhetorical flourishes to 
portray the Realist worldview throughout Leviathan. Remer follows this example to 
examine the works of Cicero and Hobbes to argue that each of these theorists relied upon 
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rhetorical nuances to convince the audience that their arguments were the most correct 
given the information that had been presented.xxv And perhaps Garsten provides the best 
explanation of the negative connotation given to the modern theorists and their study of 
rhetoric. As Garsten comments, this negative understanding can most easily be viewed 
under the assumption that rhetoric is commonplace and this should lead to the 
acceptance of reasoned persuasion.xxvi 
This first approach allows modern rhetoricians to not only examine specific 
examples from canonical theorists but this approach also serves as a filter to understand 
and critique the past and present. As Aune examines the works of Dewey in response to 
the changing nature of society and technology, there is an inherent question about 
whether the public, given an increase in technology, would be able to act as a democratic 
body.xxvii This approach also affords individuals the opportunity to reevaluate the 
traditional explanations concerning an event and to argue that the current interpretation 
of this historical event can be better understood using new information gleaned from 
studies of rhetoric.xxviii Using a similar method, Ivie examines the rhetoric surrounding 
the process of war and the types of arguments that play into debates concerning the 
decision to go to war.xxix These examples all portend that rhetoric is able to influence the 
decision-making process of an individual and war is often the topic of debate. More 
recently, Mercieca examines the Abolitionist Mail Crisis of 1835 through the lens of 
honor and examines the response of southern slaveholders as it relates to Ivie’s analysis 
of arguments concerning the justification of war through perceived victimage of the 
target population. Mercieca argues slaveholders could not rely upon adopting a position 
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of being victimized by the abolitionists and instead had to present their case in the 
language of honor as it pertained to the norms of their society.xxx These studies of 
rhetoric allow researchers to more easily determine whether the standard interpretation 
of an event includes both the political reasons as well the political undercurrents that 
ultimately influence public policy.  
The second main approach to rhetoric and political theory is an examination of 
utility and the question of how rhetoric can be useful in the realization of an idealized 
society. Through the exploration of deliberative democracy, the focus on rhetoric or 
constant deliberation could provide the public with access to the information requisite 
for decision-making processes. As Dewey first maintains, the notion of a deliberative 
democrat demands that the public be allowed equal access to information or be given the 
ability to educate itself and thus govern itself.xxxi Following in this tradition, Gutmann 
and Thompson suggest that the ease of access to information would allow for individuals 
to make decisions but it is paramount that all individuals are placed in a mutually 
defensible and equal position prior to working toward a deliberative democracy.xxxii 
Dryzek also argues that rhetoric would not only allow for the equal access to information 
but that rhetoric can serve to unify and strengthen social groups.xxxiii This particular 
focus on rhetoric in political theory emphasizes the end product of rhetoric and how it 
affects deliberation rather than attempting to discern how individual arguments promote 
one decision over another.  
The third approach to the study of rhetoric in political theory focuses upon 
whether words and their meaning are inherently static between generations and moments 
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of social upheaval. This “conceptual change” scholarship argues that concepts and words 
vary “inasmuch as the concepts that constitute political life and language lose old 
meanings even as they acquire new ones, political discourse appears, in retrospect, to 
have been–and even now to remain–in a state of perpetual flux.”xxxiv This perpetual flux 
requires that political actors mostly agree with a shared definition and are able to argue 
from this baseline. However, these definitions are dependent upon the context of events 
and remain fluid throughout multiple events in history.xxxv The conceptual change 
literature finds itself at the intersection of political theory and rhetoric in an attempt “to 
study how certain theses or beliefs were used in argumentation by the agents.”xxxvi In this 
particular approach, there is the expectation that not all arguments are created the same 
and that an examination of this language will allow researchers to discover the nuances 
that help frame conditions and arguments. One particular subfield of this conceptual 
change literature focuses upon the American Revolution to determine how particular 
words and ideals have grown since they were first invoked in American history.xxxvii  
While these three predominant approaches to the study of rhetoric in political 
theory all focus upon language and how it may change the world through continued 
discourse, or how rhetoric influences the perception and may persuade the actions of the 
public, I examine the fundamental nature of how political theory is in itself an argument 
by political theorists that attempts to persuade their audience to accept the political 
narrative, world, and theory they have created. As Mercieca argues, “The fact that 
people and political theorists have created and argued for various kinds of government 
… demonstrates that there is not one ideal form of government, but rather a plurality of 
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political theories that must be adapted to the particular people and circumstance of a 
particular political community.”xxxviii Within this context, normative political thought 
relies upon rhetoric to convince others that one particular approach or view of the world 
is more viable than another. As Aune explains, all political theory “strives for advantage 
over its opponents” and this advantage is often formulated in word choice and the types 
of arguments.xxxix Examining the moments when individuals decide to take up arms will 
allow us to understand the instances in which theorists can evoke emotional and 
rhetorical appeals that may influence the decision-making capabilities of the audience.  
A rhetorician effectively using ethos, pathos, and logos can help persuade an 
audience to adopt one argument over another, serving to quicken the rational decision-
making capabilities of the masses.  As illustrated by the Federalist Papers, the founders 
were concerned that rhetoric and enflamed passions would lead the assembly to declare 
war more often than if rational thought dictated the response of the country. As Madison 
explains, “In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion 
never fails to wrest the sceptre [sic] from reason."xl The founders were fearful of the 
influence and ability of rhetoric to sway the passions and to limit the ability of reason to 
hold power. As Howe explains, because the Constitution had the potential to inflame the 
passions, it was  “ …all the more essential to keep the discourse on a high level and out 
of the hands of demagogues.”xli With this idea in mind, an examination of the rhetoric of 
conflict will serve to elucidate the ability of a speaker to frame arguments in a manner 
that would more effectively serve to limit rational thought and to promote action. As 
Bitzer explains, rhetoric is a dialogue leading to an exigency, or an imperfection marked 
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by urgency.xlii Bitzer’s definition alone stands in stark contrast to Andrews’ belief that 
honor and principled arguments would be sufficient in getting men to pick up arms. It is 
entirely necessary that any understanding of the use of rhetoric in the decision to enter 
into conflict should also include an examination of expedient rhetoric.  
 
Chapter Presentation 
This dissertation focuses upon examining the types of rhetoric utilized in the 
discussions presented before going to war. I build upon Andrews’ original study by 
examining three case studies in which one would predominantly expect to find 
arguments concerning honor and commerce dominating the national agenda. Instead, I 
argue that Andrews’ study only explains one small aspect of the larger picture and that 
arguments of expediency are more commonplace than arguments of principle. 
Additionally, I argue that expedient rhetoric is a necessary component for mobilizing 
mass support for a war but, expedient rhetoric is not necessary when arguing for 
inaction. Rather, principled arguments can also serve to motivate audiences toward 
inaction. I demonstrate this argument by showing: 
Chapter II: The popular view of Machiavelli’s The Prince is that a leader should 
do whatever is necessary in order to stay in power. While there is a negative connotation 
generally associated with Machiavellian thought, I argue that this is not the case with 
Machiavelli’s writings. First, I explain that Machiavelli’s writings are found throughout 
the founding of the United States and his writings, coupled with an examination of 
language, shows that he is at least partially responsible for early elements of the 
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American republic. Next, I argue that Machiavelli’s The Prince, the Discourses, and The 
Art of War actually work together to present one central argument of returning Florence 
back to republican rule. I argue that Machiavelli attempts to persuade the Medici about 
the necessity of war through a strategic combination of arguments that show citizen 
militias are necessary for a good army, the idea that virtù can be learned, and argument 
for fortuna to suggest that there is an immediate need to seize an opportunity (war). 
While Machiavelli remains a theoretical example of how language and ideas can be used 
to persuade the elites that war is desirable, can the same language concepts of 
opportunity and immediacy persuade the masses to undertake a war? 
Chapters III and IV: In Chapter III, I examine Jefferson’s Summary View of the 
Rights of British Americans and Paine’s Common Sense. Specifically, I look at the 
rhetoric of Jefferson and Paine and its influence on the American Revolution to show 
that arguments of principle are not enough to rally individuals behind a cause. 
Jefferson’s Summary View relies strictly upon an argument of principle, whereas Paine’s 
Common Sense extends the principled argument and adds an element of expediency. I 
focus upon the expediency of Paine’s rhetoric to show its value in gaining support for 
the American Revolution. 
 In Chapter IV, I further the arguments of expediency and principle from Chapter 
III and examine whether the motivations for a war, whether for the security of a state or 
for future economic and social advantage, require different uses of expedient and 
principled rhetoric. I focus upon the War of 1812 and Madison’s pro-war discourse to 
determine that expedient rhetoric is a necessary factor in a call to arms with Britain.  
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Chapter V: While the previous chapters focus on persuading individuals to 
pursue war, this chapter examines what types of arguments may be used to persuade the 
masses not to go to war. I draw upon the writings of Thoreau to examine the rhetorical 
elements involved with stopping potential conflict. In particular, I look into the 
discourses involved with the Mexican-American War and Civil Disobedience to 
determine the arguments of principle associated with these dialogues. I then compare 
these to Thoreau’s “A Plea for Captain John Brown” as another example of divergent 
rhetorical practices that are used to persuade the audience and affect public opinion 
concerning future conflicts. 
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CHAPTER II 
BREAKING BAD OR: HOW MACHIAVELLI LEARNED TO STOP FEARING THE 
MEDICI AND ADVANCE REPUBLICANISM THROUGH PRO-WAR DISCOURSE 
 
The motivations for going to war are sometimes more numerous than the number 
of battles fought in a skirmish. War can be waged for the procurement or defense of 
territory; solidifying the position of a country within the global arena; or even the 
removal of the political institutions and buildings that once marked the regime of an old 
government. However, these reasons for going to war often overlook the discussion used 
to convince others that war is necessary. Underneath it all, this dissertation focuses upon 
the question of what types of arguments can convince men to take up arms; I examine 
several case studies to determine whether Andrews’ hypothesis that arguments of honor 
are more likely to help spur action. In the context of war, arguments of honor and 
principle are likely to be made without any attention given to specific events and 
outcomes whereas arguments of expediency are more likely to be used when there is a 
specific outcome in mind. I introduce Machiavelli’s writings to show that arguments of 
expediency are used in an attempt to convince others to act and this is an example of 
political thought that is does not seek simply to inform but also to persuade.  
In this chapter, I argue that in the context of 16th century Florence, Niccolò 
Machiavelli, the author of The Prince, Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy, 
and The Art of War, made varied claims as to the role of war in the process of expanding 
and securing an empire. The particular message and intent behind Machiavelli’s corpus 
of political thought is difficult to ascertain, given that each of these writings seems to 
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contain a unique stratagem for achieving political ends that are seemingly unrelated. For 
instance, there is very little interplay between the themes in The Prince and the 
Discourses or The Art of War. However, viewing these pieces through a different lens, 
one can see each as working in concert toward persuading the Medici that there is only 
one course of action, that is going to war and in essence, forcing social change in early 
16th century Florence.  
 The Prince and the Discourses are largely considered to be Machiavelli’s 
definitive texts and form the framework for most of the scholarship about Machiavelli. 
While some studies include a broader swath of Machiavelli’s writings, these other texts 
are rarely given consideration as much more than secondary or anecdotal writings.xliii 
However, these secondary texts may be dismissed too quickly without proper 
consideration being given to the meanings behind Machiavelli’s subject matter. The Art 
of War is one such text that yields a considerable wealth of information about 
Machiavelli’s beliefs and offers a bridge between the seemingly disjointed narratives 
produced by The Prince and the Discourses. I argue that Machiavelli uses The Art of 
War to portray the way in which military service creates a shared identity among the 
citizens and also cultivates republican ideals and civic virtue. This shared identity and 
civic culture among the Florentines would eventually lead to the casting out the Medici 
and returning the government to republican control.  
First, I demonstrate that The Prince, which is usually understood as an effort to 
solidify the power of a regime, instead promotes a doctrine that, if followed, would 
weaken the influence and control of the Medici over Florence. The Prince explains that 
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warfare is the primary means of maintaining and extending military and political power 
and to make these campaigns successful, a prince should rely on a citizen militia.xliv The 
Prince, then, first outlines a method by which the Medici would cede power to the 
citizens; subsequently, the Discourses illustrates that Machiavelli’s primary purpose is 
the prolonged reinstitution of a republican government. The Art of War, then, actually 
serves to show how the citizen armies advocated within The Prince would allow for the 
easy implementation of a republic.xlv The underlying message, in short, demonstrates 
that the population would benefit from advanced training in the military and through this 
service they would be more adept at achieving Machiavelli’s vision of a republican 
government. 
 
A Brief History 
To understand Machiavelli, it is first necessary to note the conditions 
surrounding the Florentine government that influenced his writings. Prior to 
Machiavelli’s birth in 1469, the Medici, a wealthy family involved in the banking 
industry of Europe, gained de facto control of the Republic of Florence.xlvi While 
Florence still retained the title of republic, Lorenzo de’ Medici and family influenced 
and controlled much of the political and economic environment within the state. By 
1490, political unrest had become widespread in Florence because of Lorenzo de’ 
Medici had been “… concentrating all political decision-making in the hands of a small 
clique of followers.”xlvii However, this unrest would not reach critical mass until after 
Lorenzo passed away and Piero de’ Medici succeeded him. In 1494 the King of France, 
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Charles VIII, invaded Italy in hopes of conquering Naples. Upon reaching Florence, the 
French threatened to sack the city unless Florence could provide a considerable tribute. 
Piero decided, without consulting the elites in Florence, that it was in the best interest of 
the state to pay the tribute. Having angered the Florentines by so quickly submitting to 
the French, Piero left Florence and resigned Medicean control of the city.  
The Medicean exit from Florentine political life created a unique opportunity for 
the Florentines to redesign the constitution – a feat that had not been possible since the 
Medici gained de facto control of the city in 1434. Given the corruption and political 
unrest that abounded during the reign of Lorenzo and later, Piero, the Florentines 
attempted to create political representation that would afford the denizens the 
opportunity to influence their own political affairs. The result of this redefined 
constitution was an increase in the size of assemblies for the state and a greater degree of 
inclusion for citizens who were previously frozen out of government service. It was 
during this period that the relatively unknown Niccolò Machiavelli was first appointed 
as head of the Florentine Second Chancery and then as secretary to the Ten on Peace and 
Liberty. 
In 1495, Pisa revolted from Florentine rule, and Machiavelli’s appointment as 
head of the Second Chancery and secretary for the Ten of Peace and Liberty (the Ten) in 
1498 coincided with Florence’s attempts to reconquer the land. Machiavelli’s new duties 
placed him in charge of governing the military, managing the internal affairs of the state, 
and being secretary to the group that would define Florence’s role in the war. 
Machiavelli was immediately thrust into a position that would force him to navigate 
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between Florence’s refusal to pay for a quality military and the need to successfully 
resolve the war with Pisa. In 1503, the initial answer to this conundrum would be to hire 
mercenaries to fight as the main contingent for Florence backed by conscripts from the 
rural lands outside the city. However, this particular formula resulted in the mercenary 
troops contributing to a defeat for Florence and led to Machiavelli spearheading an effort 
to raise a militia as the primary military force. In 1505, Machiavelli received the 
authorization to form a militia and gained the new title of Secretary of the Nine of 
Militia. 
After several years of raising and training troops, Machiavelli’s stalwart support 
and reliance of the militia proved to be a tremendous success and resulted in the fall of 
Pisa in June 1509. After the battle, Machiavelli was placed in charge of maintaining and 
building the militia as the focus of the Florentine forces changed from conquest to the 
defense of its territory. This confidence in the capabilities of the militia would remain 
one of Machiavelli’s primary approaches to conscripting an armed force, even after 
suffering defeat. In 1512, the Spanish who were aligned with the Medici attacked 
Florence. Machiavelli’s 12,000 militiamen were unable to repel the trained regular army 
of the Spanish and the Medici were once again in control of Florentine affairs.  
 
Republicanism and Rhetoric  
After being accused of plotting against the Medici and being exiled from 
Florence in 1512–1513, Machiavelli wrote The Prince as a blueprint for a new ruler 
properly to gain and maintain control of a territory that had once been a republic. It is 
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difficult to ascertain the motivations for Machiavelli’s authoring of The Prince so 
quickly after his exile; however, Machiavelli claimed that the primary importance of The 
Prince is to serve as a “token of devotion” to Lorenzo de’ Medici.xlviii If a prince were to 
follow the instructions contained therein, it would be possible for the Medici family to 
rule Florence without opposition and obtain great honor. However, if one considers the 
contents or intent of The Prince in a different light, it is difficult to believe that 
Machiavelli did not have at least one ulterior motive.  
As Machiavelli writes in the introduction, if Lorenzo were to observe 
Machiavelli’s current living conditions, then it would be easily ascertained “how much I 
am unjustly oppressed by great and cruel misfortune.”xlix As Machiavelli’s misfortune 
was the result of being accused of conspiring against the Medici, this “token of 
devotion” signals that Machiavelli holds no ill will toward the ruling family and that he 
would be willing to serve in another capacity within this regime. The Prince shows a 
considerable amount of knowledge about how to rule a principality. If his book were 
well received, then the odds of receiving a future appointment within the regime would 
be greatly increased. However, this literal interpretation of The Prince assumes that this 
one writing is an anomaly in Machiavelli’s corpus and that he had temporarily 
abandoned hope of Florence returning to republican rule.  
A competing interpretation of The Prince is that Machiavelli accepts that 
Florence would not quickly return to republican rule, and thus Machiavelli wrote this 
text in hopes of gaining the most advantage, including employment or political favor, 
from the prevailing circumstances. As Garver notes, because Machiavelli failed to 
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distribute widely the contents of The Prince to the public, there was less likelihood that 
the text would gain Machiavelli any benefit if Lorenzo de’ Medici failed to view or act 
upon the contents of the text.l Garver further explains that if The Prince had been widely 
released, then the public would understand the motivations of the prince and that every 
action was meant to control the changing circumstances surrounding that government. 
The public would understand that the prince’s broken promises and the lack of 
compassion were not meant to be the actions of a vicious prince but were instead 
necessary to control the political environment. This mutual understanding between the 
prince and the public would help to create a glorious society based upon the mutual 
understanding that a seemingly harsh rule would sometimes be necessary. This particular 
explanation, however, relies too heavily on the interpretation that the Medici would 
desire to reach a mutual understanding with their subjects and eventually a republican 
government would be possible under Medici rule.li Garver links The Prince to the 
Discourses by explaining that Machiavelli believes the rule of the Medici would 
eventually return to republican rule given time, but this approach severely 
misunderstands Machiavelli’s desire for republican government via the Discourses and 
underestimates the nature of political power under the Medici. Given Machiavelli’s 
desire for republican rule and predilection for subterfuge, it is difficult to believe that 
Machiavelli wrote The Prince and the Discourses under the belief that the Medici would 
simply surrender their political power. 
Of the arguments suggesting that The Prince is written with pro-republican 
tendencies, one of the most notable examples is a few simple lines from Rousseau’s 
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Social Contract that claim “[Machiavelli] professed to teach kings; but it was the people 
he really taught. His Prince is the book of Republicans.”lii Rousseau includes a footnote 
explaining that the choice of historical figures used in the work as well as Machiavelli’s 
status as an enemy of the Medici clearly shows that the intent of the work is to educate 
republicans while placating the Medici.liii This understanding, however, does little more 
than to say that Machiavelli’s historical allusions could purposely be flawed and that if 
the Medici followed the document in its entirety, then a form of republican government 
may somehow emerge. Rousseau’s assertion fails to capture the true intent of 
Machiavelli, which is turning Florence into a republican government through military 
service and trapping the prince, especially when considering the later Discourses and 
The Art of War.  
Other scholars contend that The Prince was less a political tract and more a 
literary “tell-all” that would serve to warn the masses of the horrors the Medici would 
impose upon society.liv These previous republican approaches fall short of Machiavelli’s 
intent. The Prince was written for the Medici and therefore it would be highly unlikely 
that the public would ever obtain a copy of the text. Instead, it would be more helpful to 
revisit The Prince as a text containing advice for the Medici about the most effective 
ways to rule a newly acquired state. However, this advice is designed to lay the 
groundwork for a return to republican form of government.  
One last line of research contends that Machiavelli was attempting to trap the 
Medici by giving flawed advice to Lorenzo. Dietz argues that Machiavelli knowingly 
disseminated information that suggested the prince could not take the weapons of the 
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people and this, along with poor behavior from the prince, would lead to an insurrection 
against the Medici.lv This viewpoint fits closer to my central argument in this chapter, 
but with a different interpretation of the manner in which Machiavelli is intending to 
overthrow the Medici and reinstate Florentine republicanism. I contend that Machiavelli 
uses The Prince as a means of genuflecting to Lorenzo de Medici and of convincing him 
that war is a necessary component of maintaining and increasing the power of a 
government. If war is necessary, then the inclusion of one’s own citizens in an army is 
the only way to guarantee that a principality does not expose itself to the threat of 
foreign troops. Knowing that these armies would consist of Florence’s own soldiers, 
Machiavelli uses the language of virtù and fortune to explain that wars should be fought 
by seizing the immediate advantage and that this process can be learned by any 
individual. Throughout the Discourses and The Art of War, we see the expansion of 
Machiavelli’s plan to allow Florence to revert back to a republican form of government. 
The military with The Art of War serves as a metaphor for the masses within a republic. 
Machiavelli argues that military commanders should instill civic values into their 
soldiers and should seek to create laws and order that would be conducive to reacting to 
the challenges of facing a state.  
The literature concerning Machiavelli’s writings systematically makes use of the 
pro-republican language and ideas that are present in The Prince and permeate the later 
political tracts. Throughout this modern scholarship, there is the attempt to reconcile the 
perceived intent of The Prince with Machiavelli’s later works, with particular attention 
given to discerning whether The Prince was written with expedience or as political 
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philosophy. As Pocock notes, there is an inherent difference between rhetoric and 
philosophy. Machiavelli’s work, while addressed to a specific moment, takes a largely 
philosophical approach to understanding broader issues affecting government.lvi 
However, Pocock’s particular view fails to imagine, as Viroli explains that, “through 
history, rhetoric can attain results that reason alone would never be able to.”lvii So while 
Pocock views The Prince as mainly a history-centered philosophical work, Viroli argues 
that it is a combination of history and rhetoric that allowed Machiavelli “… to persuade 
an audience or a readership – that is, to win their support – but also to persuade or impel 
the addressees of his speech or text actually to put his advice into practice.”lviii As Viroli 
assumes that Machiavelli’s works necessarily focus on expedient political action, Garver 
suggests that The Prince actually succeeds because the work forces individuals to 
consider the consequences of political action and requires the audience to determine the 
appropriate course of action for a principality.lix Garver treats The Prince as a meta-
narrative that is fully aware that the arguments contained therein may extend further than 
just the “princely reader.” Kahn utilizes a similar approach, asserting that Machiavelli’s 
use of rhetoric forces the reader to recognize and engage in the issues that a prince 
would likely face in a principality.lx Looking past the immediate issue of “how to 
maintain power,” Kahn demonstrates that Machiavelli’s rhetoric alone indicates a strong 
preference for republics over principalities. If these rhetorical approaches to The Prince 
illustrate such a commitment to one form of government over another, then how does 
Machiavelli’s rhetoric signal his pro-republican preference?  
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When approaching The Prince, it is important to note that Machiavelli focuses 
upon the outcome of an action as its justification. For Machiavelli, it was possible to be 
virtuous and moral in the private realm but actions concerning the formation and 
maintenance of the state are amoral. The actions of a prince could then “… involve a 
conflict between private morality and political expediency.”lxi By ascribing to the prince 
the moral latitude to combat any exigencies, Machiavelli is able to dictate a precise 
distinction between the view of honor and glory associated with a western Christian 
belief system and the view of doing everything necessary to maintain authority and 
stability. As Remer notes, Machiavelli’s rhetorical approach ignores his contemporary 
community’s view of honor and glory as being a fundamental aspect of a western 
Christian belief system and instead establishes a rhetorical dimension that cannot be 
judged by the standards of his contemporary community.lxii With order and stability 
being the fundamental goals of a society, Machiavelli is able to advocate a government 
system that emphasizes order over honor and glory. 
Within the context of Florence and a tumultuous political environment, 
Machiavelli declares that a principality would help foster a politically stable society and 
would therefore be the most advantageous form of government. However, this system 
remains dangerous because an overly subjugated or even a restless public coupled with a 
conspiring elite would be willing to overthrow a prince in retaliation for tyrannical 
acts.lxiii The elite need not be enemies of the prince because those held in close 
confidence would also be likely to attempt to redefine the balance of power within an 
empire.lxiv If a disgruntled public exists, then the conspirators in the cause of rebellion 
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could enlist these individuals.lxv Machiavelli writes, “For men are much more interested 
in present things than in those that are past, and if they find that their affairs are 
flourishing, they are content and do not seek changes,” thus suggesting that a well-
treated public would likely withstand the initial spark of rebellion and minor injustices 
would not set off the public passions.lxvi While emphasizing that there exists an absolute 
dominion over the subjects in a territory, The Prince requires that the public should be 
kept in favorable conditions lest they be exploited in the cause of overthrowing the 
prince.  
  This emphasis on creating a favorable environment for the population stands in 
contrast to the advice Machiavelli gives concerning whether it is better to be loved or 
feared by a public. Using love as a means of controlling the population would create a 
public that would “shed their blood for you… offer their possessions, their lives, and 
their sons” but this public would just as soon throw off the chains of bondage whenever 
it suited the cause of liberty.lxvii Using fear as the predominate method of controlling the 
population creates a unique difficulty as well because fear can lead to hatred which 
would in turn lead to insurrection. Given the belief that a principality would be better 
able to provide order and control, Machiavelli cautions that the public can be an 
unreliable and unstable variable in an empire. Thus there arises the question of what 
form of government best suits the maintenance and growth of an empire. If the end goal 
is to create the best form of government, then it becomes necessary to examine whether 
republics or principalities create the most prosperity for the people.  
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 Machiavelli alludes to a principality as being dangerous for stability because of 
the difficulties of subjugating the people while maintaining control. However, in the 
Discourses we learn that Machiavelli favors a Roman form of republican government. 
As Roebuck explains, “… although [Machiavelli] does not conceive of the question so 
explicitly, [he] gives his preference to a Republic and his emphasis to the preservation of 
states. We might conclude that the Prince represents the act of foundation of the state, 
while the Discourses treat not only of foundation, but of growth and maintenance.”lxviii If 
we are to believe that Machiavelli did not reach this conclusion immediately after 
penning The Prince, then perhaps the original intent of this work is to find a means of 
transforming the rule of the Medici into the previously practiced republican rule in 
Florence or even the Roman model of republican government. Indeed, Machiavelli 
addresses the Medici in the last chapter of The Prince to explain that Italy lacks a central 
authority that would be wiling to follow the prescriptions of The Prince and to use this 
advice to reinstate Florence back to a state of glory. As Machiavelli explains, “… in 
order for the valour [sic] and worth of an Italian spirit to be recognized, Italy had to be 
reduced to the desperate straits in which it now finds itself… Again, see how ready and 
willing she is to rally to a standard, if only there is someone to lead the way.”lxix The 
question remains: how does Machiavelli intend the advice in The Prince to lead Italy 
back into this state of “valour and worth of an Italian spirit?” Undoubtedly, Machiavelli 
defines the successful ruler as an individual that would attempt to conquer new 
territories and expand the empire. If the Medici had read The Prince and were persuaded 
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by the advice contained therein, then this final chapter serves to goad the Medici into 
action.  
 
Advocating Action 
 Typically the act of warfare in a democratic nation involves persuading the 
masses that warfare is necessary. Because early 16th century Florence was ruled by the 
Medici, convincing the masses was not a necessary condition for going to war, as the 
Medici would make the final decision. But could the Medici be persuaded to go to war? 
In this chapter, I examine the rhetorical arguments Machiavelli uses to convince the 
Medici that war is necessary.  Further, I explore the outcome Machiavelli hopes to 
achieve by involving the Medici in conflict.  
 On its face, The Prince prescribes the ways in which a ruler might gain and 
maintain power within a new territory. As Machiavelli explains, “Wanting to annex 
territory is indeed very natural and normal, and when capable men undertake it, they are 
always praised or, at least, not criticized.”lxx Further, the annexation of territory is 
necessary because the strength of principalities should be determined on the basis of 
whether  “… a ruler has sufficient territory and power to defend himself, when this is 
necessary, or whether he will always need some help from others.”lxxi Therefore the 
prince should attempt to acquire more territory because this would lead to the acquisition 
of more power and also the ability to protect his territory from external threats. 
However, there exists a genuine conundrum in that while acquiring larger amounts of 
land would give the prince access to the resources needed for external protection, the 
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internal stability of the empire is more at risk of insurrection and rebellion. Machiavelli 
seemingly solves this issue by declaring that the new subjects within a conquered 
principality should be granted some degree of autonomy and liberty so that they would 
be less likely to reject the prince.  
 But there also exists another purpose for Machiavelli to advocate an expansionist 
policy for statecraft.lxxii He writes that an army is a necessary component of a successful 
principality because “… any principality that does not have its own army cannot be 
secure; rather, it must rely completely on luck or the favor of others, because it lacks the 
strength to defend itself in difficult times.”lxxiii Moreover, he argues “the main 
foundations of all states (whether they are new, old or mixed) are good laws and good 
armies.”lxxiv This idea of a “good army” may be characterized as the most 
technologically and tactically adept armed force, but Machiavelli does not believe that 
military prowess is a sufficient condition for a good army. Instead, Machiavelli discerns 
the differences between the membership of different military units and explains that the 
most appropriate and thus the strongest army for a state is one whose membership 
consists of a state’s own citizens. If a prince relies upon a military not composed of his 
own citizens, then the results can be more disastrous than not having the ability to 
defend itself. As Machiavelli explains, “… [A]uxiliaries can be capable and effective but 
they are almost always harmful to those who use them; for if they lose you will be 
ruined, and if they win you will be at their mercy … Wise rulers … form armies 
composed of their own men… for they do not consider a victory that is gained by using 
foreign forces to be genuine.”lxxv Armies that use their own citizens are more adept at 
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policing their own members and bolstering the reputation of the state because there is 
one common objective (the defense of the state). Without needing to worry about 
allegiances or ulterior motives, a prince could trust that his army would protect the 
principality. Machiavelli uses these reasons as a justification for not only selling the idea 
of warfare to the Medici, but also for filling the ranks of a military with the subjects of a 
principality. 
Machiavelli believes that war is necessary as a means of strengthening an empire. 
But there exists an added benefit of using one’s own citizens as the soldiers in an army. 
Knowing that these citizens are generally not well equipped or even capable of defense, 
Machiavelli realizes that such individuals must first be trained and, most of all, trusted to 
obey the rules and regulations set forth by the families in power and the military. Once 
any campaign is finished, however, these citizen soldiers do not simply forget the 
training that they have undergone, instead, they resume their primary role as citizens 
with the knowledge of how to defend the empire. As Hörnqvist writes about The Art of 
War, “Arms are now in the hands of citizens, but more important still is the fact that they 
are commanded and directed by the republic and its leaders. Such arms can be used in 
the defense of republican liberty and the pursuit of imperial greatness. Without them 
there can be no sovereignty.”lxxvi Once Machiavelli has demonstrated that there exists a 
reason to enlist citizens as the soldiers charged with protecting the principality, he must 
find a way to convince the prince that war is a necessary and that victory is obtainable 
given the right combination of capability and luck.  
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While the traditional view of war is that the outcome is decided by a combination 
of fortune and skill, Machiavelli alters this perception in hopes of convincing the prince 
to take action. Machiavelli relies on personifying fortune as a woman and suggests that 
these forces can be mastered by anyone with skill and the right degree of 
impetuousness.lxxvii These feminine attributes reinforce the belief that an adept leader 
would be able to overcome the fickleness of chance and that preparation and skill are the 
more decisive factors in a battle. Fortune is not completely discounted, however, as 
Machiavelli establishes a hierarchy that acknowledges that fortune is responsible for the 
results of some campaigns, “Nevertheless, rulers maintain themselves better if they owe 
little to luck.”lxxviii So while republics and principalities may owe some degree of success 
to fortune, Machiavelli believes that fortune would still favor those individuals “… of 
much spirit and much virtù, that he will recognize those opportunities [fortune] 
offers…”lxxix This minimization of fortune suggests that the result of a battle is not 
decided by happenstance alone and that skill plays a larger role in determining 
success.lxxx 
By creating the narrative of fortuna being easily overcome by virtù, Machiavelli 
reinforces the view that order, skill, and preparation are the necessary conditions to 
overcome political turmoil and the circumstances of war. Any successful leader would 
benefit his rule by focusing on cultivating virtù within his society.lxxxi But as Wood 
suggests, the state of an undisciplined Medicean military suffered from “… a decline of 
military discipline and organization, and a decrease in virtù. In fact, Machiavelli 
concludes that so little virtù remains, that fortuna now governs the affairs of men.”lxxxii 
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Because virtù could be learned and effectively limit the influence of fortuna, the prince 
would have an interest in composing a well-trained military that would simultaneously 
secure the principality and benefit military conquests. Given Machiavelli’s penchant for 
a strong militia over the use of reserves and auxiliary forces, the focus on virtù translates 
into the training of citizens for military service. This process of training and educating 
the population would prime the citizenry for an eventual leadership role within a 
republic. As Hörnqvist explains, “… Machiavelli transforms tyranny from being a 
destructive force that runs against and threatens to dissolve the other constitutional 
elements, into a dynamic, creative, and expansive power . . . and places [the tyrant] in 
the service of the republic.”lxxxiii 
 
A Simple Plan 
 
 While Machiavelli’s strong republican leanings are well documented throughout 
the Discourses and can be assumed from arguments regarding The Prince, the discussion 
of types of government is largely missing from analyses of The Art of War. With this 
missing prescription for government, The Art of War appears to be nothing more than a 
flawed field guide for combat instructors or the fanciful delusions of a man once tasked 
with organizing the Florentine militia. However, if we assume that Machiavelli wrote 
The Prince as a means of convincing the Medici that warfare was necessary to expand a 
regime, and that Machiavelli would write a text with an ulterior motive in mind, then it 
is all too possible that The Art of War should be viewed with the same raptness and 
attention to detail as these other two works.  
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 As a field guide, The Art of War demonstrates Machiavelli’s considerable 
knowledge about the process of selecting troops, the training each unit should receive, 
the encampment processes, as well as what types of units should comprise an army. 
Viewing The Art of War as an independent text within Machiavelli’s corpus, Lynch 
argues that The Art of War serves to destabilize the influence of Christianity within the 
early 16th century military.lxxxiv This particular view relies too heavily on the belief that 
Machiavelli’s works were each written for a particular time and place and that the intent 
of the writings is too specific to lend themselves to a larger view of politics, government, 
or the world. Regent approaches Machiavelli more holistically and argues that The Art of 
War represents the end piece to a larger belief that a search for virtù and military 
expansion will eventually lead to the ruin of civilization. Instead of ever reaching an 
idealized society, Machiavelli’s The Art of War is the admission that the ends will never 
justify the means and instead a civilization should find contentment in the process of 
working toward a republican government.lxxxv 
 Perhaps the most complete analysis of The Art of War is given by Hörnqvist, who 
looks at themes presented throughout The Prince, the Discourses, and The Art of War. 
Hörnqvist argues that Machiavelli wrote the Discourses with the expectation that a 
proper army would be composed of civic-mind citizen-soldiers that would “…be 
expected to use their arms not to fight each other or to compete for power within the 
republic, but to contribute to its expansion and territorial growth by seeking glory 
beyond its borders.”lxxxvi Military glory, while not traditionally categorized as a virtù 
throughout The Prince or the Discourses, fits into Wood’s argument that the nature of 
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Machiavelli’s virtù corresponds to the changing political and social atmosphere.lxxxvii 
Hörnqvist’s analysis focuses on how Machiavelli’s Discourses would create the 
idealized republic through the use of citizen-soldiers. Hörnqvist’s treatment of The Art of 
War merely contends that Machiavelli is trying to portray himself as a pragmatic 
military expert. This analysis of The Art of War holds promise if Hörnqvist would 
further flesh out the argument of The Prince, the Discourses, and then The Art of War as 
being the realization of the society Machiavelli wishes for in the Discourses. In my 
view, the conquest advocated in The Prince and the military relationships described 
within the Discourses create a common bond between the members of the military and 
the state itself. If the military society from The Art of War is created, then the members 
of the military are unified through the common goal of attaining virtù, and the resulting 
relationship between the soldiers and the state also changes. The inclusion of military 
glory as virtù serves to personalize conquest and to change the reasons for why a soldier 
would fight. No longer is the command of the prince enough to require blind obedience, 
but instead, each soldier works toward a personal goal of virtù as found in military glory. 
This changing dynamic between a prince and the military would guarantee a gradual 
shift from a principality to a republican form of government and as Machiavelli explains, 
“There will always be a greater number of excellent men in republics than in monarchies 
because virtù is generally honored in the former, but feared in the latter…”lxxxviii  
For Machiavelli, a member of the militia could be expected to serve during times 
of battle but also during times of peace. As a failure in design, The Art of War fails to 
differentiate between the role of the citizen and the role of the soldier. As a way of 
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determining whether the public could or should be armed to form a militia, Machiavelli 
writes “…for it is certain, that no subjects or citizens, when legally armed and kept in 
due order by their masters, ever did the least mischief to any state.”lxxxix Machiavelli 
believes that the individuals could be armed during peacetime and during battle, but at 
all times, the commanding officer would be tasked with keeping this armed population 
under control. If there is no clear distinction between what constitutes a member of the 
society serving in a militia or generally being armed, then perhaps Machiavelli does not 
believe that these soldiers would ever leave their posts and would always remain as 
soldiers. Another possibility is that a citizen, once having been trained to serve in the 
militia, is imbued with a responsibility to always act for the best interests of society and 
that all citizens would be similarly required to act in this same fashion. As Pocock 
argues, “… Machiavelli is employing the concept of armed virtù to transform the 
question of the participation of the many in citizenship. The usual way of defending a 
governo largo was to assert that the many were peaceable… [and] had common sense 
enough to reject what was not for their own good and moral sagacity enough to elect and 
defer to their natural superiors in the civic elite.”xc  The individuals who chose to 
become part of the military were given more responsibilities to protect the rest of the 
population but also maintained the primary role of citizen. Citizens and soldiers then, 
have the same responsibility to the society to maintain order and follow the laws that 
limit harm. If The Art of War lacked applicability to a republic then there would be very 
little discussion about how a citizen-soldier would be expected to act when not on the 
battlefield.  
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While The Art of War contains advice about militaries, the prescriptions 
contained therein apply to republics much in the same way as many of the 
recommendations in The Prince apply equally as well to republics. Machiavelli notes 
that both republics and principalities require laws and arms because: “The main 
foundations of all states… are good laws and good armies.”xci As Machiavelli dispels the 
belief that a republic would require any less order than a principality, there is an inherent 
need for a prince or a republic to limit transgressions against the rest of the 
population.xcii A militia would require the same amount of order and discipline 
regardless of whether the troops were on the battlefield or serving as a peacetime 
contingent tasked with protection. Machiavelli takes particular care to blur the lines 
between the soldiers on the battlefield and soldiers serving within the confines of a 
republic by requiring commanding officers to discipline troops regardless of their duty 
station.xciii Furthering this idea of order, throughout The Art of War Machiavelli warns 
that the only way to achieve continued success is through providing discipline for the 
soldiers. Using the battlefield to show the uncertainty that exists in both war and in the 
political world, Machiavelli explains, “…a good infantry must able not only to withstand 
cavalry but also to confront any other sort of infantry fearlessly; and this, as I have often 
said before, must be entirely a result of their discipline and arms.”xciv As discipline and 
arms make an army more likely to respond favorably to any possible threat against a 
state, Machiavelli argues that “… a republic, being able to adapt herself, by means of the 
diversity among her body of citizens, to a diversity of temporal conditions better than a 
prince can, is of greater duration than a princedom and has good fortune longer.”xcv 
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Although the Discourses relates that republics are better able to adapt to changing 
circumstances because there are numerous individuals in charge, there is also the 
requisite that these numerous individuals must maintain a disciplined position that 
allows for the recognition of the changing environment.xcvi  
Machiavelli contends that commanding officers are the lifeline of the military by 
serving in various capacities. These officers are tasked with providing council to the 
general and with training and preparing the military to fight, but the most important part 
of this relationship is that commanders serve to mitigate the whimsical and hedonistic 
nature of the troops. Machiavelli characterizes officers as the general overseers of the 
soldiers that would have intimate knowledge of troop morale as well as the capabilities 
of their forces and enemy forces as well.xcvii This close proximity to the troops grants the 
commander the ability to control against the primal instincts of soldiers while on the 
field of battle. As Machiavelli warns, soldiers will typically become so fixated on the 
immediate gratification of claiming the spoils of war that many commanders have had 
their victories lost in the waning moments of the battle.xcviii However, the Romans were 
able to overcome this greed by relying upon a system where “a certain proportion of [the 
spoils] was given to the soldiers according to their rank and merit. This custom made 
them more intent upon victory than plunder.”xcix These officers guarantee that their 
soldiers are in place to control not only the actions of their soldiers but also to dole out 
necessary punishments and rewards. 
The Art of War concludes that officers are necessary to overcome the fog of war. 
While soldiers are consistently given training and drills to automate their responses to 
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changing circumstances, the confusion that comes from a heated battle is normally 
enough to override training and there exists the need to relay orders that allow the troops 
to act quickly, decisively, and serve to limit mistakes.c The fog of war is enough to limit 
rational thought and order is meant to ensure that the training is not forgotten because 
“…good order makes men bold; confusion makes them cowardly.”ci  
Machiavelli suggests that music is the appropriate means to deliver messages 
during combat because music “…is a direction to the whole army which acts and moves 
in a certain measure and pace according to the different notes and sounds so that the 
army may know how to keep due time and order… so an army properly observing the 
beat of its drums cannot be easily disordered…”cii The introduction of music in the heat 
of battle is instrumental in determining Machiavelli’s ulterior motives concerning The 
Art of War. Music is a symbol of civilization and rational thought and Machiavelli 
makes several references throughout The Art of War about the importance of music to 
maintain discipline. While music does serve to signal the orders of the general, its 
secondary importance is that the soldiers would be transported from a mindless state of 
battle back into the realm of civilized and rational thought. These commanders are 
responsible for delivering their soldiers from a pre-civilized position–the act of war– 
back to a mass of soldiers that are capable of understanding intricate battle plans. The 
Art of War suggests that soldiers should not be treated as mindless mobs or the minions 
of a commanding officer. Instead, the soldiers are able to comprehend information and 
are able to return to a state of rational thought even amongst chaos. 
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As Machiavelli finds it necessary to convince the Medici that a military should 
rely upon a militia rather than auxiliary armies or mercenaries, it is also necessary to 
convince the citizens that a republic is attainable. For this argument, Machiavelli 
surmises that commanders must not only be capable leaders but should also be capable 
of convincing their soldiers about a particular course of action. As Machiavelli writes, 
“It is an easy matter to induce a few people either to do or not to do a thing, for if 
arguments are not sufficient, you may use force and authority; but the great difficulty 
lies in making a whole army change its resolution… For this reason, it is necessary that a 
general should be an orator as well as a soldier; he will sometimes find it no easy task to 
mold it to his purposes.”ciii This general does not rely solely upon arms or discipline to 
convince the army of the necessity of a particular action. Instead, a rousing speech is 
required to convince soldiers to act on orders and this requirement seems counter to the 
normal operations of well-disciplined militaries. From this, it seems entirely plausible 
that Machiavelli is not addressing the rank and file nature of the military and is instead 
addressing an entirely different scenario, the argumentation and address found within a 
republican assembly. 
If The Art of War is a pro-republican piece, perhaps no line of argument more 
clearly illustrates Machiavelli’s preference for the multitude than his negative treatment 
of elite units and his insistence that a militia should rely most heavily upon infantry. The 
Discourses and The Art of War detail the composition of an ideal military and advance 
the argument that infantry should be held in higher regard than elite units such as cavalry 
or artillery. The infantry, which is the most populated of all units, symbolizes the masses 
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within a republic and emphasizes how training provides the appropriate response in the 
face of adversity, whether it is on the battlefield or within a town square. The obedience 
of the soldier to the commanding officer portrays the same relationship that a common 
citizen should have to his representative because both guarantee fair and equal treatment 
for the individual in relation to achieving the best possible good for the masses. 
Machiavelli underplays the advantages of the artillery and the cavalry as elite units by 
emphasizing that well-trained pike men can repel cavalry and that artillery quickly loses 
its effectiveness if the common soldier shapes the terrain to his own advantage.civ This 
anti-cavalry and anti-artillery position mimics Machiavelli’s position against elites being 
self-interested and often at odds with what is best for the whole population.cv The 
artillery and cavalry seek glory for their own units rather than focusing on merely being 
part of the whole.  
While military units are often trained separately to maximize their potential and 
role within an army, Machiavelli argues that specialized units provide a limited utility 
and should be avoided. Cavalry and artillery slow the advancement of the regular 
military by requiring special treatment, provisions, and considerations while in battle. 
These forces may turn the tide of a battle but Machiavelli clearly believes that the virtù 
of a common soldier makes a larger determination of success. If the prescriptions for 
Machiavelli’s citizen militia were followed, then the regular infantryman would have a 
vested interest in the outcome of a contest because a defeat would mean a possible loss 
to their own land or government. These soldiers, then, the citizens, would be willing to 
pursue military success through cleverness and hard work. Machiavelli notes that the 
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digging of trenches or perseverance in battle are often determinants of success and these 
common soldiers would be the most willing to do whatever is necessary to secure a 
victory. If we extend this idea to Machiavelli’s republic then these common soldiers and 
citizens would be willing to do whatever is necessary to guarantee success of their 
government. Machiavelli believes that empowering the masses through military training 
would lead to an increase in civic virtue and this is the impetus behind The Art of War.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 If the foundations of all states are “good laws and good armies,” then The Art of 
War clearly focuses upon the requirement for good armies as a means to ensure good 
laws.cvi Much of The Art of War appears to be focused solely on the best methods of 
training an army and conducting warfare. However, there exists an underlying theme 
that Machiavelli believes that modeling a republic after the military would be the best 
means of unifying a state. To achieve an idealized society, Machiavelli does not 
prescribe a military government or even compulsory military service. Instead, The Art of 
War through its advocacy of citizen militias acts as an inherently expedient text that 
reiterates the advice of The Prince: the outcomes of campaigns are decided by a lot of 
training and a little luck.  
While Machiavelli’s intentions behind The Prince have been obscured because of 
political necessity, it is not all too difficult to posit that Machiavelli’s writings are an 
attempt at persuasion. From The Prince, the Discourses, and The Art of War, we find 
that warfare can masquerade as a means to elicit social and political change in a closed 
society. While Florence was under Medicean rule, Machiavelli found it politically 
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necessary to craft subtle arguments that would undermine the existing government and 
pave the path to a return of republican government. Machiavelli focused upon 
persuading the Medici, however, this is only one facet of his entire plan. Machiavelli 
alludes to citizen militias, skill, and fortune to create a narrative that should persuade the 
Medici that the outcome of a battle is contingent solely on the factor of which army is 
more prepared. This rhetoric used upon the Medici can easily be applied to the citizens 
of any country and it holds an almost universal appeal in its realization and application 
as Machiavelli’s “advice” about maintaining and centralizing political power certainly 
applies to governments far beyond Florence. In the next few chapters, I analyze whether 
expedient or principled rhetoric is more commonly used in arguments concerning war in 
the tradition of American political thought.cvii  
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drum beat or by the sound of a trumpet, it should be done in so distinct a manner that 
one note or sound cannot be mistaken for another…” 
ci Ibid. II, 61. 
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University Press, 1978), Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1981) and J.G.A. Pocock’s The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
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security in The Prince and then liberty in the Discourses (Foundations, 156) and 
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John Harper, American Machiavelli: Alexander Hamilton and the Origins of U.S. 
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McCormick, “Machiavellian Democracy: Controlling Elites with Ferocious Populism,” 
American Political Science Review 95 (2001): 297-313. McCormick argues that the 
institutional design of the American government perpetuates class inequalities that 
would create conflict between the lower classes and the elites. This process might allow 
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controlling themselves.  
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CHAPTER III 
REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC FOR LOCKEAN LIBERALS: JEFFERSON AND 
PAINE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 
 
The preceding chapter argues that Machiavelli used the narrative of fortuna and 
virtù as a means to persuade the Medici that war was necessary. While Machiavelli used 
the idea of virtù to show that victory was attainable in conflict, it is the use of fortuna 
that conveys an arguments of expediency by emphasizing there is an immediate need to 
go to war. While Machiavelli remains a theoretical example of how language and ideas 
can be used to persuade the elites that war is desirable, can the same language concepts 
of opportunity and immediacy persuade “men to take up arms?” This chapter as well as 
the two remaining chapters are case studies that illuminate the intersection of rhetoric 
and political theory to answer the question of whether early American arguments relied 
upon appeals to honor and principle rather than using arguments of expediency in the 
attempt to persuade the people to take up arms. In these cases, it is important to note that 
the particular arguments used are less important than the way in which these arguments 
are conveyed. From a Pocockian perspective, we should study political languages, the 
modes of discourse available to people discussing political affairs in particular times and 
places in order to understand the full intent of the written word.cviii This chapter 
illustrates that two individuals, writing in roughly the same time period and from the 
same tradition, are able to reach vastly different results with the manipulation of 
language. 
Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine have long been counted among the founders 
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of American political thought because the principles of their arguments support a liberal 
interpretation of the rights of man and the government’s duty to protect these rights. 
These authors rely upon an understanding of the Lockean conception of liberty that 
ultimately leads to the default position that revolution may be necessary.  First, I look at 
Locke’s Second Treatise of Government to explore the justifications for revolution 
through the liberal tradition and then I explore the ways in which Jefferson and Paine 
utilize these arguments to create a social narrative with which the colonists can identify. 
From this point, I argue that principled arguments alone, however, were necessary but 
not sufficient for the project of independence. In this chapter, I argue that the rhetoric 
used during the years immediately prior to the Revolution greatly aided in its realization. 
The work of Jefferson and Paine reveal the divergent rhetorical strategies each employed 
in their arguments supporting a war for independence. I argue that for the American 
Revolution, Jefferson’s use of the Lockean conception of natural rights in A Summary 
View of the Rights of British America serves to justify and appeal for action, but is never 
the impetus for the revolution. Instead, the argument of natural rights coupled with an 
explicit revolutionary rhetorical pragmatism found in Paine’s Common Sense serves to 
create an atmosphere conducive to spurring a rebellion. 
The rhetorical significance of these two early American revolutionary documents 
can be easily overlooked. For Jefferson, the Summary View is often considered only as a 
precursor to the Declaration of Independence and not as a significant work within early 
revolutionary rhetoric. However, “[in] contrast to earlier colonial statements of […] 
rights, the Summary View put much less emphasis on the painful details and dangerous 
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implications of parliamentary efforts to tax the colonies, and deal[s] primarily with the 
constitutional and philosophical issues” concerning the rights of British Americans.cix 
Contrary to Jefferson, Paine does not rely upon a strictly constitutional interpretation of 
parliamentary law but instead gives birth to a continental identity in Common Sense. As 
Lucas writes, “[Common Sense] contributed to the creation of a store of public 
arguments that could be used to rationalize a decision for independence if and when such 
a decision was forced upon them.”cx But Common Sense was not only a store place for 
arguments about independence, for within this tract existed the expression of colonial 
frustrations over Britain and the ability to unify the public. As Foner describes,  
Common Sense did express ideas which had long circulated in the 
colonies–the separateness of America from Europe, the corruption of the 
Old World and innocence of the New, the absurdity of hereditary privilege 
and the possibility of a future American empire. None of these ideas was 
original with Paine. What was brilliantly innovative was the way Paine 
combined them into a single comprehensive argument and related them to 
the common experiences of Americans.cxi  
 
Common Sense served as a precursor to a newly imagined American identity by 
reiterating the thoughts already on the minds of the Colonists but also by having the 
audacity to boldly proclaim that these beliefs were valid. As the foundational work of 
this new identification, Paine is able to summarily declare that the colonists are not 
deserving of better treatment from England because they are displaced Englishmen, but 
instead, they should be treated as citizens of their own country. Both Jefferson and Paine 
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highlight these two different schools of thought found throughout the colonies and 
introduce the common theme of revolt in response to mistreatment. 
 
John Locke 
The political thought of the colonists was based upon a variety of sources, “the 
major figures of the European Enlightenment and many of the lesser, contributed 
substantially to the thought of the Americans; but except for Locke’s, their influence, 
though more decisive than that of the authors of classical antiquity, was neither clearly 
dominant nor wholly determinative.”cxii Locke’s The Second Treatise of Government: An 
Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government utilizes a 
natural rights based argument as the legitimating form and end of Government. For 
Locke, individuals enter into society because society affords protection that is not 
properly regulated within the natural state. A social contract is therefore formed to 
initiate the protection natural rights because man “hath by nature a power, not only to 
preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts 
of other men…”cxiii This social contract places individuals into a civil society with one 
another that allows for “… a common established law and judicature to appeal to, with 
authority to decide controversies between them, and punish offenders…”cxiv For Locke, 
the entrance into society is predicated upon the equal protection of life, liberty, and 
estate as well as a common and impartial judge to make decisions concerning these 
rights and infringements upon them. If there is no impartial judge, then man is in “the 
perfect state of nature.”cxv As Wootton explains, “For Locke… absolute governments 
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cannot be legitimate because they provide for no impartial arbitrator in disputes between 
the subject and his ruler,” and this places both of these individuals into a state of war 
with one another.cxvi However, “[t]he end of government is the good of mankind; and 
which is best for mankind” and this exists so long as “the boundless will of tyranny, or 
that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be opposed, when they grow exorbitant in 
the use of their power . . .”cxvii When the rights of the individual are infringed upon by 
the government, then civil society is given license to find a government that will better 
protect their interests. 
According to Locke, even if the government is dissolved, the individual still does 
not revert back to a pure form of the state of nature. Rather, the individual must find or 
install a new government that will allow individuals and government to better fulfill their 
own reciprocal obligations.cxviii These reciprocal obligations dictate that if an individual 
obtains property, then there is not an absolute dominion over the property. Instead, there 
is a requirement that all property should not be wasted and government is legitimated so 
long as it protects an individual right to property.cxix Hence, “The state of nature has a 
law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one . . . that being all equal and 
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions…”cxx 
Within this conception of the natural world and society, reason would dictate that a 
greater good may be achieved by furthering societal relations instead of the strict 
accumulation of wealth. Locke’s view of property rights and reason dictates that any 
government is responsible to further society and that a government could encroach upon 
these natural rights by failing to offer adequate protection. This call for natural rights and 
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adequate protection, however, fails the universal human rights litmus test when 
compared to any ideal of egalitarian natural rights. 
 For Locke, the institution of slavery has been very difficult to reconcile given 
contrasting views found within the Second Treatise and the Fundamental Constitutions 
of Carolina.cxxi While the sole authorship of the Fundamental Constitutions are under 
some scrutiny, David Armitage finds that Locke is mainly responsible for the passages 
that offer a unique religious toleration and freedom for individuals within the 
Carolinas.cxxii The Fundamental Constitutions were written and published before the 
Second Treatise was written and the particular view of the Lockean liberal political 
society does not extend natural rights as far as the Second Treatise does. For the 
Fundamental Constitutions, slavery can legitimately exist and slaves are under the 
absolute dominion of their masters. The rights of slaves were overlooked in that “no 
slave shall hereby be exempted from that civil dominion his master hath over him, but be 
in all other things in the same state and condition he was in before.”cxxiii Furthering this 
concept, Locke asserts that “[e]very freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and 
authority over his Negro slaves, of what opinion or religion soever” granting that 
religious liberty will not free an individual who has been already placed in a life of 
slavery.cxxiv As a disjuncture to this approach, Locke allows for a law that gives slaves 
the ability to choose their own religion and maintain the same benefit and right of 
practice for their religion as a free man.cxxv Also, Locke’s First Treatise references the 
practice of slavery within the West Indies by allowing a master the “Power in His 
Family over Servants born in his House, and bought with his Money.”cxxvi And referring 
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to issues of sovereignty and war, Locke writes, “… may not therefore a man in the West 
Indies, who hath with him sons of his own, friends or companions, soldiers under pay; or 
slaves bought with money, or perhaps a band made up of all these, make war and peace, 
if there should be occasion…”cxxvii Based upon these references from the First Treatise, 
it is difficult to reconcile the extent to which the natural rights argument of the Second 
Treatise extends to all individuals. Coupling the First Treatise with the Fundamental 
Constitutions as well as personal practice, Locke appears to condone the slave trade. 
However, taking the passages concerning slavery in the First Treatise, without the filter 
of our personal knowledge of Locke, we find that these passages do not condone slavery, 
but instead simply recognize that slavery occurs in the world and that the power of the 
owner over the slave is absolute in these circumstances. While none of these offer 
satisfactory explanations for Locke’s personal behavior or the differences between his 
writings, Waldron explains these contradictions the best in that “… few theorists have 
managed successfully to establish a perfect unity between theory and practice, and when 
they have it has usually been in the context of institutional opportunities… that are quite 
different from the environment in which Locke wrote.”cxxviii 
Locke’s acceptance of slavery, notwithstanding the Second Treatise, appears to 
be fueled by the practices and beliefs of the time period in which Locke was writing.cxxix 
The First Treatise and Fundamental Constitution are in seemingly direct contradiction to 
the natural rights argument found within the Second Treatise. However, as Waldron 
explains for the Second Treatise, “ . . . the conditions [for slavery] are themselves very 
restrictive. We are talking only about the enslavement of captives taken in a just war, 
 60 
and only captives who were actual participants in the aggression that made the just war 
necessary.”cxxx This just war theory of slavery holds that slavery can only occur when an 
individual places themselves against the will of the majority and attempts to eliminate or 
limit the individual’s natural right to property. Farr attempts to reconcile the difference 
between slavery and natural rights in Locke’s writings by suggesting that Locke never 
intended slavery to exist in the New World. Looking back to the First Treatise, Locke 
discusses the power and not the right of the owner over slaves.cxxxi This explanation 
gives much credibility that there exists a distinct difference between the practice and the 
theoretical justification for slavery. The First Treatise and Fundamental Constitutions as 
well as Locke’s ownership in slave trading companies suggests that he condones the 
practice of slavery. The Second Treatise is different, however, in that it attempts to 
legitimate the practice of slavery under a distinct set of circumstances. One possible 
explanation that may have been largely overlooked by most scholars seeking to answer 
the question of when slavery may occur in society is that Locke uses slavery in the 
Second Treatise to emphatically suggest that placing oneself in a war against another 
individual is such a horrendous practice that the aggressor is no longer afforded any 
natural rights except for death or servitude. If Locke uses slavery as a warning for an 
atrocious action and the possible outcome of a state of war, then those individuals that 
would place themselves willingly at war against others are inhuman and are thus 
removed from society and its comforts. Locke’s theories do not allow for a powerful 
force or sovereign to automatically correct for unchecked aggression, but much like 
Locke’s view of nature, man is allowed to punish a crime to so that it can dissuade the 
 61 
same crimes from occurring in the future.cxxxii Within the terms of society, Locke does 
not allow for a government to take the life, liberty, or estate of an individual and so an 
aggressor who has removed him or herself from society is guaranteed life under the 
condition of slavery, but as a sole exception, allowed to take their own lives if the 
servitude is too unbearable.cxxxiii This warning becomes such a distinct part of Locke’s 
Second Treatise that Locke is forced to describe the extent to which the property is 
subject to seizure by the society.  
Rhetorically, Locke’s Second Treatise may not have to make the strict 
regulations against slavery that the argument for liberalism would suggest. As Farr 
explains, “’Slavery’ was a rhetorically powerful fear for Englishmen–or radical Whigs at 
least. They associated it with monarchical ‘absolute power’ that might descend or had 
already descended upon the English nation.”cxxxiv Locke was well acquainted with the 
conditions of slavery and his familiarity with this practice in the world. His own personal 
life suggests that Locke could use the term slavery as a grim warning for anyone 
willingly placing themselves outside guidelines of an ordered society. This relationship, 
however, is reciprocal because it applies not only to the right of individuals to place 
themselves in a state of war with one another, but also the ability of government to place 
itself at war with the people. The state of war removes all societal obligations for the 
populace, but this also signifies that resistance and rebellion play a fundamental part of 
the Lockean liberal tradition that is all connected to a theory about the protection of 
property rights.  
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The traditional interpretation of Locke’s Second Treatise was that this treatise 
seeks to “justify ‘the Whig Revolution of 1688.’”cxxxv Regardless of the original intent of 
Locke’s work, the underlying theme revolves around a principled argument that the 
original basis for government is founded upon the consent of the governed, but societal 
dependence upon institutionally defined rights limits the ability of an individual simply 
to choose to dissolve government based upon the infractions of these natural rights. 
Indeed, as Dunn explains, consent may be limited as a positive law that requires that all 
actions of the government must be based solely on what is considered as the good of the 
society.cxxxvi If the actions of the government do not infringe upon the rights of all the 
citizens, then Locke holds that the government is not immediately dissolved. Instead, as 
Corbett explains, there is a distinction between the right of an individual to openly resist 
government and the process of spurring a large-scale revolution that requires a majority 
to agree that a government must be replaced. As Corbett writes,  
That such men must suffer is not necessarily just under the law of nature, 
but should they fail in their resistance, the only common judge would have 
declared it just. Revolution, then, is limited not only by the law of nature 
but also by the spiritedness of the people. When a revolution is right is 
judged by the majority. The individual’s judgment as to whether to take 
part in an attempted revolution must therefore look only what reason says 
is just but also to what the majority will decide.cxxxvii 
  
Corbett argues that while government exists for the protection of the individual, there is 
a necessity that decisions for the entire society must reflect the general welfare of the 
mass society. Upon leaving the state of nature, the individual has given up the ability to 
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punish intrusions on his rights and the process of revolution reflects the individual 
inability to act in these circumstances. Under the process suggested by the Second 
Treatise, the removal of government must be deemed necessary because multiple 
transgressions suggest the government has become tyrannical and no longer works for 
the well being of the society. This call for revolution is one that a single individual 
cannot make alone. 
Should government transgress the natural rights of a citizen, an individual then 
has the right to withdraw his or her consent from this government and to seek out 
another that will offer better protection.cxxxviii Man does not revert back to the perfect 
state of nature but is instead given the opportunity to erect a different government that 
will more adequately protect the liberty and property of that society. As Locke writes, 
To conclude, The Power that every individual gave the Society, when he 
entered into it, can never revert to the Individuals again, as long as the 
Society lasts . . . Or else when by the Miscarriages of those in Authority, 
it is forfeited; upon the Forfeiture of their Rulers . . . it reverts to the 
Society, and the People have a Right . . . erect a new Form, or under the 
old form place it in new hands, as they think good.cxxxix 
 
While Locke grants society the authority to remove the current government from power, 
he fails to explain adequately the means or process by which government would be 
removed. In theory, The Second Treatise would allow for the formation of a new 
government whenever the legislature or executive has failed to protect the rights of the 
society, but this process and the formation of a new government requires that society 
acts in unison toward this end. As Locke writes, “… such revolutions happen not upon 
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every little mismanagement in public affairs.  Great mistakes… will be born by the 
people without mutiny or murmur.  But… a long train of abuses… put the rule into such 
hands which may secure to them the ends for which government was at first 
erected…”cxl The fomenting of rebellion, then, does not rely solely upon the recognition 
of an injustice to one individual, but the recognition of numerous injustices to the whole. 
For an individual can rationally decide that a governing authority has overstepped their 
boundaries but this does not automatically establish that revolution or resistance is 
required. This cry for revolution necessitates that a majority of the public agrees that 
their natural rights have been violated and the encroachments to their rights, when not 
acted upon, will lead to an undesirable end that is worse than any fate suffered from a 
revolutionary action. As Wootton suggests, “In Locke’s view men have an inalienable 
right to stand up for themselves; but rebellion will be futile if others do not recognize 
that the interests you are defending are theirs too.”cxli Locke allows for the removal of 
government to further the idea that legitimate governments operate solely through 
consent. However, if a society agrees that a government is no longer acting within the 
best interests of the society and when the grievances are severe enough, how does one 
convince others of any particular course of action? 
  Locke argues from a standpoint of principled action that contains “lofty” ideals 
that colors the world in black and white, right and wrong. These lofty ideals are not 
closely represented in the actual world and are often difficult to realize. However, these 
form principled arguments can alert the public that all is not right with the world and 
suggest a normative position for which society ought to strive. In the period prior to the 
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Revolution, Jefferson and Paine utilized arguments from principle to explain that Britain 
has overstepped its boundaries. Paine, however, furthers this argument with an element 
of expediency that justifies the call to arms, a point that Jefferson only superficially 
addresses. Arguments of expediency do not shade the world into two distinct colors that 
embody the notion of right and wrong, but instead, the preferred course of action is 
determined through what is deemed as the desired end of the speaker. Jefferson’s A 
Summary View of the Rights of British America utilizes an argument of principle in 
hopes of gaining support for independence by structuring itself strongly upon the 
Lockean principles of life, liberty, and property and an aversion to slavery. Ultimately, 
Jefferson’s approach is unable to lead the audience to the desired conclusion of a 
revolutionary syllogism. Common Sense differs in that it does not rely upon the audience 
to complete the logical argument. Instead, Paine offers the premises of the argument as 
well as the desired conclusion that requires the audience only to decide whether or not 
revolution will be undertaken. 
 
Thomas Jefferson 
Thomas Jefferson is the primary author for A Summary View on the Rights of 
British America and a major contributor to the Declaration of Independence, but while 
these works are just a small portion of Jefferson’s entire corpus, they elucidate the ideals 
for the singular responsibilities of government. More importantly, they serve as a 
window into the authors who influenced Jefferson’s political thought. As a student of the 
Enlightenment, rhetorical studies, and belles-lettres, Jefferson is also known to have 
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studied under William Small and George Wythe, whose rhetorical works and teachings 
played a large role in further cementing a rhetorical presence in his later works.cxlii 
Furthering the tradition of rhetorical studies and the belles-lettres, Jefferson owned 
numerous volumes of Cicero and Quintilian that would also lead to a fluency in 
rhetorical strategies and, at very least, a superficial knowledge of argument 
construction.cxliii  But if any claim can be made that Jefferson was familiar with an 
argument solely because it appears in his library, then one must also examine whether 
the absence of any particular author means that Jefferson was not familiar with the work.  
Because a fire at Shadwell is responsible for extinguishing the library of the 
young Thomas Jefferson, little remains known about which theorists influenced his 
political thought. Since no authoritative list exists as to what books occupied the shelves 
at Jefferson’s residence prior to the fire, the question of Locke’s influence on him still 
remains in contention. Most famously, Gary Wills uses this fire as a convenient 
opportunity to explain that the lack of Locke’s tracts in the colonies means that Jefferson 
most likely had other influences on his political writing.cxliv Wills asserts that “we have 
enough evidence of [Jefferson’s] reading, and of his conclusions from that reading, to 
establish that the real lost world of Thomas Jefferson was the world of William Small, 
the invigorating realm of the Scottish Enlightenment at its zenith.”cxlv Wills’ contention 
that the Scottish Enlightenment was the primary influence on Jefferson does not 
withstand a barrage of information presented by later scholarship, which asserts that 
Locke helped influence the Scottish Enlightenment as well.cxlvi The influences and 
authorship of the Declaration of Independence remain as the decidedly most important 
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question in establishing the significance of Locke for Jefferson’s political thought, 
though Jefferson denied Locke as a primary influence on his writings and instead related 
the Declaration of Independence as being the “one opinion on this side of the water. All 
American whigs thought alike on these subjects.”cxlvii But as Becker relates,  
Most Americans had absorbed Locke's works as a kind of political 
gospel; and the Declaration, in its form, in its phraseology, follows 
closely certain sentences in Locke's second treatise on government. This 
is interesting, but it does not tell us why Jefferson, having read Locke's 
treatise, was so taken with it that he read it again, and still again, so that 
afterwards its very phrases reappear in his own writing. Jefferson 
doubtless read Filmer as well as Locke; but the phrases of Filmer, 
happily, do not appear in the Declaration.cxlviii  
 
Initially, the Declaration of Independence was written in committee and the 
identity of the author was not a matter of dispute in the days and years after the initial 
resolution. As McDonald explains, “The Declaration, like all resolutions of Congress, 
was a corporate statement. The word ‘I’ is entirely absent. ‘We’ appears thirteen times in 
Jefferson’s draft and ten times in the Declaration as altered by Congress.”cxlix The 
Declaration remained the finished product and Declaration of a committee, but the 
committee served only to moderate the original language of the document. While the 
original document did not bare Jefferson’s name and the authorship did not seem to 
matter in 1776, there were moments in the history of the nation that statesmen valued the 
identity of the author. John Adams recounts that Jefferson’s authorship would benefit the 
nation because a southern state would sacrifice fewer lives and property in an ensuing 
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revolution and this would help “elevate principle above interest.”cl While the final 
authorship of the Declaration is largely credited to Jefferson, it is important to note that 
under the cover of anonymity, Jefferson was able to use in the Declaration the same 
principled argument that appears in the pages of A Summary View.cli These two 
documents serve as points from which we can draw a line to understand Jefferson’s 
political theory and fundamentally, the use of principled arguments that supersede 
arguments of expediency. 
A Summary View of the Rights of British America was initially submitted as an 
anonymous pamphlet, in care of the Virginia Delegates, to the Continental Congress. 
The identity of the author was not too closely guarded and, as McDonald explains, “after 
individuals in the Virginia legislature leaked their knowledge of [Jefferson’s] authorship, 
[it] gained him notoriety as far away as London.”clii The Continental Congress reviewed 
the letter and decided that it was too “revolutionary” for their tastes and thus shelved the 
document. Even with this lack of positive reception, A Summary View helped earn 
Jefferson a reputation that would gain him access to the committee that would draft the 
Declaration of Independence. As Adams recounts, Jefferson “brought with him a 
reputation for literature, science, and a happy talent of composition. Writings of his were 
handed about, remarkable for the peculiar felicity of expression.”cliii As Browne writes, 
“In his rhetorical craft as in his thought, Jefferson could appear almost too eloquent, as if 
in the finely crafted sentiment he could make the world over again, in his image, to his 
own satisfaction, heedless of others.”cliv As Bailyn notes, Jefferson was “a radical 
utopian idealist and a hardheaded, adroit, at times cunning politician; a rhetorician, 
 69 
whose elegant phrases had propulsive power, and a no-nonsense administrator–who, 
above all others, was fated to confront the ambiguities of the Enlightenment program.”clv 
In this confrontation with reality, Jefferson sought to take a “pure vision” and then find a 
way to lend this vision to the reality of the situation. As an instance of this approach, 
Golden and Golden recount, A Summary View “contains three major claims which, in 
turn, are developed by multiple subordinate heads and supporting details. The first of 
these claims is based on a series of historical precedents grounded in experience and 
stated in the form of an analogy” which draws upon the idea that the lands in the 
Colonies belong to those who first settled the soil and the invocation of the “Saxon 
myth.”clvi 
This argument by analogy masks the principle that Jefferson uses to refute the 
original jurisdiction of Parliament and the King’s authority over the Colonies. Jefferson 
constructs a history that seeks to relate the original ownership of the colonies to the 
Saxons who first settled the soil. Jefferson did not state that the “colonial problem with 
British authority [began with] the Stamp Act crisis of 1765; the problem began in 1066, 
when the Normans defeated the Saxons at the Battle of Hastings.”clvii From this point, 
the King began to grant lands under the name of feudalism. As Jefferson writes:  
Our ancestors, however, who migrated hither, were farmers, not lawyers. 
The fictitious principle that all lands belong originally to the king, they 
were early persuaded to believe real; and accordingly took grants of their 
own lands from the crown. It is time, therefore, for us to lay this matter 
before his majesty, and to declare that he has no right to grant lands of 
himself.clviii  
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This declaration serves as the basis for Jefferson’s argument. Jefferson believes that the 
lands settled by the colonists are rightfully theirs because “their own blood was spilt in 
acquiring lands for their settlement…for themselves they fought, for themselves they 
conquered, and for themselves alone they have right to hold.”clix Any aid received from 
Britain “appeared to be motivated not by a benevolent attitude toward the colonies but 
by the view that it would produce economic gains for England.”clx The lack of beneficent 
motivations by Britain limits any right that England has to the Colonies because all their 
actions were motivated by self-interested behavior. The other revolutionary rhetoric 
focuses upon the same idea that a legitimate government could exist within the colonies 
so long as the only goal of Parliament was to “regulate American commerce but not to 
raise revenue in the colonies…”clxi For Jefferson, any interference from the King or 
Parliament was too much. 
Jefferson’s “style of Summary View was simple and emphatic, with a dramatic 
flair that previewed certain passages in the Declaration of Independence.”clxii More 
importantly, one of the “salient features” of the Summary View is “Jefferson’s treatment 
of George III and… the British monarchy.”clxiii This work openly addresses the King 
concerning property grievances and in essence blames George III for not allowing the 
colonies to effectively govern themselves. Prior to the Summary View, pamphlets and 
editorials tended to blame parliament for grievances and excused the King from claims 
of wrongdoing.clxiv Jefferson forces the public attention onto the King and thus changes 
the posturing of American discourse toward the British monarchy. Jefferson alters the 
traditional means of addressing the King by using language that is “declaratory rather 
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than plaintive… the tone toward George III ranges between the disrespectful and the 
accusatory.”clxv Jefferson attempts to give the other colonists the ability to directly 
engage the King as an equal. Jefferson’s language replaces the mysticism associated 
with the King’s position by boldly stating the King is the “chief officer of the people, 
appointed by the laws, and circumscribed with definite powers, to assist in working the 
great machine of government, erected for their use and consequently subject to their 
superintendence.”clxvi Because the King is appointed by the laws and circumscribed with 
definite powers, Jefferson is able to question the degree to which the King is able to 
violate the rights of citizens. This sets up a very easy syllogism with two basic premises: 
The first is British citizens do not have their rights violated by the King and the second is 
that the Colonists have had their rights violated. The conclusion follows that the 
Colonists are not British citizens. 
Jefferson’s use of this basic argument questioning the citizenship of the Colonists 
is also furthered with a redefinition of property rights in the Colonies. Jefferson 
introduces the Saxon myth as an attempt to change the narrative typically associated 
with the King and to alter the dynamic of rebellion for the colonists. No longer are they 
rebels resisting the rule of their sovereign; instead, they are natural citizens on their own 
lands resisting the advances of a tyrant. Further, because the colonists were natural 
citizens who had willingly placed themselves under British rule, they should be accorded 
all the same rights of British subjects. Jefferson furthers the natural rights argument by 
maintaining, “Parliament could not legitimately govern the colonies in any form because 
there was no constitutional and legal link between the colonial governments and 
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Parliament whatsoever.”clxvii Jefferson follows that consent to the King could be given 
only as long as the Crown protected the natural rights to life, liberty, and property; 
otherwise consent could be revoked. Since the King has refused to concede that these 
colonists deserve the same basic rights to property, the original contract between Britain 
and the Colonies has been broken. Therefore, Colonists are no longer breaking British 
law because the King has no right to the Colonies and British law does not apply in these 
lands.  
The Saxon myth is a convoluted story used to start a common heritage for the 
colonists and to create an identity for the readers that did not focus solely upon the 
traditional English heritage. By affirming an origin of the colonists that is counter to the 
traditional narrative, Jefferson creates an identity that would allow “his readers . . . [to] 
find therein a powerful source of collective pride in such origins.”clxviii According to 
Ellis, the theory of expatriation employed by Jefferson stated that the colonists were free 
just by having migrated to this new country.clxix This changed the basis on which 
traditional sovereignty issues were defined. If the colonists were free, and always had 
been, then the trespasses of the King violate the natural law of property rights. And 
furthermore, Jefferson argues that the only reason the colonies have adopted the British 
form of government is because the settlers wished to keep the same form of government 
that they had previously lived under, so that the colonists are free to reject the King’s 
rule at any time. Browne explains:  
The rhetorical function of the Saxon myth: it simultaneously re-authorizes 
a set of historical claims even as it de-activates another; it recalls from the 
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past an originary tale of rights earned and assumed, and in the process 
literally displaces the false sovereignty of English imperial rule.clxx 
 
This is almost seemingly enough justification to resist the British monarchy. Jefferson 
explains that if Parliament has failed to protect the colonists who have willingly placed 
themselves under their laws, then there can be no obligation to the parent country and 
the colonies are able to act in their own self-interest to maintain their own rights. The 
Saxon myth would conceivably create a breaking point with England, but as Ellis 
elucidates, the Saxon myth is false. Jefferson failed to create a believable common 
narrative for the audience and this explains why there was no realization of a change in 
the relations between Britain and the Colonies.clxxi However, while the Saxon myth may 
have failed to establish the desired change, it creates a rhetorical premise that challenges 
the right of Parliament to levy taxes upon the Colonies. From this premise Jefferson is 
able to question whether “justice is not the same thing in America as in Britain, or else 
The British parliament pays less regard to it here than there.”clxxii Regardless of the 
degree to which the Colonists believed the Saxon myth, the rhetorical approach furthers 
the dramatic principle of distancing the Colonies from British influence.   
Jefferson’s A Summary View presents a very principled argument advocating a 
separation between the Colonies and Britain. While Lucas explains that arguments from 
principle and arguments of expediency are not mutually exclusive, they distract because 
principled arguments generally rely upon a retroactive view of events whereas 
arguments of expediency are generally proactive.clxxiii Jefferson attempts to argue from 
principle while suggesting that the natural outcome to having violated rights is action. 
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Jefferson conveys a tone that justifies future action, but action for which the timetable 
for an immediate change is not explicitly stated. A Summary View highlights the limited 
freedoms of the Colonists and the inability of the Colonies to sufficiently govern without 
the sovereign’s approval. The dissolution of the colonial legislatures at the behest of the 
King serves as one of the grievous issues that Jefferson uses to advocate rebellion. As 
Jefferson writes, “It is neither our wish, nor our interest, to separate from her. We are 
willing . . . to sacrifice every thing . . .  [for the] restoration of that tranquility . . . Let 
them name their terms, but let them be just.”clxxiv The just principle that Jefferson 
advocates, however, favors the rights of the colonists over the rights of the British and 
does not rely upon an egalitarian relationship between Britain and the colonies.  As 
Browne notes, A Summary View of the Rights of British America does not attempt to 
reconcile the Colonies with England. Any reconciliation would only be a token gesture 
because the injustices suffered by the Colonies were far too severe to allow for a 
peaceful end.clxxv Jefferson suggests that the Colonies be allowed their own parliaments 
in exchange for the Colonies and England maintaining a common heritage. As Jefferson 
writes:  
One free and independent legislature hereby takes upon itself to suspend 
the powers of another, free and independent as itself; this exhibiting a 
phœnomenon unknown in nature, the creator and creature of his own 
power. Not only the principles of common-sense, but the common 
feelings of human nature, must be surrendered up before his majesty’s 
subjects here can be persuaded to believe that they hold their political 
existence at the will of a British parliament.clxxvi  
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Jefferson relates that there is only a superficial linkage between the Colonists and Britain 
and that the Colonists cannot be asked to sacrifice their political rights because King 
George III is unwilling to recognize these rights. Jefferson asks for no less than a 
complete change in the political landscape of both countries and maintains that while 
reconciliation is possible, the resulting act of Britain ceding claims of authority to the 
Colonies would create the same result as a revolution.  
 
Thomas Paine 
 Common Sense, originally intended to be a series of letters to a newspaper, was 
published in pamphlet form in January of 1776, at the urging of Benjamin Rush, also a 
strong supporter of independence. Paine crafted an argument that was not altogether 
original, but as Keane suggests, Paine perhaps reiterated clearly and forcefully what was 
already on the minds of others.clxxvii This had an effect of placing Paine at the forefront 
of the Revolutionary movement as Paine “is the only figure in the pantheon of 
Revolutionary leaders who achieved his place entirely through authorship.”clxxviii 
Common Sense is credited as being the fundamental pamphlet that finally sparked the 
flames needed for revolution, according to Keane, it “sparked a new spirit.”clxxix 
Ferguson states, “It was the first American best-seller. Hundreds of thousands of 
Americans, perhaps a fifth of the adult population in all, either read Common Sense or 
had it read to them during the course of the Revolution.”clxxx As Wood claims, “Common 
Sense was the most incendiary and popular pamphlet of the entire Revolutionary era . . . 
In it Paine rejected the traditional and stylized forms of persuasion designed for educated 
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gentlemen and reached out for new readers among the artisan- and tavern-centered 
worlds of the cities.”clxxxi This attention to a new persuasive style propelled the rights-
based argument that was predominantly used throughout the Revolutionary period. 
Fruchtman writes that Paine crafted a language that emphasizes the specific purpose of 
sparking a revolution, in that he 
On different occasions for specific purposes… [chose] the language he 
thought was most appropriate to his subject matter. At times, for example, 
he spoke the Old Whig or Country language of virtue and corruption and 
at other times used Lockean themes of the social contract and its 
accompanying rights, liberties, and obligations that every citizen 
possessed.clxxxii  
 
As Lucas opines, “Common Sense was so well conceived, so soundly structured, so 
engagingly written, so perfectly timed that it thoroughly dominated public discussion of 
independence . . . few authors–whether for or against severing the bond with England– 
strayed far from the topics introduced in Paine’s pamphlet.”clxxxiii While Jefferson’s 
argument from principle conveys a notion that an injustice is being visited upon citizens 
and that this in turn requires some form of action, it is largely unsuccessful because it 
gives no absolute timeline to be followed. With this lack of timeline, Jefferson’s 
arguments become secondary in the discussions of the Colonists. Paine’s argument from 
expediency, however, conveys a sense of urgency and an immediate need for action. 
This urgency of action served to motivate the public to not only notice the work, but to 
maintain this argument on the forefront of debate. 
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Common Sense is often viewed as the germinal work that sparked the debate for 
revolution. It appeared on the market nearly two years after Jefferson’s Summary View 
and is ultimately credited with changing the traditional view of reconciliation for the 
Philadelphia Whigs. According to Lucas, “Until the appearance of Common Sense 
almost all Philadelphia Whigs had spoken or written of the restoration of American 
rights within the empire as their goal.”clxxxiv Paine insisted on independence and the 
entire pamphlet leads to this conclusion. As Lucas relates, “Much of [Common Sense’s 
effect] was due to the manner in which Paine patterned his arguments for independence. 
He clarifies the direction of the essay early, the mood develops swiftly and forcefully, 
and the ideas unfold easily and spontaneously. Each argument is positioned to attain 
maximum ideational and emotional effect.”clxxxv In part, Paine achieves success because 
the language does not rely upon elevated imagery. Instead the “ungrammatical language 
and coarse imagery […] showed the common people, who in the past had not been very 
involved in politics, that fancy words and Latin quotations no longer mattered as much 
as honesty and sincerity and the natural revelation of feelings.”clxxxvi Paine’s writings and 
“interests lay in setting forth his views of politics and society in a bright, vivid language 
designed to convince his readers that he was right to condemn tyranny and praise 
democracy.”clxxxvii John Adams recognized the influence of Paine’s work by remarking, 
in a letter to his wife Abigail, “You ask, what is thought of Common Sense. Sensible 
Men think there are some Whims, some Sophisms, some artfull [sic] Addresses to 
superstitious Notions, some keen attempts upon the Passions, in this Pamphlet. But all 
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agree there is a great deal of good sense, delivered in a clear, simple, concise and 
nervous Style.”clxxxviii 
 Paine begins Common Sense with a discussion of man and society and an attempt 
to separate the two. If man can exist in the state of nature with no government, then 
government exists only as a result of individuals choosing a particular form. For Paine, 
government is necessary only because of man’s “wickedness”; it works by restraining 
our vices. Furthermore, “nothing but heaven is impregnable to vice, it will unavoidably 
happen.”clxxxix Because nature is cruel, men must work together in order to avoid 
perishing, which forms the very essence of a social contract of which individuals must 
partake in order to continue to survive. Paine relates that society is the original social 
contract, which derives its power from necessity. Government is the manifestation of 
men being too comfortable with their own vices and bad government, or tyranny, only 
serves to pervert the relationship of men to society. As a whole, however, government 
serves as an elite class serving to limit the rights of man and the only governments that 
are just and proper will be found when “the simple voice of nature and reason will say, it 
is right.”cxc 
 Paine defends the idea of a government not ruled by Kings and hereditary 
succession by bringing in biblical allusions and hinting at the idea of wise men and their 
private thoughts. “Most wise men in their private sentiments have ever treated hereditary 
right with contempt; yet it is one of those evils which when once established is not easily 
removed: many submit from fear, others from superstition, and the more powerful part 
shares with the king the plunder of the rest.”cxci Paine draws upon the idea of wise men 
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to lend credibility to anyone who may question the idea of hereditary succession. The 
common man is allowed to note his own preferences after having been informed that 
other men, much wiser men, have given consideration to the same idea. In many ways, 
this practice gives birth to an open dialogue about hereditary succession and also 
validates any existing fears that thoughts about rebellion are fleeting. Paine maintains 
that “[a] government of our own is our natural right; and when a man seriously reflects 
on the precariousness of human affairs, he will become convinced, that it is infinitely 
wiser and safer to form a constitution of our own in a cool deliberate manner, while we 
have it in our power, than to trust such an interesting event to time and chance.”cxcii 
Paine argues that it is better for the Colonies to make the decision to rebel and to 
contemplate these actions rather than delaying an inevitable action and allowing more 
harm to occur to future generations through inaction. 
Paine begins to establish more fully the expediency of his argument by using 
romantic language that highlights the idea of revolution. Paine highlights the role of 
nature in the pursuits of the colonists and gives rise to lofty ideals by emphasizing that 
“the sun never shined on a cause of greater worth,” and he asks whether or not 
reconciliation was just a dream that has passed.cxciii The imagery of the sun summons the 
idea of freedom and living in world that is unencumbered by the constraints of a 
legislative body that exists miles from the same soil. Paine shapes this argument by 
defining the scope of possible actions the colonists have in response to the grievances 
brought about by the King. Paine further emphasizes that the decision is up to the 
readers themselves in that “I offer nothing more than simple facts, plain arguments and 
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common sense… than that [the reader] will divest himself of prejudice and 
prepossession, and suffer his reason and his feelings to determine for themselves….”cxciv 
By asking readers to consider the implications of the document for themselves, Paine 
places weight on allowing them to draw their own conclusions, however biased and 
weighted the argument. Paine openly includes the audience in this decision-making 
process because the realization of revolution will have to be decided by the degree to 
which each colonist decides that the King has infringed upon their rights. Paine 
understands that reconciliation is a possibility for the Colonists, but as a pamphleteer, his 
arguments center upon the desire to initiate action and not to maintain the status quo. 
 The expediency of the argument in Common Sense is drawn from the use of 
language that denotes time and action. Paine asserts the idea that the longer action is 
delayed, the worse the injustices become to the colonies:  
Tis not the concern of a day, a year, or an age; posterity are virtually 
involved in the contest, and will be more or less affected even to the end 
of time, by the proceedings now. Now is the seed-time of Continental 
union, faith and honour. The least fracture now will be like a name 
engraved with the point of a pin on the tender rind of a young oak; the 
wound would enlarge with the tree, and posterity read in it full grown 
characters.cxcv 
 
Paine attempts to convince the audience that immediate action is necessary because 
nature demands it. It is the best time to act. Paine relates, “It is not in the power of 
Britain or of Europe to conquer America, if she does not conquer herself by delay and 
timidity. The present winter is worth an age if rightly employed, but if lost or neglected, 
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the whole continent will partake of the misfortune; and there is no punishment which 
that man will not deserve, be he who, or what, or where he will, that may be the means 
of sacrificing a season so precious and useful.”cxcvi In this sense, the expediency of 
Paine’s argument requires immediate action.  
Paine also includes imagery of the family in an attempt to remind the colonists 
that future generations will be subjected to the same misery if action is not presently 
taken. As Paine writes, “In order to discover the line of our duty rightly, we should take 
our children in our hand, and fix our station a few years farther into life; that eminence 
will present a prospect which a few present fears and prejudices conceal from our 
sight.”cxcvii The idea of family and children gives the argument personal and emotional 
appeal by referencing future generations. Each colonist can relate to these ideas and 
would surely desire to avoid selling his progeny into the same conditions that he is 
experiencing. Paine forces the audience to consider not only themselves, but to also 
question what affect their inaction is bringing on future generations. This appeal deals 
less with rationality and more with an emotional response, one that is likely to forego 
self-preservation in hopes of creating a better future.  
Paine uses elements of time and petitioning to the common man to achieve his 
purpose. Particularly, Paine’s language makes the case seem urgent, as though a 
pandemic may break out at any time. This language of crisis and urgency helps force the 
issue because it signals to the audience that immediate action is necessary in order to 
save the colonies from absolute tyranny. As Sigelman, Martindale and McKenzie note, 
Common Sense used fewer syllables and sentences to convey the message.cxcviii This 
 82 
direct style, asyndeton, creates a rhythm that forces readers to respond without giving 
much time for personal thought or reflection on the matter. The lofty ideals and 
sentiments of liberty served to obscure the author’s desire to draw the colonists into a 
call for action. As Foner notes, “Paine transformed the language of an impending 
millennium into the secular vision of a utopia in the New World…” where “…the future 
destiny of America as a society defined by its commitment to liberty and its isolation 
from the Old World.”cxcix Paine draws together the idea of liberty with a vision of 
Heaven and a mandate from God. While God would not ask men to openly attack 
George III, the separation of the Colonies from England was paramount for His will to 
succeed. Lucas writes that Paine “understood that his readers could not avow 
independence without first disavowing George III.”cc Paine first has to force a break with 
the idea of remaining loyal to the sovereign. The suggestion of reconciliation is candidly 
repudiated by Paine, who maintains that bringing America and Britain together again is 
akin to giving “prostitution its former innocence” or ultimately “[t]here are injuries 
which nature cannot forgive; she would cease to be nature if she did.”cci Only after 
individuals had committed themselves to the idea of revolution, preparation for a conflict 
became tantamount to the success of the Colonies. As Ferguson writes: 
In celebrating the unprecedented promise of America, [Paine] realized 
that communal well-being might best be appreciated in a context of crisis. 
Therefore, the presumed glory of America could be made to matter more 
if the country itself seemed to teeter on the edge of ruin and chaos. 
Danger, properly conveyed and then overcome, would carry mere 
prosperity toward the realms of higher accomplishment.ccii  
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Paine’s idea of a context of crisis helps to feed the sense of the expedient argument. 
Action was necessary and necessary now. If one waited too long, all could be lost.  
 
 
Common Themes 
Jefferson and Paine rely upon the process of identification to establish a dialogue 
between the audience and themselves. Because the message of rebellion may be foreign 
or an unacceptable conclusion for the audience, the credibility of the authors may 
become suspect and the message discounted as a simple grievance against the King and 
little else. Jefferson and Paine rely upon the audience to believe that their writings are 
beneficial for the common man and that the conclusion of revolution is not too far-
fetched and remains a practicable solution. Jefferson and Paine first heighten the division 
that the colonists face from England by using examples of how the colonists have 
suffered at the hands of the British empire but then using this division to emphasize a 
unity between the colonists and ultimately an identification between the audience and 
writer as well. As Burke explains, the “great emphasis upon division really serves to 
sharpen our understanding of identification.”cciii The process of identification then, 
makes the audience more susceptible to arguments because it creates a dynamic between 
the rhetor and audience by emphasizing that we are all in this together. Jefferson and 
Paine may not be able to reach each person and convince him of the rightness of a liberal 
argument, but an effective means of gaining support is to appeal to the emotions and to 
use these emotional arguments as the standard bearer for any potential forms of action. 
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As Corbett writes, the “… common ground for a fruitful communication between the 
two parties may be reached through an appeal to the emotions and the imagination of the 
audience. There is a natural uniformity of emotional response among human beings, and 
that uniformity constitutes the grounds for the establishment of the kind of identification 
that [Kenneth] Burke says is necessary for communication.”cciv This appeal for 
identification relies upon the image of slavery to draw strong emotional responses from 
the audience and this creates a cognitive shortcut that eludes rational thought. 
Jefferson and Paine use the common theme of slavery to illustrate the dichotomy 
of the Colonists, on one hand and Britain, on the other. By emphasizing the refusal of the 
British to work toward a mutually satisfying resolution with the colonies, Jefferson and 
Paine create strong feelings within the audience of disdain toward Britain by recounting 
how there is a division between what was once a united kingdom. Jefferson emphatically 
reiterates that multiple infractions upon the rights of the British Americans were 
attempts to continuously oppress the Colonists and to limit their ability to self govern 
through a systematic reduction of the colonists toward slavery. As Jefferson writes, 
“Single actions of tyranny may be ascribed to the accidental opinion of a day; but a 
series of oppressions… too plainly prove a deliberate and systematical plan of reducing 
us to slavery.”ccv The acts of Parliament in the past act as a justification to explore the 
degree to which these natural rights have been consistently limited, regardless of 
circumstance. The numerous transgressions serve as a constant reminder that this 
government is only interested in patronizing the colonists and that as a whole the British 
Americans are forced to live at the mercy of the King and Parliament. Jefferson contends 
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that the laws of Parliament have caused harm and have limited the quality of life for the 
Colonists.  
Using Locke, Jefferson alludes to the argument that slavery is only just under the 
conditions of war. Without the colonists waging war upon Britain, the British Parliament 
was guilty of violating the social contract. Jefferson links the terms of slavery to the idea 
of colonial representation and the inability of the colonists to hold the king accountable 
for actions that systematically attempt to reduce the colonies to slavery. These claims for 
representation exist within the ideal of consent that the liberty of man shall not be placed 
“under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall 
enact, according to the trust put in it.”ccvi Since the King has forbidden the governor of 
Virginia to give “assent to any law for the division of a county, unless the new county 
will consent to have no representative in assembly,”ccvii Jefferson is able to link liberty to 
representation and the lack of representation to systemized slavery. Jefferson appeals to 
the rational capacity of the colonists by asking for the justification for:  
[W]hy 160,000 electors in the island of Great Britain should give law to 
four millions in the states of America, every individual of whom is equal 
to every individual of them, in virtue, in understanding, and in bodily 
strength? Were this to be admitted, instead of being a free people, as we 
have hitherto supposed, and mean to continue ourselves, we should 
suddenly be found the slaves not of one but of 160,000 tyrants, 
distinguished too from all others by this singular circumstance, that they 
are removed from the reach of fear, the only restraining motive which may 
hold the hand of a tyrant.ccviii  
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These representation issues are of key importance to the colonies, and limiting the ability 
to redress Parliament and the King is seen as an act of tyranny in itself. Jefferson draws 
upon the slavery imagery and the lack of free will to emphasize that the lack of colonial 
representation is inherently against the rules of reason and that any individual 
responsible for these acts are placing themselves in opposition to liberty. As Dorsey 
explains, “[Jefferson] first figuratively describes Britain’s plan to enslave the colonies, 
and then he announces that the colonies intend to end the literal practice.”ccix Slavery 
then becomes a strong identifier linked to the terms of discretion prescribed by the King 
and Parliament. Jefferson asks, “Does his majesty seriously wish . . . that his subjects 
should give up the glorious right of representation . . . and submit themselves the 
absolute slaves of his sovereign will?”ccx The King not only ignores the will of the 
colonies and limits the ability of the colonies to diplomatically solve this dilemma; the 
dissolving of colonial parliaments is an act of war. 
 Paine, too, uses the image of slavery to accent the division of the Colonists from 
the practices of England. The use of slavery for Paine, however, is primarily a threat 
about what may occur if the colonies trust the British for security in the course of 
reconciliation. “Conquest may be effected under the pretence of friendship; and 
ourselves, after a long and brave resistance, be at last cheated into slavery.”ccxi While this 
is just one possible outcome of reconciliation, Paine also uses the image of slavery to 
explain it as a course of action for when true governments fail. “It is easy to see that 
when Republican virtues fail, slavery ensues.”ccxii Paine suggests that slavery is the 
natural end to governments that fail to ensure a legitimate form of government based 
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upon consent. Anyone without this legitimate government is reduced to slavery. For 
Paine, as well as Locke, legitimate government can only be achieved through consent 
and through the mutual goal of attaining what is best for the people. Paine loads the 
argument by asserting that the life of a colonist under British rule is much like slavery 
because it is against nature and reason for such a large country to operate as the satellite 
of a smaller country and so “it is evident they belong to different systems: England to 
Europe, America to itself.”ccxiii Paine further charges the argument with negative 
connotations by associating any form of reconciliation with willingly donning the chains 
of bondage and by equating the consequence of failing to secure a new government with 
the slavery to which the colonists are already subject. Reconciliation only means that 
slavery is the preferred mode of life and the only solution for those desiring freedom is 
to no longer live under the banner of Britain.  
 The imagery of slavery and bondage functions much like any other strong 
concept or God-term.ccxiv These God-terms serve to limit the ability of an individual to 
rationally consider the terms of an argument by circumventing reason for a majority of 
the people and changing an argument to the terms of an absolute dichotomy. One 
example would be the idea that “anyone not with us is against us,” which fails to allow 
for any middle ground. In the context of Jefferson and Paine, the God-term of slavery 
serves as an apocryphal syllogism in which the Colonists associate the premise of British 
rule with the outcome of slavery. In this argument, the warning of slavery does not 
guarantee that any specific outcome will result from the desired action. Instead, God-
terms in these writings rely upon first extinguishing the threat to individual liberty and 
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then thoughts concerning a better future would be examined. Numerous God-terms exist 
at any time. As Lucas explains: 
“Liberty” was an emotive word possessing any number of potential 
meanings depending on the goals, values, and attitudes of its perceivers… 
Liberty might also mean simply freedom from unconstitutional taxation 
by an arbitrary legislature three thousand miles away. The term served to 
unite various people with diverse interests in defense of a common 
value.ccxv 
 
Slavery in Summary View and Common Sense evokes different ideas for every reader, 
but unites those readers in a common theme: slavery is against nature and the Colonies 
should not readily embrace it.  
Jefferson and Paine use slavery as a powerful motivator that unifies the public 
under the idea that unchecked tyranny would ultimately bring misery and injustice to the 
Colonies. Jefferson suggests that the Colonies should be allowed to decide their own fate 
as the subjects of Britain while Paine demands the ultimate severing of ties between the 
two. The injustices of the King and Parliament demand a recourse that would allow 
British America to steer its own path, unfettered by the whims of the King and requiring 
Parliament’s consent to self-govern. The imagery of slavery and the Colonists’ desire for 
a local parliament reiterates that any large body of citizens must have the ability to make 
laws to govern themselves. By contrast, the British Government is seeking only to 
perpetuate its own power through force, no longer concerned with the rights of the 
people. Jefferson’s and Paine’s uses of Locke’s argument for natural rights and a 
responsive government only serve to illuminate these problems. While Jefferson clearly 
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illustrates the two major premises of an argument for revolution, it is Paine’s work that 
essentially serves as a catalyst for action by providing a course of action according to 
which rebellion could succeed.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 If we view Andrews’ “American adolescence” theory, one would expect that 
Jefferson’s writings would be enough to convince men to take up arms. This is 
especially true considering the infancy of the country. As Jefferson’s writings suggest, 
revolution is necessary but this argument fails to gain the necessary support to begin 
action. Jefferson and Paine both write of the grievances the colonies face at the hands of 
the British monarchy. These ideas were present within much of the revolutionary 
literature and lack any novel basis from which to argue that encroachments on the rights 
of Colonists had been made by Britain. The novelty of Jefferson’s and Paine’s 
arguments derives from the rhetorical approaches that these authors use to motivate the 
public in a revolutionary-inspired syllogism. Jefferson accomplishes this by addressing 
the King as the chief perpetrator of any injustices by Britain and by identifying the 
history of claims made against Britain and the failure of the George III or Parliament to 
rectify any of these problems. Jefferson furthers the syllogism with a premise that the 
perceived authority of Britain over the colonies is non-existent because free men had 
spilled their own blood to settle the colonies. If the colonies were not originally under 
the control of the British government through original consent, then the King has no 
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legitimate power and can thus be cast off. This argument relates to Paine’s ideas 
concerning the nature of hereditary succession and the legitimacy of monarchy. Paine 
uses biblical allusions and careful semantic interpretation to convey the point that nature 
does not allow for monarchy and that continuing to live under one would allow for no 
relief from the current “atrocities” associated with the British.ccxvi  
 While Jefferson argues from the basis of honor and principle, his argument is not 
completely devoid of expedience. Jefferson includes a sense of urgency in his writing by 
outlining the possibility of reconciliation between the colonies and Britain. However, 
this argument does not quite explain a course of action for the American people to 
follow if Britain refuses to change their approach to the colonies. Paine, however, guides 
the public to quite another interpretation. His ultimate goal is not to prepare the readers 
for the idea of revolution, but rather to not allow any alternative interpretations other 
than the colonies need to forcefully break their ties with England. Paine attempts to limit 
the use of history in order to force the context of all interaction to the idea of being 
“now.” By changing the context of past interaction to only the interaction of “now,” 
Paine is able to explain forcefully to his audience that a fight for independence is 
necessary because current history shows the grievances warrant such action.  
When viewing Jefferson’s and Paine’s uses of Locke’s Second Treatise as the 
justification for breaking ties from the Crown, the use of alternate narratives helps 
explain why one argument may be more successful than another. Jefferson’s argument 
from principle serves to inform the public that rebellion is a possibility but that any 
change in terms between the two societies would be acceptable. Paine, however, never 
 91 
allows the colonists to not follow fully through with the Lockean principles of natural 
rights and the right to revolution. Paine carries out the familiar argument that the King is 
no longer protecting the Colonies and because of this, action is warranted. Jefferson and 
Paine attempt to use the same fundamental framework to further the cause of revolution. 
However, their attempts to get the public to accept the rhetorical syllogism vary quite 
significantly. In this particular instance, arguments of honor and principle are not enough 
to cause men to take up arms. Instead, an argument of expediency seems to legitimate 
action against England.  
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CHAPTER IV 
MADISON AND THE WAR OF 1812 
 
The decision to go to war must often be weighed against considerations of 
capability and benefits; the question of why countries ultimately decide to go to war 
remains a rather inconclusive area of study. In a democratic regime, the individuals or 
groups making the decision to go to war are often responsive to the public and because 
of this, some attention must be accorded to the degree to which elites are able to 
convince men to take up arms. As the previous chapters have indicated, the types of 
arguments used in convincing men to go to war oftentimes involve arguments of 
expediency rather than relying upon arguments from principle or honor. As the 
“American Adolescence” theory suggests, we can expect that arguments of principle or 
honor would be most likely to convince men to take up arms. However, in the case of 
Machiavelli and then with Jefferson and Paine, expedient arguments are more persuasive 
for furthering the cause of war. However, are all arguments of expediency created the 
same?  In this particular chapter, I draw upon Madison’s war rhetoric and the War of 
1812 to focus on whether it is possible to differentiate arguments of expediency into two 
different categories, namely arguments focusing on the security of a country and 
arguments where the future advantage of a country is the primary concern.  
When war is declared, there are often two main reasons: fighting for security and 
fighting for gains or advantages. While the last chapter dealt with a war of security, this 
chapter further dissects types of expedient rhetoric to determine whether security is the 
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prevailing factor for the success of these arguments or do all arguments of expediency 
seem likely to help convince men to take up arms? In this chapter, I focus upon the 
rhetoric of James Madison directly before the War of 1812 to examine whether 
arguments of expediency can be dissected into fighting for national security and fighting 
for high-minded ideals such as sovereignty and preferential trade agreements would be 
likely to convince men to go to war. In this chapter, I argue that Madison uses expedient 
war rhetoric to convince the citizens of the United States that war is necessary with 
Great Britain to create domestic and maritime security. However, I also argue that 
Madison links these arguments of security to arguments about high-minded ideas such as 
future economic advantage for the country. It is through this cooption of security 
arguments that Madison is able to successfully persuade the people that war is necessary 
to protect our country’s borders, but also to fight for future advantage.  
 
A Preface to War 
The United States has always enjoyed the distinct advantage of being 
geographically isolated, with fertile lands and the ability to condition an economy based 
upon the abundant natural resources of the area. These factors contribute to the overall 
ability of the inhabitants of this country to create a government without resorting to force 
and to promote a defensive posture in dealings with other nations.ccxvii With these 
geographic advantages, the United States has been able to formulate a government based 
upon the idea of representation with relatively little influence from other nations. This 
resulting society creates a thought experiment for the realization of an idealized society, 
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for if the United States failed to achieve a society that propagated individual freedom 
and liberties, then perhaps all men would likewise fail in this similar endeavor. As 
Epstein suggests: 
America’s accidental advantages in choosing her own government 
suggest that America can decide what societies of men are really capable 
of in only a limited way. If we fail despite our very favorable 
circumstances, the conclusion must be that men cannot establish 
government by reflection and choice. If we succeed, our reliance on lucky 
accidents suggests that a similar choice will not always or often be 
available to other societies of men.ccxviii 
 
With natural boundaries and ‘lucky accidents’ that help foster this particular approach to 
government, could the United States remain free from external entanglement? 
Immediately following the conclusion of the Revolution, the United States had managed 
to avoid most intrusions from France and Britain and the Zeitgeist favored the idea that 
domestic security was obtainable with little cost.  
Of the multitude of causes that exist for the War of 1812, one of the key events is 
the 1807 Chesapeake Affair in which a British warship boarded the American frigate 
Chesapeake in search of deserters. Perhaps the four dead, seventeen wounded, and four 
captured sailors were enough of a spark to ignite a long and subtle fire that ended with 
the War of 1812, but this was only one incident among numerous others that ultimately 
resulted in the War of 1812. A large literature exists that explores the causes of the 
United States’ second war with Great Britain. Most of these theories further explanations 
pertaining to re-invigorating economic interests, agrarian expansionism into the West 
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and Canada, the need for security against Native Americans or the belief that Britain was 
single-handedly working against the security, national honor, and sovereignty of the 
United States.ccxix The previous studies concerning the War of 1812 follow the debates 
of the War Hawks within Congress and use these dialogues as the primary influence 
drawing the United States into war with Britain.ccxx However, the few studies focusing 
upon the issue the United States going to war in order to reaffirm national sovereignty 
often view sovereignty as a prerequisite for any nation and this idea of sovereignty 
merely grants territorial and trade rights to the nation. These arguments fail to account 
for the view that sovereignty would provide a distinct advantage for a new nation when 
other nations attempted to assert their power and ability over the new nation. In 
particular, these previous arguments recognize sovereignty and national honor as 
concerns of the War Hawks, but rarely does the role of the president serve as anything 
more than a footnote in the dialogue pre-dating the decision to go to war.ccxxi I argue that 
the president is in the unique position to be able to frame and advocate for war and that 
James Madison uses the common themes developed by the War Hawks as a means to 
persuade the masses and the rest of Congress that war with Britain would be required to 
secure future advantages. Further, I argue that Madison views the issue of sovereignty as 
the paramount concern for the United States and uses the incursions of Britain and 
France as the impetus to address the issue of the global recognition of the United States. 
The War of 1812 was the end result of a culmination of events that were 
precipitated from the United States attempting to find its own economic identity during 
the war between Britain and France. Following the Chesapeake Affair in 1807, the 
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United hoped to economically pressure Britain and France to cease their hostilities 
toward American vessels. President Jefferson was able to convince Congress to pass the 
Embargo Act of 1807 that prohibited the exporting of American goods to foreign 
markets.ccxxii This Embargo came in conjunction with Britain’s Orders in Council that, in 
an attempt to limit the availability of supplies to the French, mandated the blockading of 
ports for any ship that had not first traded with England.ccxxiii Alternately, France also 
insisted that the United States limit trade with Britain and began seizing American ships 
that violated the French non-trade agreements directed at limiting supplies to Britain. 
The United States’ non-intercourse acts soon proved to hurt the American economy and 
by 1808 had been largely replaced with policies that promised to confine trade to any 
country that recognized the United States as a neutral entity. As a whole, the policies of 
both Britain and France forced the United States either to allow a foreign government to 
dictate American economic policy or to limit trade with one of the larger markets in 
Europe. While the Embargo was meant to convince these two aggressor nations that the 
United States would not allow a foreign nation to dictate economic policy, this Act 
further strained a stalling economic system in America and soon proved ineffective at 
allowing the United States to remain neutral in the ongoing war between Britain and 
France. Given the inability of the United States to temper the acts of aggression toward 
its vessels, going to war became tantamount to questions of the failing economy. 
To reinvigorate the economy, it was necessary for the United States to be able to 
trade with foreign markets, namely, those of Britain and France. Because Britain 
blockaded French ports to any vessel that had not first stopped at a British port, and 
 102 
France would equally disrupt trade, it became difficult for the United States to maintain 
its economic independence without allying with either France or Britain. Attempting to 
remain neutral and continue trading with both countries was to invite the loss of 
American goods, sailors, and sometimes ships. The process of searching private 
American vessels for contraband on international waters was not illegal according to 
Britain, but for the United States, this was clearly an issue of Britain trespassing on the 
sanctity of U.S. sovereignty. As Burt explains:  
What [Britain] did assert, and the United States deny, was the right to 
search private vessels because this involved no invasion of another 
sovereignty. Both sides were right, Britain by the old usage, and the 
United States by a new doctrine then only beginning to take shape: that a 
country’s ships at sea are detached portions of its soil and therefore 
covered by its sovereignty. Though already admitted for public vessels, it 
was not yet really established for private ones.ccxxiv 
 
This newly identified belief in sovereignty as extending from one’s own soil to private 
ships as well documents the necessity of a continued dialogue over the nature of 
sovereignty and the view of what each country could and could not do. If the United 
States was considered sovereign, then its vessels and trade routes would be protected and 
any trespasses would be punished. Because Britain and France did not embrace this 
definition of sovereignty, long-range security was problematic in that it remained 
difficult to protect American sailors and freight on the high seas.  
A simple definition of sovereignty only addresses the question of who is the 
reigning authority in a nation. However, Holsti introduces a normative distinction that a 
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truly sovereign nation is free to exist without the encroachments of other nations.ccxxv 
While the simple definition encapsulates the degree to which one government is in 
control of a territory, the normative distinction furthers this idea that a nation should be 
free to decide not only issues of governance but also of free trade. Britain’s infringement 
on these maritime rights served, in effect, to suggest that the United States was not seen 
as a fully independent nation and that Britain would violate these rights whenever it is 
convenient. As Holsti explains, “A state is either sovereign or it is not. It cannot be 
partly sovereign or have ‘eroded’ sovereignty no matter how weak or ineffective it may 
be.”ccxxvi These maritime failures signaled that the United States was not considered 
sovereign by England or France and that any country willing to routinely violate the 
rights of a country to govern itself would make paramount the question of security and 
defense. If France or Britain did not consider the United States sovereign, then there 
would also be the concern of whether the United States could secure its own borders and 
protect itself in the face of an overwhelming power. This soon proved to be the vehicle 
from which one could house arguments of advantage as issues of security. 
Because both France and Britain were guilty of impressing American sailors and 
attacking American vessels, it was necessary to distinguish whether both countries posed 
the same threat to the United States. Britain was thought to pose the most immediate 
threat because of its large naval capabilities, while France was recognized as being 
predominantly land based. However, before the War Message to Congress, Madison 
questioned whether war was necessary with both countries. As Madison writes to 
Jefferson, “To go to war with Engd [sic] and not with France arms the Federalists with 
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new matter, and divides the Republicans… To go to war agst [sic] both, presents a 
thousand difficulties, above all, that of shutting all the ports of the Continent of Europe 
agst our Cruisers who can do little without the use of them.”ccxxvii The United States had 
to consider the strategic implications of a “triangular war” and whether it would be 
possible to only combat one belligerent without needing to engage in a second war. As 
Ivie writes: 
Throughout the crisis, representatives of the Federalist majority insisted 
that France would “relinquish her aggressions” if the United States called 
the Directory’s bluff. America needed only to remain alert and militarily 
prepared while keeping open the channels of diplomacy, for the threat 
was one of subversion, subterfuge, and seduction, not direct physical 
confrontation.ccxxviii 
 
The United States would be unable to support a war militarily or economically on two 
fronts. While Britain and France would continue to fight against one another and the 
United States would be the late addition to the war, there was an assessment that 
between Britain and France, France was the more rational of the two countries and the 
most likely to not follow through on threats of attack. By focusing upon only one 
belligerent nation, the United States could hope that this war would signal their resolve 
against the infractions on their sovereignty and this would influence the treatment 
received by the remaining belligerent. As Ivie writes, “The French were portrayed as 
essentially rational adversaries who depended upon deception more than force to attain 
their objectives. Their advance was neither inevitable nor immune to the influence of 
continued diplomacy.”ccxxix Given that continued diplomatic negotiations may work with 
 105 
France and not with England there was the possibility that only one war would be 
necessary. Madison found it imperative to demonstrate that Britain could not be 
reasoned with and that this war would pay dividends to the United States in all future 
international agreements. If the United States can assert its will against one of the 
superior military powers, then all other countries would fall in line and afford America 
the same recognition.  
 
War Hawks and Rhetoric 
 The War Hawks were a group of Republican Congressmen elected to the Twelfth 
Congress who “represented a popular disillusionment with the Jeffersonian system… 
who were determined to assert America’s position in the world.”ccxxx Following the 
numerous incidents with Britain in the years prior to 1812, the War Hawks routinely 
sought to forego the economic remediation employed by the Jeffersonian and early-
Madisonian governments and to actively declare war. The same attempts of previous 
War Hawks in Congress had failed, but in the election of 1810, some 63 new members 
were elected to the House, among whom were Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun.  Henry 
Clay became Speaker of the House for the Twelfth Congress and was able to advance an 
agenda that war with Britain was necessary. Because the War Hawks did not form a 
majority in Congress, they had to demonstrate that not only was war required to regain 
and reassert American sovereignty, but also demonstrate a justification for war with 
Britain, France, or both of these countries.  
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The recent history of France and Great Britain affecting the United States’ 
trading vessels as well as impressing American sailors did little to differentiate the two 
countries. Both had been responsible for multiple transgressions against the United 
States, but in the case of Britain, an argument could be made that these repeated 
transgressions were the signaling of hostile intent and the hope of once again reclaiming 
North America. The same case could not be similarly made for France. Perhaps sensing 
that a war would be necessary in the near future, Congress acted against the will of 
Presidents Jefferson and Madison by increasing the size of the standing army/militia in 
the United States. The first of these increases came in response to the 1807 Chesapeake 
affair and the second came in 1811 following “deteriorating relations with 
England.”ccxxxi The process of increasing the size of the standing armed forces within the 
United States demonstrates that Congress, or at least a particular faction within 
Congress, believed a military initiative would be necessary to curtail the infractions of 
the English against the American commercial sector. The votes to increase the military, 
however, only demonstrate that there was an indication that military action may have to 
be taken against Britain. These military increases represent the awareness that the 
security of the United States and the protection against an invading force was necessary 
but without the votes for a war, there was obviously not enough support for the 
sentiment that the United States should become an aggressor. However, as Risjord 
identifies, for the Twelfth Congress “as significant as the sudden appearance of a few 
talented war hawks… was the gradual conversion of the average Republican from 
Jeffersonian pacifism to a vigorous defense of America’s neutral rights… stemm[ing] 
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primarily from a disillusionment with the old system… and a growing realization that 
the only alternative to war was submission and national disgrace.”ccxxxii 
 Within Congress, there was a consistent syllogism that involved the concept of 
sovereignty. If the United States was a free nation and able to choose its own markets, 
and Britain continuously ignored the rights of the United States’ trade, then either the 
United States was not free or Britain could expect some form of retaliation. An 
additional premise requires that in order for Britain’s actions to be interpreted as part of 
a larger process set to systematically eliminate the freedoms of the United States, then 
there must be apparent victimization and not the happenstance of events that gave the 
appearance that Britain was in a de facto war with the United States. As a means of 
analyzing the recurring themes used in the speeches and public discourse of Congress in 
the years leading up to the formal declaration of war, Hatzenbuehler and Ivie review the 
predominant themes that permeated the Twelfth House, first session of Congress. The 
main two themes are based upon the two concerns of “Depredations on Commerce” and 
“Violations of National Rights.” Combined, these two themes account for a thematic 
density of .209, meaning that depredations on commerce and violations of national rights 
accounted for nearly 21% of all instances of discourse concerning the War of 1812.ccxxxiii 
Most arguments were focused upon the economic impact of the English blockades and 
how these violated the rights of a sovereign nation, furthering the belief that as a 
sovereign nation, the United States should be allowed to trade without the hindrance of 
other nations. England and France’s trade restrictions were meant to further their own 
causes by limiting supplies to their enemies but as Mahon explains, the “British Orders 
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in Council and Napoleon’s Continental system were designed primarily to affect 
England’s manufacturing and shipping. It was incidental that they cut off an essential 
part of America’s trade with Europe . . . at about three-fifths of its level of five years 
earlier.”ccxxxiv  
The trade restrictions that impeded the U.S. economy served to exacerbate the 
dilemma of U.S. and British relations. Because England was consistently losing sailors 
at a rate of 2,500 men a year and needed to replenish their membership, the English 
would routinely seize American vessels in search of British deserters. It was commonly 
thought that the United States was employing British deserters and this was often the 
case. But the process of seizing another nation’s private vessels and impressing its 
sailors into its navy only served to further add to the argument that Britain was violating 
the sovereignty of the United States, regardless of the reasons behind the seizures. As 
Mahon explains, “If the United States could not protect her own nationals from British 
press gangs, she could hardly expect to be considered sovereign.”ccxxxv Coupled with this 
argument was that if the United States was freely allowed to trade with France, then 
England needed to disrupt the supply line of their enemies. The third most used theme 
within Congressional discussions centered on a “repudiation of the retaliation/self-
defense excuse.” Because focusing upon England’s defense of its military actions 
against American commerce was the third most common theme, Congress reiterates that 
Britain feels justified in its actions against the United States. There is the implicit 
distinction that the United States serves only at the pleasure of the British government. 
Without any consideration being given to the United States as its own entity, Britain has 
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unforgivably trespassed upon the ability of a country to decide its own fate. Revisiting 
the earlier syllogism, if the United States is free, then Britain cannot continue this 
infringement without expecting retaliation. 
 
Madisonian Rhetoric 
If one only examines the message of the War Hawks as the sole indicator for 
measuring the temperature of the public for war, then it is far too easy to miss the subtle 
changes and degrees to which Madison influences the decision to go to war. If the War 
Hawks advocate that war is necessary in order to sustain or regain national honor, then it 
is by examining Madison’s multiple writings in the years leading up to the second war 
with Britain that it becomes evident that there was a distinct and but subtle shift in a War 
Message to Congress.ccxxxvi One early example of Madison’s belief in war being used 
only as the last resort for a long and continuing list of grievances is a refutation of Kant’s 
idea of a “Universal Peace.” Writing for the National Gazette in 1792, Madison remarks 
that a wholly peaceful society “will never exist but in the imaginations of visionary 
philosophers, or in the breasts of benevolent enthusiasts.”ccxxxvii Because war is a natural 
extension of men within society, there must be constraints preventing wars of ambition 
and avarice. War, however, can be “divided into two classes; one flowing from the mere 
will of the government, the other according with the will of the society itself.”ccxxxviii The 
remedy to a war stemming from the will of the government is to set the government as 
the subordinate to the will of society. Wars resulting from the will of society “can only 
be controuled by subjecting the will of society to the reason of society; by establishing 
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permanent and constitutional maxims of conduct, which may prevail over occasional 
impressions, and inconsiderate pursuits.”ccxxxix Madison reveals a circular logic 
concerning war in that government should not commit to war unless the public decides it 
is necessary and, as a whole, reason will temper the will of the public in matters of 
conflict.  
Even with conflict being the possible extension of governments and society, 
there exists the primary motivation of regaining honor and justice before allowing 
bloodshed to occur. In 1807, Secretary of State Madison wrote to James Monroe, the 
United States’ plenipotentiary to Britain, about the impressments of American sailors by 
the British navy. The tone of the letter suggests that the United States seeks for Britain to 
acknowledge that their actions threatened the sovereignty of the United States and there 
should be an immediate reparation paid by Britain “not less by a sense of its own honor, 
than by justice to that of the United States.”ccxl Madison’s letter to Monroe focuses upon 
the issue of sovereignty as the chief concern and the majority of the letter focuses upon 
rectifying this outrage before any other business can be attended to. Madison writes 
about numerous cases that Monroe can use as examples for Britain when other nations 
had their sovereignty encroached upon. In each of these cases, the nation responsible for 
overstepping their jurisdiction and violating the sovereignty of other nations, a formal 
apology would be issued. The impressments of American sailors are not the chief 
concern, nor should they be. The particular concern reiterated is that Britain should 
reaffirm the sovereignty of the United States.  
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Madison makes a principled argument concerning these international incidents. 
The apology of Britain to the United States is the foremost goal that Jefferson’s 
government hopes to achieve. As Madison explains, “The President has an evident right 
to expect from the British Government, not only an ample reparation to the United States 
in this case, but that it will be decided without difficulty or delay.”ccxli The belief that 
Britain should quickly respond to such incidents suggests that the United States wants an 
immediate rectification, but that also this rectification signals that Britain values and is 
attempting to stay in the good graces of the United States. If Britain refuses to apologize, 
Madison asserts that Monroe should send all American vessels home and further, “All 
negotiations with the British Government on other subjects will, of course, be suspended 
until satisfaction on this be so pledged and arranged as to render negotiation 
honorable.”ccxlii The preoccupation with honor suggests that the United States seeks 
formally to be recognized as a legitimate power within the realm of international affairs. 
Madison does not seek to force Britain to acknowledge that its own policies of 
blockading ports and impressing sailors would place these two countries at war with 
another. Rather, Madison offers Britain a measure of recourse by suggesting that “it is 
not easy to suppose, that so rash and critical a step, should have originated with the 
admiral; but it is still more difficult to believe, that such orders were prescribed by any 
Government, under circumstances, such as existed between Great Britain and the United 
States.”ccxliii As the final measure of suggesting that the United States’ national honor is 
being threatened by England, Madison urges Monroe to “communicat[e] to the Russian 
Minister at London, the hostile insult which has been offered, as well as the resort which 
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may become necessary on our part, to measures constituting or leading to war…”ccxliv 
While Madison does not believe that war would be necessary, this is the first 
consideration that national honor and the recognition of sovereignty is of primary 
importance for the United States.  
Two years after the Chesapeake incident and after continued issues with the 
European belligerents, Madison’s First Inaugural Address reaffirms the United States’ 
commitment to constitutionalism and the spirit of liberalism in the international arena. 
By “indulging no passions which trespass on the rights or the repose of other nations, it 
has been the true glory of the United States to cultivate peace by observing justice, and 
to entitle themselves to the respect of the nations at war by fulfilling their neutral 
obligations with the most scrupulous impartiality.”ccxlv Madison denotes that the United 
States will refuse to be drawn into the skirmish between France and Great Britain and 
that continued trade and relations with these foreign markets is the primary objective. 
The emphasis that each nation at war can expect to be treated impartially serves to 
reaffirm that the United States does not wish to enter into any form of preferential trade 
agreement with either Britain or France, but instead wants to rely upon a fair and open 
market with the whole of Europe. However, “This unexceptionable course could not 
avail against the injustice and violence of the belligerent powers . . . [their] principles of 
retaliation have been introduced equally contrary to universal reason and acknowledged 
law.”ccxlvi Madison relates that Britain and France have acted against their own best 
interests and have committed criminal acts in their attempts to limit the capabilities of 
their opponents. This process endangers other nations that seek only to sustain free trade 
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and a liberal disposition toward all countries. Because war threatens to engulf multiple 
nations due to the actions of England and France, the all too possible scenario 
developing in 1809 is that the United States is drawn into a war in which there will be 
clearly defined victors. Madison is aware that the United States will have difficulty 
remaining neutral against belligerents and their courses of retaliation. 
While the first half of Madison’s First Inaugural Address identifies the goals and 
aims of the United States and ultimately the international climate during this time period, 
Madison uses the second half of the address to reaffirm his devotion to liberal principles. 
Madison pledges to use the office of the Executive “to cherish peace and friendly 
intercourse with all nations having correspondent dispositions; to maintain sincere 
neutrality toward belligerent nations; to prefer in all cases amicable discussion and 
reasonable accommodation of differences to a decision of them by an appeal to 
arms…”ccxlvii This commitment to principled non-aggression juxtaposes the position of 
the Executive to the position of the War Hawks in later years. Madison’s rhetoric clearly 
denounces any country that would look to conflict in hopes of solving minor 
disagreements. Madison’s earlier writings and even his First Inaugural Address focus 
upon the lofty ideals of honor, justice, and sovereignty.  
For Madison, however, the idea of sovereignty is not solely a concern for the 
recognition of a governing body as being the rightful government for a nation, but there 
are also considerations associated with unregulated trade in the international market. 
This approach to world politics focuses on sovereignty as a precursor to the advantage 
such recognition would bestow on a nation. Given the particular predicament of the 
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United States at the time of the wars between France and England, the U.S. is 
precariously close to becoming a de facto colony of Britain once again. If the recognition 
of government and free trade markets were the principal intentions of the United States 
prior to the War of 1812, then it becomes apparent that the principled rhetoric and mere 
allusion to conflict was not enough to achieve these goals.ccxlviii Beginning with 
Madison’s First Annual Address and continuing through the War Message to Congress, 
there is a clear addition of exigent language marking a deviation from the principled 
rhetoric and neutral disposition found in Madison’s earlier works.  
 
Madison’s Use of War Hawk Imagery 
The injustices of Britain’s actions toward the United States began to elevate the 
domestic temperature and Madison’s addresses to Congress also begin to reflect these 
rising tensions. While Madison’s earlier writings and First Inaugural Address 
demonstrate a primarily principled approach for international advantage, the Second 
Annual Message to Congress serves as an early example of combining questions of 
security and expediency along with the desire for advantage. If the United States hoped 
to remain secure on its soil, then it would be necessary to strengthen the military’s 
capabilities and armaments. These increases in defensive capabilities could also be used 
offensively and by 1810, the United States had begun to fortify strategic areas within the 
country in hopes of successfully repealing any attacks from Britain or Native Americans. 
Madison also recognized that securing the borders and increasing weapons would not be 
enough to stave off disaster. He thus attempted to improve the system for training 
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commissioned and non-commissioned officers by asking for updated academies. 
Madison requested that Congress revise the law to allow for another military academy 
because “the means by which war, as well for defense as for offense, are now carried on 
render these schools of the more scientific operations an indispensable part of every 
adequate system . . . In no other way, probably, can a provision of equal efficacy for the 
public defense be made at so little expense or more consistently with the public 
liberty.”ccxlix While there is no direct mention that the United States is preparing an 
offensive campaign, Madison realizes that the efficacy of the armed forces is contingent 
on the defensive as well as the offensive capabilities of the military. The public funding 
of military academies, along with increased armaments and defensive preparations, 
transforms the public culture from victimage to empowerment. Madison’s requests for 
an increase in the academies signals that the United States is no longer at the mercy of 
Britain and security can now be achieved. The added bonus is that retaliation is also an 
option.  
While the Second Annual Message to Congress reports on the further 
deteriorating conditions between the United States and Britain, it is the Third Annual 
Message that addresses the pending conflict between the two countries. Madison 
discusses Britain’s Orders in Council and the United States’ improved negotiations with 
France. After the restrictions on trade were resolved between the French and the US, 
Britain indicated that its Orders in Council would be revoked. However, “instead of this 
reasonable step toward satisfaction and friendship between the two nations, the orders 
were, at a moment when least to have been expected, put into more rigorous execution 
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… [and] the United States being given to understand that in the mean time a continuance 
of their nonimportation act would lead to measures of retaliation.”ccl Britain’s Orders in 
Council were not only limiting the ability of the United States to trade with foreign 
markets, but Britain had also demanded, under threat of retaliation, that the United States 
revoke its own laws regarding the ability to economically regulate its trade practices. 
The demand for the United States to relinquish its ability to dictate fiscal policy 
undermines any definition of sovereignty by effectively allowing its government to be 
controlled by the threats of another nation. Britain’s demands  “under existing 
circumstances have the character as well as the effect of war on [the United States’] 
lawful commerce.”ccli The United States is therefore placed in the peculiar position of 
allowing its own rights to be infringed on or allowing another nation to systematically 
control the practices of its government. This process is tantamount to being bullied by a 
superior force and Madison’s Third Annual Message suggests that  
Congress will feel the duty of putting the United States into an armor and 
an attitude demanded by the crisis . . . I can not close this communication 
without expressing my deep sense of the crisis in which you are 
assembled, my confidence in a wise and honorable result to your 
deliberations . . . and on all the means that may be employed in 
vindicating [the United States’] rights and advancing its welfare.cclii 
 
The Third Annual Message to Congress advances the distinction between arguments of 
principle and arguments of expediency. While Madison has not openly requested that 
Congress declare war, this is the only conclusion that can be drawn from the implied 
syllogistic principle. If the United States is a free country, then it should be allowed to 
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decide its own trading practices. If England can dictate American policy then the United 
States is not free. Madison’s Third Annual Message asks Congress to decide whether the 
United States is a free country or not and then to decide the appropriate action. 
Rhetorically, Madison’s War Message to Congress on June 1, 1812 develops a 
more nuanced characterization of the relationship between the United States and Britain. 
In this writing, Madison deviates from his typical approach of overarching principled 
arguments toward free trade and sovereignty and provides a linkage explicitly equating 
England’s regulation of international trade to an act of war. Adopting the same rhetoric 
as the War Hawks, Madison explains that Britain is a belligerent nation that is routinely 
violating international trade agreements and treaties by treating the United States, a 
neutral nation, as an opponent in war. Under the guise of national defense, “British 
cruisers have been in the continued practice of violating the American flag on the great 
highway of nations, and of seizing and carrying off persons sailing under it, not in the 
exercise of a belligerent right founded on the law of nations against an enemy, but of a 
municipal prerogative over British subjects.”ccliii In these instances, Britain refused to 
recognize the sovereignty of the United States and seized vessels and sailors with the 
explanation that these vessels were supplying the enemy and that the sailors were 
originally British subjects. Madison maintains that these continuous transgressions mark 
either a continuation of the Revolutionary War or a failure to recognize the United States 
as a sovereign and neutral nation. Either reasoning furthers the argument that America is 
a victim of a superior nation and the only adequate response would be to wage a war 
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against Britain in order to reassert national identity and to regain the recognition of 
sovereignty. As Ivie explains,  
Prowar rhetors perform the ritual of victimage as they cultivate images of 
a savage enemy. Through analogical extensions, they articulate a theme 
of diabolism that, taken literally, goads nations into defending themselves 
against barbarians bent upon subjugating innocent peoples. Voices of 
belligerence, disguised in the overtones of pacific ideals, promise 
salvation to those who would vanquish satan’s surrogate.ccliv 
 
While the distinct definition of sovereignty remained a loose principle in the early 19th 
century, Madison attempts to define sovereignty as not only allowing a country to 
govern itself, but additionally to allow a government to interact at will with other nations 
in the international arena. Britain’s encroachment upon shipping rights potentially serves 
to further deteriorate the sovereignty of the United States and provides for a tacit consent 
to British dominance.  
Madison explains that Britain’s use of the self-defense argument as a justification 
for the subjugation of the United States does not exist as a preventive measure to stop 
the supplies to enemies. Rather this subjugation exists because Britain is attempting to 
dominate the seas for its own commercial benefit. Madison asserts that “it has become, 
indeed, sufficiently certain that the commerce of the United States is to be sacrificed, not 
as interfering with the belligerent rights of Great Britain; not as supplying the wants of 
her enemies, which she herself supplies; but as interfering with the monopoly which she 
covets for her own commerce and navigation.”cclv However, outside of the territorial 
demarcations, the seas of the world are part of the “great highway of nations.” 
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Emphasizing this highway of nations allows Madison to proclaim that international 
commerce is dependent upon free and open access to other nations. This need for 
maritime independence is afforded to all sovereign nations in times of peace and 
England has repeatedly violated the rights of a non-aggressive nation. Because the 
United States relies upon shipping and access to foreign markets as a cornerstone of its 
economy, Madison’s emphasis on commercial considerations between Britain and the 
United States serves to couple economic independence with fiscal security. Each of these 
economic realities requires that the United States is able to act upon its own interests 
without relying upon Britain to approve its enterprises.  
 Because England is characterized as a country that only wants to preserve its 
own commercial and navigation rights, it is effectively demonized through its actions 
toward American commerce. As a former colony, the United States once deferred to 
Great Britain in matters of trade and navigation. Though the Treaty of Paris should have 
ended any particular deference to the former colonizers, Jay’s Treaty saw a continuation 
of English superiority to American shipping rights. Under this treaty, the overall 
sovereignty of the United States was in danger because of the lack of free and equal 
access to shipping rights. Madison identifies the “great highway of nations” as a 
metaphor to explain the United States coming into its own as a legitimate country in the 
world. As Feldman explains this metaphor, “Since the sea is a means of transport open to 
all nations, for a country to threaten this free ‘highway’ was to pose a potential danger to 
the entire world.”cclvi Since the United States is unable to offer fully adequate protection 
to its shipping industry, it is forced to remain politically neutral in a divided European 
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front. This political neutrality ultimately has an economic undertone, which 
subsequently positions economic interests as a cornerstone of all discussions of national 
independence.  
To threaten the United States’ ability to freely conduct maritime commerce is to 
threaten the independence of the nation. As Madison writes, “British cruisers . . . hover 
over and harass our entering and departing commerce . . . and have wantonly spilt 
American blood within the sanctuary of our territorial jurisdiction.”cclvii Madison 
reiterates that not only has Britain constricted the flow of American trade, but it has gone 
as far as to attack sailors in United States waters. The occurrence of attacks within the 
territorial waters of the United States presents the image of a country that will stop at no 
end in order to control the seas. As Ivie explains, “Above all else, the function of prowar 
rhetoric is to establish a ‘realistic’ image of the enemy’s savagery in order to eliminate 
peace as a viable alternative to war. The metaphor of force is the constitutive form of 
that image, and the rest of the prowar discourse serves largely to embellish the trope 
until its literalization has been completed.”cclviii This embellishment of tropes, however, 
serves to frame only one possible interpretation for the actions of England at the 
exclusion of other potential explanations. If one can convince the audience to look past 
all other rational explanations and focus only upon the syllogism provided by Madison, 
then the conclusion has to follow rationally as well. In this case, Britain is attempting to 
subjugate and/or recolonize its commercial rival.cclix As Ivie explains, “Britain’s coercive 
means and aggressive ends were identical; appeals to reason were futile; the drive to 
destroy had blinded the beast even to its own best interests. Force defined the enemy’s 
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conduct, the enemy’s methods, the enemy’s motives, and the victim’s recourse – all to 
the exclusion of other possibilities.”cclx In this sense, war was the only outcome that 
could be derived from the nature of the actions against the United States. Congress 
reiterates this message in their discourse within the House of Representatives and the 
President also serves to catalyze this belief. 
 
Aftermath 
 The United States formally declared war on Britain in June of 1812. Skirmishes 
between the two countries took place on the seas and also within the United States with 
varying degrees of success for both countries. The hostilities between England and the 
United States lasted for nearly 30 months and ended in a virtual stalemate. A peace 
treaty between England and the United States was signed in Ghent, Belgium on 
December 24, 1814 with a formal ratification by the United States on February 17, 1815. 
The results of the war served as a basis for which England and the United States returned 
the property each country had seized during the course of hostilities and to redefine the 
geographic boundaries surrounding the United States and Canada. While both sides of 
the war benefited from the halt in hostilities, Madison was able to frame the war as a 
major success for the United States.  
The goal of the United States at the outset of war was to cease British hostilities 
toward American maritime commerce and for the recognition of the United States’ 
sovereignty by the English. Madison had originally framed the goal of the war as a 
means of achieving the security of American vessels on the seas and also the securing of 
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the borders within the United States. As Madison’s “Message to Congress on the Peace 
Treaty” explains, “The late war, although reluctantly declared by Congress, had become 
a necessary resort to assert the rights and independence of the nation. It has been waged 
with a success which is the natural result of the wisdom of the legislative councils…”cclxi 
The Treaty of Ghent provided for an immediate cessation to the British policy of seizing 
American vessels and also returned the United States to the level of non-hostility toward 
the Native Americans that had allied with Britain. Both of these outcomes were 
favorable for the American cause of securing commercial property and domestic 
security. These outcomes allowed Madison and Congress to claim a victory for the War 
of 1812 and to provide tangible evidence that the desired outcomes had been achieved.  
Madison’s principled arguments about achieving future advantage remain a little 
more difficult to ascertain. During Madison’s Seventh Annual Message to Congress, he 
reiterates the primary goals of the war and defines the ways in which future advantage 
had been achieved. As Madison writes, “It is another source of satisfaction that the treaty 
of peace with Great Britain has been succeeded by a convention on the subject of 
commerce… which it may be hoped will be improved into liberal arrangements on other 
subjects on which the parties have mutual interests, or which might endanger their future 
harmony.”cclxii While the Treaty of Ghent does little to improve the immediate position 
of the United States within the realm of territorial gains, it is perceived as a success 
because England is willing to negotiate with the United States concerning future 
agreements. These extra considerations can be interpreted as England beginning to 
reverse its previous position against the United States and it symbolizes that in the 
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international arena, the United States is free to decide its own fate. England’s willingness 
to offer these new considerations to the United States also helps to assuage fears that 
Britain was attempting to recolonize the United States. While the United States did not 
gain any territory, the conclusion of the War of 1812 allowed the United States to enter 
into a golden era without any immediate hostilities.  
 
Conclusion 
 Though there are a multitude of reasons for the War of 1812, very few studies 
have explored the impact of rhetoric or more specifically the impact of Madison’s 
rhetoric on influencing the decision for war. Most studies focus upon the influence of the 
War Hawks for reaching the critical mass needed to gain the vote needed for a 
declaration of war but these studies fail to account for the subtle change in rhetorical 
styles and the use of expedient and principled arguments to influence the decision-
making process. And while many events foreshadowed the war that pitted the United 
States against the dominant European power of Britain, perhaps the War of 1812 started 
when Britain first boarded the American frigate Chesapeake in 1807. However, without 
a formal declaration of war for another five years, this hardly seems the case.  
 Prior to the formal declaration of war, Madison relied upon principled arguments 
to suggest that war was not necessary to halt a belligerent nation. His belief was that a 
neutral nation could remain so against two superior military forces. However, these 
military forces soon began to impede on the ability of the United States to remain 
neutral. While the Chesapeake affair and the impressments of American sailors signaled 
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that British aggression would overrun the United States if unchecked, this incident also 
served as a vehicle from which Madison was able to form a list of grievances against 
Britain. Realizing that it would be difficult to gain support based solely on the belief that 
war would allow the United States to redefine the idea of sovereignty, Madison found it 
necessary to address the nation’s primary concern, that of securing the United States and 
its commerce from attacks by the British. By using the desire to obtain security in the 
face of Britain’s aggression, Madison is able to address questions of advantage such as 
the redefinition of sovereignty.   
 Madison’s rhetoric, prior to the War of 1812, focused upon accentuating liberal 
principles as well as arguments of honor and principle to explain why the United States 
would remain neutral in the escalating conflict between France and Britain. Had 
Madison continued these ideals even while advocating war, then it is entirely possible 
that this particular incident would reaffirm the “American adolescence” theory. 
However, Madison only relies upon this use of honor and principle while attempting to 
keep the United States out of conflict. As Madison and the War Hawks begin to argue 
for the necessity of going to war, there is a shift in the prevailing argument of the day. 
Madison envisions that there is a need for expedient political arguments to help persuade 
the people that liberty is being threatened and immediate action is necessary to protect 
the United States. While the Machiavelli, Jefferson and Paine, and Madison chapters 
suggest that arguments of expediency are better able to help “convince men to take up 
arms,” is there a particular type of rhetoric that can help defuse arguments for war? 
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CHAPTER V 
HEARING A DIFFERENT DRUMMER: THOREAU’S PRINCIPLED ANTI-WAR 
RHETORIC 
 
 One of the key components of readying a population for war or any act that 
creates a division in the population is the prevalence of rhetoric that demonizes an 
opponent, expedites action, and ultimately minimizes discourse. The rhetoric 
surrounding the issue of slavery and the Mexican-American war emphasizes dialogue 
that reduces empathy and seeks solely to create a cleavage between the two opposed 
groups. The expedient arguments used by pro-war advocates helps to streamline debate 
by creating heuristics that are adopted by the prevailing society and serve to circumvent 
rational thought. In my previous chapters, I focused upon the use of arguments of 
expediency and how these convinced me to take up arms. However, in this chapter, I 
focus upon whether there is a form of argument that can diffuse an expedient argument 
for war? This chapter focuses upon the use of principled arguments as a focal point for 
engendering dissent within a community and allowing the dissidents to serve a key role 
within a society, that of a citizen critic. I argue that principled arguments serve to 
counter expedient rhetoric and the degree to which dehumanizing rhetoric successfully 
creates two separate group dynamics, those for and against slavery. Specifically, this 
chapter explores the rhetorical discourse used to re-open public dialogue when a set 
course of action has been decided upon and the role of a citizen critic in these instances.  
In a rhetorical analysis of Henry David Thoreau’s writings, I examine the degree 
to which anti-majoritarian rhetoric is capable of producing a principled alternative to 
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expedient rhetoric and thus serves as a political instrument for which to allow open 
public dissent and discussion of government policies. In particular, I investigate the 
political context in the United States surrounding the Mexican-American War and 
ultimately the issue of slavery within the new territories of the United States. I focus 
specifically upon Thoreau’s writings concerning John Brown and Resistance to Civil 
Government and find that principled arguments in Thoreau’s writings serve two 
purposes. The first is to activate the language needed to rework the reigning assumptions 
about a publicly accepted course of action. The second purpose is to transform these 
principled arguments into a more socially acceptable form of public dialogue. 
In the traditional sense of democratic and public discourse, the individual is 
assumed to agree tacitly with any laws that the majority of individuals have deemed as 
necessary. In democratic society, every individual is expected to uphold the norms of 
citizenship, such as paying taxes and obeying laws. While the individual is the base unit 
of analysis, the view of the individual is aggregated into one unit and assumed to be the 
view of society. This resulting aggregation is supposed as the consent of all citizens but 
often ignores the rights of the individual. The distinction between the rights of the 
individual and the prerogative of society can come into conflict when the source of 
contention involves questions of morality. Individuals are often pulled into conflict with 
society when issues involving military action arise and there is the obligation to follow 
the declarations of the governing body. While the corpus of this dissertation follows the 
use of expedient political arguments and the likelihood of swaying the public toward 
war, this particular chapter qualifies the idea that expedient arguments can always gain 
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public support for war. Further, arguments of moral principle can actually serve to 
diffuse arguments of expediency.  
 
The Mexican-American War 
The historical context surrounding the issue of slavery in the United States was 
brought to the forefront once Texas was able to win its independence from Mexico in 
1836. As a newly independent nation, Texas asked for diplomatic recognition from the 
United States with the underlying assumption that Texas would soon be annexed by the 
United States. If Texas were to join the United States, the number of Senators from slave 
states would increase and the free-state Senators would be forced to adopt pro-slavery 
legislation. As McCaffrey explains, northern congressmen “… feared that the admission 
of Texas as a slave state would not only disrupt the balance of power between free and 
slave states in the U.S. Senate but would also allow the further expansion of slavery into 
the Southwest.”cclxiii As Texas would add more territory to the United States, the 
potential for settling the territory of Texas and the areas west of Texas became realized 
and under the Missouri Compromise, these territories of modern-day Texas, New 
Mexico, Arizona, and California would only further add to the rule of pro-slavery 
Senators. While this debate was temporarily contained when President Jackson 
recognized Texas as an independent nation, the argument concerning the admissions of 
slave states versus the admission of free states still generated much contention between 
the congressional forces of the Whigs and Democrats in the Senate. This question of the 
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admission of states was coupled with the question of whether or not the United States 
should continue to expand its territory by pursuing its ‘manifest destiny.’  
Because President Jackson’s recognition of Texas as an independent nation 
delayed the question concerning annexation, the debate about the admittance of free and 
slave states was successfully delayed as well. The political climate in Texas and the 
United States changed briefly over the course of several presidents of both countries and 
the desire to see Texas annexed also changed with each president. A war with Mexico 
was foreseen as the end result of annexing Texas and the question of expanding the 
United States through an aggressive military posture was also raised. The Whigs in the 
Senate favored a seemingly pacifistic approach to expanding the territory of the United 
States, whereas the Democrats were stronger proponents of using whatever means 
necessary to realize the dream of manifest destiny. In 1843, President John Tyler made 
the first legitimate attempt to annex Texas, but the initial vote was defeated along 
partisan lines with 28 of the 29 Whig Senators voting against it.  
The attempt to annex Texas failed in 1844 but this process was soon 
reinvigorated when James Polk was later elected president that November. A 
combination of efforts from President Tyler and President-Elect Polk allowed for the 
passage of a joint resolution that would allow Texas to be annexed so long as Texas 
approved. Texas officially became the 28th state to enter the Union in December 1845. 
Before the annexation of Texas was official, there were territorial disputes between 
Texas and Mexico concerning where the official boundaries of Texas ended. Once Texas 
became a state, these territorial boundary issues became a point of contention between 
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the United States and Mexico with the full weight of the United States army and navy to 
add pressure to a beneficial recognition of Texas’ boundaries. During this same period of 
time, Mexico was involved with threats of revolution in California and it appeared that 
Mexico would be unable to defend itself in a war with the United States.cclxiv Knowing 
these terms, Polk offered Mexico the sum of $2 million to settle the boundary dispute 
with Texas and another $25 million for the territory of California. As Graebner explains, 
“Having rejected negotiation in the face of superior force, Mexico would meet the 
challenge with a final gesture of defiance.”cclxv  
The decision to enter into a war is often filled with complex calculations 
concerning considerations about the hostility of the opponent as well as the opponent’s 
military capability. While the territory dispute between Texas and Mexico was not 
resolved, there were no significant skirmishes between the two countries before the U.S. 
military incursion and so this issue could be largely ignored until another time. In 1845-
1846, Mexico’s military power was in decline. Coupled with the issue of flare-ups in 
California, there was little hope of Mexico successfully defending itself from American 
aggression. After a border patrol was attacked in the contested territory between Texas 
and Mexico, President Polk used this opportunity to make a case for war and Congress 
approved the declaration, with most Whigs voting against the war. In the case of public 
opinion, because Congress had declared war, the citizens were largely expected to accept 
this decision. However, entering into this conflict could hardly be claimed to reflect the 
preferences of the entire United States. Instead, the arguments concerning war with 
Mexico clearly delineated along the lines of Democrats and Whigs and this entire 
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process questioned whether the main causes of the war were merely the lust for territory 
or the desire to add more slave states to the Union.  
 The final vote for the declaration of war eventually included the votes of Whigs, 
but the entire process created massive tension between the Democrats and the Whigs. 
The Whigs, having voted to declare war on Mexico, were unable to completely dissent 
from the Democrats and President Polk and indeed had to help furnish supplies for the 
war effort. However, due to the public impression that the Mexican-American War had 
been too aggressive toward Mexico and possibly unconstitutional, the Democrats soon 
lost favor with the public and Whig war general Zachary Taylor soon rose to 
prominence. While Taylor owned slaves, he was able to successfully navigate the 
addition of California and New Mexico to the Union and allow these states to write their 
own constitutions without Congress being forced to make the distinction of having these 
proslavery or antislavery states. After Taylor’s short-lived presidency, Millard Fillmore 
assumed the office and mostly reversed the policies of Taylor’s presidency, leading to 
further difficulties between the proslavery and antislavery forces.cclxvi 
  
Thoreau 
Henry David Thoreau, a strong proponent of Transcendentalism and a staunch 
abolitionist, was born in Concord, Massachusetts in 1817. Spending the majority of his 
life in the northeast, Thoreau graduated from Harvard and was close friends with 
contemporaries such as Emerson, another key figure in the Transcendentalist movement. 
Thoreau tried his hand at a multitude of occupations throughout the course of his life, 
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but spent his primary time as an educator, surveyor, philosopher, and always an essayist 
(at Emerson’s urging). These experiences offered Thoreau the unique perspective to not 
only critique industry, but also the belief that an individual should not need to solely rely 
upon society as a means for industry. As Thoreau wrote in his Harvard College report 
about his encounters post-graduation, “… I have found out a way to live without what is 
commonly called employment or industry attractive or otherwise.”cclxvii Included in this 
idea of living without a steady stream of employment, Thoreau left civilization for a 
couple of years in hopes that time away would allow him to concentrate on his writing 
and allow him to refine his thoughts concerning man and nature. While the questionable 
employment record and the idea of communion with nature are often used to define 
Thoreau, this is hardly the criteria that should be used to gauge Thoreau’s impact on 19th 
century social reform. The questions of slavery and the annexation of new territory for 
the United States was a key element of discourse throughout the mid-1800s and Thoreau 
addressed these issues along with key abolitionists and Transcendentalists. Believing 
that individuals should cast off society’s grip on the lives of the citizens, Thoreau offers 
a channel through which individuals could examine their belief systems and conceivably 
organize social interaction through a moral lens.  
The Mexican-American war was not a popular among the Whigs in the northern 
parts of the United States. While Southern Democrats supported the expansion of the 
United States and the hope that these newly gained territories would be slave states, this 
could hardly be thought to be the preference of the entire country. As the role of the 
individual within a representative democracy is diminished the point of only serving as a 
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single vote to elect a representative, Thoreau openly questions whether the individual 
should give up his ability to be a conscientious citizen. As a response to the Mexican-
American War, Thoreau wrote Resistance to Civil Government in hopes of challenging 
the presumptive approach of other citizens. Thoreau asks, “Must the citizen ever for a 
moment, or in the least degree, resign his conscience to the legislator? Why has every 
man a conscience, then? I think that we should be men first, and subjects 
afterward.”cclxviii Thoreau elucidates the distinction between majoritarian rule and the 
role of the individual within a society concerning arguments. Seeking a relativistic 
approach, Thoreau invokes the Aristotelian idea of whether there is but one way to argue 
for a specific course of action within a society. As the Congressional declaration of war 
indicates only one set action and path for the United States to follow, Thoreau declares 
that the subjects of deliberation are “… capable of admitting two possibilities; for no one 
debates things incapable of being different either in past or future or present.”cclxix Given 
that there exist several given paths for any action that occurs, the decision-making of the 
Legislator cannot be assumed to replace the voice and conscience of the ordinary citizen. 
In these cases, Thoreau legitimates the role of principled dissent as another forum for the 
individual, a role that is rarely acknowledged within the scope of democratic 
government.  
 The political language of Thoreau follows a linguistic meme that is defined by 
the American Revolution. Given the assumption that American identity was closely 
intertwined with the ideas of political and economic representation within a legislature, 
the values of freedom and liberty would naturally follow suit once representation had 
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been achieved. As Rosenblum explains, Thoreau operates under the assumption that the 
Revolution of 1776 and, ultimately, democratic consent provide the basis for all forms of 
political vocabulary within the United States.cclxx By continuing the Revolutionary 
meme, Thoreau can link the ideas that democratic consent is an inherent aspect of 
political representation and that the current form of government fails to adequately 
account for the consent of all members of society, namely, the rights and roles of 
members of the population in the minority that oppose the expansion of territory through 
aggressive military action. As Rosenblum explains,  
We think we know what counts as consent, but Thoreau casts doubt on 
the usual institutional mechanisms for signaling democratic consent. 
Beyond that, he advises that the great question has become how 
individuals withhold or withdraw consent – for which there is no 
precedent and no philosophical authority. Above all, democracy must be 
recognized as an invitation to cast not one’s vote only, but ‘one’s whole 
influence.’cclxxi 
 
This process for securing consent revolves around the idea that members of the minority 
are able to identify and mark their preferences as adeptly as members of the majority 
party. If the democratic society still continues to ignore the protests of the minority party 
and commits injustices upon other groups, namely those of the Whigs, then Thoreau 
offers a possible remedy. 
Resistance to Civil Government is often summarized with the idea that the 
individual must peacefully withdraw from the luxuries and advantages of government as 
a form of protest when a government fails to enact the interests of the minority party.  
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This approach mistakenly fails to acknowledge Thoreau as an inherently political being 
seeking to change the government. In general, acts of civil disobedience are not solely 
designated as acts of silent or even peaceful protest. Hendrick and Hendrick suggest that 
civil disobedience can occur whenever an individual decides to resist openly the laws of 
a society. This act does not have to be peaceful it only has to be marked with conscious 
resistance to the laws and political elite of a time and place. As Hendrick and Hendrick 
explain, the actions of “thousands of slaves during the Revolutionary War [becoming] 
free by joining British forces. By such action they were declaring civil disobedience 
against slaveholders and the Continental Congress.”cclxxii This particular distinction that 
civil disobedience lacks a coordinated civility affords an individual the ability to 
recognize that any form of protest that does not seek to overthrow a government directly 
may in fact be an act of civil disobedience. Authors such as Drinnon, Goldman, and 
Krutch have argued that Thoreau was everything from an anarchist to an 
individualist.cclxxiii The wide range of interpretations of Resistance to Civil Government 
and Walden look toward the act of Thoreau retreating to Walden Pond as the telltale 
marker for what an individual ‘ought’ to do in a society that acts against man’s own 
moral compass. Looking solely to Thoreau’s individualism blinds these works to the 
larger implications that a nuanced view of Thoreau’s argument resides in creating a 
bastion for the minority within a society when the majority dominates government.  
 While there have been many arguments that suggest Thoreau fails to have 
anything more than a modicum of political thought, Stanley Cavell forcefully asserts that 
Thoreau’s work deserves an important place in the canon of political thought. Instead of 
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viewing it as an exercise in Transcendentalism, Cavell argues that Thoreau’s Walden can 
be understood as a normative blueprint for how individuals should act in a democratic 
society.cclxxiv More recently, Walker explores Thoreau’s chapter “The Bean Field” as a 
metaphor for democratic cultivation, most notably asserting that “…cultivation can be 
seen either as planting crops or as a politically relevant process by means of which an 
individual or a group attempts to call forth and develop dispositions that align with and 
embody ethico-politco ideals…”cclxxv Although Cavell and Walker make these 
observations solely with regard to Walden as a political tract, the same idea can be 
extended to some of Thoreau’s other works, notably Life without Principle, Slavery in 
Massachusetts, and the John Brown letters. As James C. Scott explains, a relationship of 
‘domination’ exists between members of the population who are in power versus those 
who are found in the minority. Scott explains, “Once established, domination does not 
persist of its own momentum. Inasmuch as it involves the use of power to extract work, 
production, services, taxes against the will of the dominated, it generates considerable 
friction and can be sustained only by continuous efforts at reinforcement, maintenance, 
and adjustment.”cclxxvi This attempt at reinforcing the ideology of the class has to be 
continuously renewed in order to convince the majority party that no change can come 
as a result of criticism and this particular act is the will of the people as a whole. As 
Scott further explains, “By persuading underclasses that their position, their life-chances, 
their tribulations are unalterable and inevitable, such a limited hegemony can produce 
the behavioral results of consent without necessarily changing people’s values.”cclxxvii 
Because the Mexican-American War has been authorized by a majority of Congress, the 
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minority of the population should then dismiss any anti-war arguments because their 
tacit consent has been guaranteed by the election of representatives. Thoreau seeks to 
change this paradigm by insisting that the role of the individual does not exist solely as a 
means to elect Representatives.  
For Thoreau to stimulate principled dissent amongst the population, he has to 
show that the duty of each individual exists not in the realm of representation, but that 
the true role of the individual is to achieve a high moral standard for personal conduct 
and that man’s moral compass exists independently of societal norms. As Tauber 
suggests, “Thoreau’s moral philosophy is dangerously solipsistic; narcissistic to the 
extreme, Thoreau’s morality was built from the precept that the protection of his 
autonomy was the crucial and abiding parameter of moral action.”cclxxviii Tauber focuses 
upon whether Thoreau’s political and moral viewpoint is anything more than a 
superficial worldview that seeks to gratify only the individual. Hannah Arendt also 
suggests that Thoreau attempts only to “purify the self” and reaffirms that this form of 
political action retains a negative value.cclxxix If Tauber and Arendt are correct in their 
assertions about Thoreau’s worldview and singularly individualistic nature, then a moral 
and principled existence would be enough. However, upon further inspection of 
Thoreau’s writing, this is clearly not the case.  
Thoreau acts as a foil against the individualistic tendencies found within the 
nation by seeking to push individuals past their comfort levels and to embrace a larger 
picture of what society should become.cclxxx Thoreau advocates a particular moral vision 
and duty for the citizen, one that is often regarded as solely individualistic, but largely a 
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moral vision that seeks excellence in government. If Thoreau simply attempted to attain 
an idealized world that realized his own particular moral vision, then any governing 
official or social standard that contradicted this worldview would be at odds with his 
moral vision. Few individuals could ever hope to attain this narrowly specified moral 
perfection but Thoreau acknowledges that men throughout history have reached this 
level. Individuals are capable of attaining moral excellence by disregarding societal 
ideals and instead focusing upon attuning their actions and beliefs toward a communion 
with nature and exemplifying the role of living a righteous life. This process is largely 
antagonistic to the views and practices of society, but as Rosenblum explains, Thoreau’s 
political position fits into the perception that the reality of the political world “is conflict 
and its chief value is personal power.”cclxxxi Focusing upon this idea that antagonism and 
conflict are mutually reinforcing political viewpoints, Thoreau can now become a model 
for reopening public debate through openly voicing dissent from the masses. Thoreau 
first identifies that government is not the only measure by which an individual is to be 
defined. He then uses John Brown as the key example to illustrate that government and 
majoritarian politics have failed and that an individual has the duty to disregard personal 
safety to strive for a common good, regardless of whether or not these practices place an 
individual outside the protections of society. 
 
The Citizen Critic 
The role of a citizen within a democracy should not be that of an individual who 
tacitly consents to rules that violate a sense of morality. Thoreau focuses upon the act of 
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living a life of expedience versus a life of principle and exemplifies these forms of living 
by the types of arguments each uses. Expedient political arguments are often centered 
upon finding a lifestyle that would afford one the ability to live in comfort and luxury so 
long as this station in life is not questioned. Emphasizing principle instead, Thoreau does 
not argue for a government different from democracy but a “distinctively romantic 
justification: democracy as the political order that best corresponds to the romantic sense 
of infinite potentiality.”cclxxxii Within the infinite potentiality, Thoreau believes that 
individuals will be able to best order their lives and to form a government from the 
bottom to the top. Instead, the current government enforces the decisions of a few as the 
decision all. Thoreau writes, “But, to speak practically and as a citizen, unlike those who 
call themselves no-government men, I ask for, not at once no government, but at once a 
better government.”cclxxxiii This better government is not the dissolution of the current 
government or a revolution, but instead a government that evolves to more fully 
represent the values of the individual, values that correspond with nature and God. 
In the current conception of society, the individual is forced to submit to a life 
that requires blind allegiance to actions that lead to relatively little personal or moral 
gain. As Thoreau recounts, “Most men would feel insulted, if it were proposed to 
employ them in throwing stones over a wall, and then in throwing them back, merely 
that they might earn their wages. But many are no more worthily employed now.”cclxxxiv 
Society and the government attempt to allow for the individual to “earn a living” through 
allowing for the basic modes of economic production. However, Thoreau suggests that 
the society has been wrongly focusing its attention: the business of living and earning a 
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wage through labor and toiling in the fields fails to account for the true meaning and 
purpose of a society, that is, to allow individuals to reach their own conclusions and 
construct their own value systems. Without the ability to strive toward personal and 
moral growth, individuals are left as tools of the State. Their very livelihood is defined 
by the acts that will continue to keep their bodies alive, but this process does very little 
to ensure that workers will be engaged in any process that can be defined as life. As 
Worley explains, “When citizens cease to use the government to serve their will and 
begin to be, instead, servants of its will, they surrender precisely what it is that makes 
them human: their ability to choose and create their own values and destinies. Citizens 
cease to be human and become mere inanimate tools and commodities.”cclxxxv  
Thoreau routinely emphasizes that an individual lacking the ability to think and 
act independently is akin to an inanimate tool or commodity to be traded away by the 
government. As Thoreau describes in Resistance to Civil Government, “The mass of 
men serve the State thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with their bodies… In 
most cases there is no free exercise whatever of the judgment or of the moral 
sense.”cclxxxvi This process of being nothing more than a machine places the value of 
these “commonly esteemed good citizens” as having the “same sort of worth only as 
horses and dogs.”cclxxxvii While a horse or dog may increase the wealth of the owner, 
these objects fail to possess any value beyond their immediate uses. The key premise of 
Resistance to Civil Government reaffirms the idea that the individual should seek to 
serve the State with the free range of motion and sanctity of conscience to fully aspire 
toward transforming ‘bad’ government into a moral government. The process of 
 143 
becoming more than an inanimate tool or commodity centers on the ability to break free 
from the lifestyle found within traditional society, which can only be attained by 
individuals who choose to live boldly. Even as the citizens may be tools of the state, 
Thoreau explains that legislators also fail because “our legislators have not yet learned 
the comparative value of free-trade and of freedom, of union, and of rectitude, to a 
nation . . . If we were left solely to the wordy wit of legislators in Congress for our 
guidance, uncorrected by the seasonable experience and the effectual complaints of the 
people, America would not long retain her rank among the nations.”cclxxxviii The end goal 
of an idealized society revolves around individuals living boldly and legislators being 
responsive to the people.  
 If Walden serves as a blueprint for the democratic individual, then Resistance to 
Civil Government serves as a blueprint for the individual within a society. As 
Rosenblum explains, “Thoreau’s essay on civil disobedience is enduring because he 
successfully speaks in the voice of a conscientious democratic citizen.”cclxxxix As 
Rosenblum alludes to the conscientious democratic citizen, there is the admission that a 
democratic citizen has the innate belief that government and the individuals in a society 
should both strive for the same moral end. Resistance to Civil Government creates a 
conflict between this innately held belief and the observed actions of government and the 
society. Instead of choosing to work toward resolving this issue through a proactive 
change in government, some individuals interpret believe that the answer is to remove 
themselves from society and withdrawing consent. As Worley contends, 
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 [T]he single greatest obstacle we must overcome in making sense of 
‘Resistance to Civil Government’ is the notion that the essay concerns 
withdrawal from society . . . any such bonds have already been all but 
destroyed . . . The essay’s true agenda is not the destruction of social 
bonds but their reconstruction and restoration to their original vitality.ccxc 
 
The project of Resistance to Civil Government relates to the overall goal that 
government can become responsive to the citizens. If the two groups are disaffected 
from one another, then it is the role of the citizen to become a critic in hopes that this 
process will foster a new form of government or at very least a government more 
conducive to the growth of the individual. 
After the Mexican-American War and the looming admission of new states to the 
Union, the Compromise of 1850 was drafted as a way of placating both slave states and 
free states. A particular problem with the annexation of Texas was that the territory 
claimed by the state occupied areas north of the Missouri Compromise line. Due to the 
large size of the state, Texas was given the option to split into a total of five different 
states if it chose to do so. Under the Missouri Compromise, any state North of this line 
would be admitted to the Union as a free state. Another issue concerning the admittance 
of states was that California would be split in half as the Missouri Compromise line 
bisected the state. As part of the Compromise of 1850, Texas was admitted solely as a 
slave state and California was admitted as a free state. Any other state south of the 
Missouri Compromise line would be given the option to decide whether it would become 
a free state or a slave state on the basis of popular sovereignty. As a whole, this process 
served to keep the division in the Senate as amicable as possible, given such a distinct 
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difference in belief systems about the future of slavery in the country. Another provision 
of the Compromise of 1850 was the enactment of stronger guidelines for returning slaves 
that escaped to the North back to their owners in the South. The Fugitive Slave Law of 
1850 legalized excessive fines for individuals who aided escaped slaves and also 
demanded the immediate return of any slave who had escaped to the North. This 
particular provision of the Compromise of 1850 exasperated those opposed to slavery in 
the North. 
The Compromise of 1850 may not have been widely accepted by those residing 
in the North, but the attention given such laws as the Fugitive Slave Act could be seen as 
fleeting at best. In 1854, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, introduced into Congress, would 
repeal the Missouri Compromise and give the individuals in all new states the ability to 
vote on whether slavery would be allowed. While in Concord, Thoreau attended a 
meeting about slavery “expecting … to speak on the subject of slavery in Massachusetts; 
but I was surprised and disappointed to find that what had called my townsmen together 
was the destiny of Nebraska.”ccxci Thoreau examines the preoccupation of the citizens of 
Concord with the issue of slavery in Kansas and Nebraska rather than attempting to 
resolve the issue as it stands in their own state. In a lecture, Slavery in Massachusetts, 
Thoreau explains that the Governor fails to represent the interests of the masses because 
slavery exists within Massachusetts and there is little chance of discussion or recourse to 
this particular injustice.ccxcii By focusing on the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, Thoreau 
intimates that the citizens of Massachusetts were more concerned about the issue of 
slavery in a far away land than with attempting to have an immediate impact by 
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denouncing the Fugitive Slave Act and acting against it. Thoreau suggests that the 
Governor of Massachusetts knows that his constituents clearly do not favor slavery, but 
he creates a disparity between the wishes of the citizenry and the natural rights of all 
individuals failing to address the issue. As Thoreau explains, “I listen to hear the voice 
of a Governor… I hear only the creaking of crickets and the hum of insects which now 
fill the summer air… when freedom is most endangered, he dwells in the deepest 
obscurity… every moment [Massachusetts] hesitated to set this man free – every 
moment that she now hesitates to atone for her crime, she is convicted.”ccxciii  
As the northerners reiterate their desire to see slavery abolished in Nebraska, the 
lack of action toward the institution of slavery as a whole is reminiscent of individuals 
who opt to serve evil rather than attempt to live a scrupulous life. Thoreau argues that 
the judges attempting to determine the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law only 
look to the Founders to determine whether this law can or cannot stand. Instead, Thoreau 
suggests that men follow their own intrinsic notion of what is right and moral by 
“obeying that eternal and only just CONSTITUTION, which He, and not any Jefferson or 
Adams, has written in your being.”ccxciv The moral sentiment of principled action 
resonates throughout Slavery in Massachusetts in which Thoreau argues for a distinction 
between the laws of man and the law of God. The law of man can easily be influenced 
by avarice whereas God’s law created men to be free of bondage and the will of others. 
Thoreau openly makes accuses Massachusetts and its citizens as being complicit in 
slavery by not immediately acting against the Fugitive Slave Act. If these citizens had 
broken no laws but were still being accused of guilt through their inaction, then there 
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exists the all too real possibility that they were not being judged solely by the laws of 
man but also by moral laws. Thoreau’s admonitions, however, carry little weight unless 
he can illustrate that there is a precedent for moral behavior, an abolitionist willing to act 
without regard for personal health and welfare. This example is John Brown.  
 
John Brown 
The Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 was an attempt to assuage the fears of both 
proslavery and antislavery proponents. By allowing for popular sovereignty in new 
territories, the North and South could be reasonably assured that slavery could either 
continue or end in the new territories based upon the will of the people. The practice of 
popular sovereignty, however, did little more than ensure that the residents in these 
territories would be terrorized by groups of individuals attempting to forcefully sway the 
elections in the favor of their cause. Lawrence, Kansas was established in 1854 by 
antislavery settlers with the influx of northeasterners who hoped to vote Kansas as a free 
state. Later, in 1856, proslavery settlers sacked Lawrence in an attempt to disband the 
antislavery settlers and to destroy antislavery printing presses and equipment. Hearing 
that there was violence in Lawrence, John Brown and a company of soldiers started 
toward the city in order to be of assistance if needed. The company of soldiers 
eventually decided to turn back, but Brown, four of his sons, and two others continued 
on. While there was only one casualty in the sacking of Lawrence, Brown and his 
company executed five male slaveholders as retaliation in what is known as the 
Pottawatomie Massacre. This act and Brown’s protection of other antislavery settlers in 
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a couple of other military actions helped gain Brown the reputation for having strong 
moral convictions against slavery and for having the willingness to resort to violence in 
the cause of ending slavery. 
John Brown’s most notable action against slavery was a raid against an armory in 
Harpers Ferry, Virginia in 1859.  Brown, with the financial support of abolitionists in 
New England, purchased weapons and attempted to enlist the aid of freed slaves and 
other antislavery advocates. The intent was to capture the armory and to use these 
weapons to arm recruits to Brown’s cause of liberating slaves in Virginia. From there, 
Brown’s forces would travel south and continue to swell in rank as others realized the 
righteousness of the cause. Prior to the assault on Harpers Ferry, Brown’s force 
consisted of only 22 men, including him, and was unsuccessful at recruiting other 
volunteers. Deciding to continue the raid anyway, Brown was able to secure the armory 
but soon drew the attention of the local militia and the raiders were unable to escape. 
Brown and most of the surviving members of the raiding party were later tried for 
treason against Virginia and hanged. 
For Thoreau to contend that John Brown was an honorable individual willing to 
do everything necessary to abolish slavery, it is necessary to illustrate that Brown’s 
actions were just and righteous. To accomplish this goal, Thoreau maintains that Brown 
only enlisted like-minded individuals who were cut from the same moral fiber as Brown 
himself. These individuals were also willing to follow a law established by a power 
higher than the legislatures of men. Thoreau also contends that Brown fought for a cause 
that would not simply pass even if Brown’s corporeal body had died. The public could 
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understand that the common person could aspire to hold beliefs so strongly and of such a 
high moral caliber that these ideas would be timeless. Thoreau’s John Brown texts serve 
as epideictic works that have a twofold purpose: to eulogize Brown while also 
humanizing him. This eulogy and humanizing allows the audience to see how they might 
act in a similar situation and to place themselves in Brown’s shoes for a moment. As the 
Rhetorica ad Herennium explains “…we shall try to make them [the audience] desire to 
know a man of such excellence; since the hearers of our eulogy have the same zeal for 
virtue as the subject of the eulogy had or now has, we hope easily to win the approval of 
his deeds from those whose approval we desire.”ccxcv  
Thoreau writes “A Plea for Captain John Brown” after the trial that finds Brown 
guilty of treason against Virginia. Thoreau counters the typical narrative of a lawless 
man breaking down the bonds of society by portraying Brown as a man of higher 
integrity than a commonplace criminal. Indeed, if Brown was a moral man, then it is 
easier to accept the narrative that Brown’s cause was morally derived and Thoreau 
furthers this by recounting that Brown would “’permit no profanity; no man of loose 
morals was suffered to remain there, unless, indeed, as a prisoner of war’” and that 
Brown “would have been glad to add a chaplain… if he could find one who could fill 
that office worthily.”ccxcvi Brown’s inability to find a chaplain that could worthily fill the 
office for Brown and his men illustrates that Brown took religion seriously and held men 
of God to a higher standard than other men. Thoreau suggests that “it is easy enough to 
find [a chaplain] for the United States army” and in doing so, immediately calls into 
question the decency of any group that could so easily find a chaplain. When asked if the 
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raid on Harpers Ferry had been at the behest of any authority, Brown responds, “No man 
sent me here; it was my own prompting and that of my Maker, or that of the Devil, 
whichever you please to ascribe it to. I acknowledge no master in human form.”ccxcvii 
Brown and Thoreau equally add to the narrative of Brown’s mission coming from a 
higher cause by emphasizing the inability to find a chaplain that was worthy of leading 
Brown’s soldiers in a time of war. Brown could not accept any ordinary man and even 
the men who were ordained as men of God could not pass muster. This process is 
compounded by Brown’s courtroom assertion that the mission to liberate slaves comes 
from ‘no master in human form.’ Had Brown been an individual of lesser morals, then 
the apologetics would convey that Brown was only acting under orders from other 
abolitionists or that Virginia had in some way violated an antislavery law. Instead, 
Brown maintains, “I believe that to have interfered as I have done–as I have always 
freely admitted I have done–in behalf of His despised poor was not wrong, but 
right.”ccxcviii    
Thoreau openly compares Brown to a Christ-like figure by declaring “some 
eighteen hundred years ago Christ was crucified; this morning, perchance, Captain 
Brown was hung. These are the two ends of a chain which is not without its links. He is 
not Old Brown any longer; he is an Angel of Light.”ccxcix If Brown was a Christ-like 
figure, then Brown’s hanging is nothing more than a modern day crucifixion and the 
teachings of this moral teacher have fallen on deaf ears. The average person may realize 
that Brown’s moral behavior is right, but it would be too late to save Brown from the 
same fate as Christ. Thoreau explains that Brown’s men, who double as Apostles, were 
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of such a breed that “few could be found worthy to pass muster. Each one who there laid 
down his life for the poor and oppressed was a picked man, culled out of many 
thousands, if not millions; apparently a man of principle, of rare courage, and devoted 
humanity; ready to sacrifice his life at any moment for the benefit of his fellow-man.”ccc 
By contending that John Brown’s troops were ready to sacrifice their lives for the benefit 
of their fellow men, Thoreau seeks to create a disparity between human laws and a 
higher order of morality. Men should be allowed to stand outside of human laws so long 
as these incursions are conducted as the basis of a moral principle. By contrast, “The 
modern Christian is a man who has consented to say all the prayers in the liturgy, 
provided you will let him go straight to bed and sleep quietly afterward … they cannot 
conceive of a man who is actuated by higher motives than they are.”ccci 
This stirring narrative of John Brown as a Christ-like figure is difficult to 
accomplish while the news of Harpers Ferry was still fresh in the minds of the audience. 
Thoreau is in danger of losing the argument about Brown as a moral being unless there 
is a way to justify the transgressions of Harpers Ferry and the Pottawatomie Massacre. 
Thoreau circumvents this matter by alluding to the story of Christ at the temple with the 
moneychangers in that “the same indignation that is said to have cleared the temple once 
will clear it again. The question is not about the weapon, but the spirit in which you use 
it.”cccii Because Christ had once been so terribly frustrated with practices of the 
moneychangers at the temple and the selling of livestock and doves, Christ’s righteous 
anger is vented by forming a whip out of cord and overturning tables and chairs.ccciii For 
Brown, the slave trade represented the travesty of government and its inherent 
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corruption. While the killing of slave owners could be seen as being moral reprehensible, 
it was in the same spirit as Christ, an attempt to purge the system of its perversion. 
In A Plea for Captain John Brown, Thoreau pointedly reminds others that 
expedience or maintaining the status quo need not be the only consideration when 
choosing how to move forward as a society. In this example, Thoreau emphasizes that 
no one can fault the character of John Brown and that steadfastly standing by one’s own 
morals allows the individual to explicitly denounce the crime to which the country is a 
party. As Turner explains:  
… In Thoreau’s eyes, democratic citizens must have the capacity for self-
criticism, both personal and national. Though it would be wishful 
thinking to hold up the self-righteous Brown as a paragon of personal 
self-criticism, he nevertheless fulfills his role in the project of national 
self-criticism.ccciv 
 
This project of self-criticism compels individuals to reexamine their particular station in 
life and their approach to passively allowing government to rule over them. The 
problematic aspect of using John Brown as a prime example revolves around the idea 
that Brown has not only openly resisted the laws of society, but also has taken lives in an 
attempt to live a moral life. Thoreau is required, then, either to show that the individual 
is allowed to resist a government through violent action or that the laws were so morally 
repugnant that the only option to rectify these acts is through an extreme response. As 
Worley remarks, “The radical, violent gesture situated outside of any discourse or moral 
argument, risks total meaninglessness if it fails . . . Thoreau responds to the failure of 
Harpers Ferry by attempting to reattach Brown’s action to recognizable cultural values. 
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Thoreau works to bestow meaning on actions whose failure has left them otherwise 
unintelligible.”cccv Thoreau accomplishes this process by attempting to reaffirm the 
degree to which Brown was a moral individual who spent his life focusing upon 
rectifying and destroying evil. Brown becomes the prototypical protagonist whose only 
folly is the belief that all individuals should be accorded the same rights as others.   
The raid on Harpers Ferry is interpreted as the beginning of northern aggression 
against the institutions of the south. In the trial of Virginia v. Brown, Brown is found 
guilty of committing treason against Virginia because any attempt to arm slaves or cause 
an insurrection is an open attack against the state and this action becomes a capital 
offense. As Brown declares, however, the raid on Harpers Ferry was meant to secure 
weapons to give to slaves in an attempt to secure their passage to freedom. Brown makes 
the distinction that giving weapons to slaves in hopes of peaceably walking to freedom is 
different than attempting to overthrow a state because he would only be correcting an 
injustice against a group of people. Brown admits, “I never did intend murder, or 
treason, or the destruction of property, or to excite or incite slaves to rebellion, or to 
make insurrection.”cccvi Because Brown was unable to rouse enough support to his cause, 
he foresees that the only end to slavery in the South can be through force and this 
approach would surely end in lives lost. As Brown’s final statement predicts, "I, John 
Brown, am now quite certain that the crimes of this guilty land can never be purged 
away but with blood."cccvii Thoreau uses John Brown as a catalyst for inspiring 
antislavery sentiments by juxtaposing the actions of Brown against the inaction of the 
public. Thoreau distinguishes two forms of discourse in the United States, that of 
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maintaining the social norm and that of arguing from principles and morals in an attempt 
to transcend arguments of expediency. Brown signifies that even when the laws fail to 
accord an end to unjust action, there is still an outlet to be had through demonstration 
and principled discussion.   
 A Plea for Captain John Brown works as a reminder that the conscience of the 
nation is not necessarily enacted in its laws. Thoreau attempts to use John Brown as the 
fundamental example for citizens, ultimately reversing the process of tacitly observing 
rules within a society. In this sense,  
The ‘Plea’ shows that Thoreau has a positive politics–a politics of 
performing conscience. The performance of conscience before an 
audience transforms the invocation of conscience from a personally 
political act into a publicly political one. The aim of the performance is to 
provoke one’s neighbors into a process of individual self-reform that will 
make them capable of properly vigilant democratic citizenship and 
conscientious political agitation.cccviii 
 
This political agitation is the reminder that dissent remains a viable political alternative 
to the reigning assumptions and laws of a democratic society. By martyring Brown, 
Thoreau is able to describe a moral life and to describe how achieving this ideal is 
possible. For Thoreau, the act of living a morally steadfast life would ensure that an 
individual had accomplished something in their lifetime and in living for these few 
moments, their actions would overcome death. If the citizens of the United States knew 
that slavery was morally reprehensible, then the failure to act against it would be akin to 
not living. As Thoreau explains, “It seems as if no man had ever died in America before, 
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for in order to die you must first have lived . . . there was no death in the case, because 
there had been no life… no temple’s vail was rent, only a hole dug somewhere. Let the 
dead bury their dead. The best of them . . . Franklin – Washington – they were let off 
without dying; they were merely missing one day.”cccix The voices and actions of the 
great leaders allow them to transcend death. For the rest of society can aspire to be great 
men and “these men, in teaching us how to die, have at the same time taught us how to 
live.”cccx 
 
Conclusion 
Expedient arguments, whether primarily concerned with security or advantage, 
are rarely defeated by principled arguments. As a whole, once the decision to go to war 
is made, it is quite difficult to silence the war machine and to have individuals reconsider 
their desire to go to war. In this particular instance, Thoreau demonstrates that as a 
citizen critic, principled argument allows for the minority to envision that a change can 
be made, not the decision to go to war, but to the extent of how far the war would 
continue. Thoreau begins with the Mexican-American War as a protester against the 
inclusion of another slave state in the Union. Over the course of a decade, Thoreau 
remains the voice of principled dissent and the outlet for other individuals voicing their 
idea that slavery, regardless of where it occurs, is wrong. Thoreau finally utilizes a key 
example of an individual who is willing to forego personal security in order to act 
against slavery. Brown’s actions were coupled with language that was plain and refused 
to be identified as rhetorically based because there was “no need to invent any thing, but 
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to tell the simple truth, and communicate his own resolution.”cccxi Through this 
resolution, this steadfastness in beliefs, Thoreau is able to transform John Brown, not 
into a monster intent on terrorizing the south and wrecking havoc on the institutions of 
southern life, but into a martyr who had a quietness about him, a martyr who seemed like 
a “volcano with an ordinary chimney flue,” a martyr who solely wanted to end 
slavery.cccxii The antislavery discourse could not quell the civil discord that would 
become the Civil War, but it could provide the principles by which one portion of the 
country could strongly identify. In this case, principled rhetoric could serve to mitigate 
the effects of expedient rhetoric and to rein in the effects of arguments for security and 
advantage. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
Words have power. By themselves, words evoke little emotion and often have 
little consequence. Strung together, words begin to exhibit a variety of effects and 
influences. Words can be used to shape reality, influence decisions, inspire the masses, 
and ultimately define action. This dissertation, a study of The Rhetoric of Conflict in 
Political Theory, analyzes how words can convince men to take up arms in the early 
American political tradition. In my first chapter, I explore James Andrews’ “American 
Adolescence” theory that suggests arguments of honor and principle were enough to 
influence men to take up arms during the early years of the American republic. Andrews 
further holds that as the United States matured as a country, these principled arguments 
had lesser degrees of success in leading men to war. This dissertation, however, serves 
as an extension of Andrews’ “American Adolescence” theory by examining the 
effectiveness of arguments of honor and principle as well as arguments of expediency on 
persuading men to engage in war. 
There have been many studies that attempt to discern what affect rhetoric has on 
individuals in the American tradition. One approach to rhetoric and political theory 
focuses upon the utility of constant deliberation and how this can help lead to an 
idealized society.cccxiii Another approach seeks to analyze the use of rhetoric by political 
theorists in hopes of uncovering a hidden meaning and deeper understanding of the 
original text.cccxiv Of these different approaches, however, few studies have attempted to 
 160 
examine rhetoric and persuasion through political theory. This dissertation is an 
examination of rhetoric and persuasion as it pertains to arguments about war.  
In Chapter I, I briefly examine Andrews’ “American adolescence” theory and 
suggest this argument is flawed because it focuses only upon one small part of rhetoric. I 
conduct a brief overview of the literature of persuasion and rhetoric through the lens of 
political theory and suggest that arguments of honor and principle are only half of the 
picture. Instead, I argue that arguments of expediency may help fill any holes in the 
current research over political theory and rhetoric.  
Chapter II examines Machiavelli’s The Prince, Discourses, and The Art of War. 
Within the examination, while seemingly unrelated, I determine that these texts contain a 
common thread that calls for a return to republican government in early-16th century 
Florence. Moreover, I argue that Machiavelli’s language, specifically the use of virtù and 
fortuna, creates an overtone of expediency which would convey the necessity of war to 
the audience. While this chapter does not fit within the early-American tradition through 
geographic and temporal considerations, Machiavelli is a fundamental influence upon 
early-American political thought and his influence can be seen throughout the arguments 
used in the American political tradition. These arguments, which focus upon creating a 
narrative that intertwines opportunity and expediency, can serve as a baseline for further 
considerations when arguments of expediency compete against arguments of principle. 
In Machiavelli’s case, a call to arms is a desired conclusion for his political tracts.  
 While the first chapter examines Andrews’ argument concerning the early-
American political tradition, Chapter III serves to directly test Andrews’ theory: 
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arguments of principle and honor are sufficient in persuading men to take up arms. In 
this chapter, I examine the influence of Lockean political thought on the writings of 
Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine to establish that both authors use similar principles 
and concepts to argue for the American Revolution. However, I identify one 
fundamental difference between Jefferson’s A Summary View of the Rights of British 
Americans and Paine’s Common Sense. Compared to Jefferson, Paine utilizes an 
additional argument of expediency as a persuasive element in his writings. Specifically, I 
argue that Paine’s introduction of an argument of expediency, serves to counter 
Jefferson’s principled call to arms. Paine and Jefferson’s argument serves as one 
example that rejects Andrews’ “American Adolescence” theory. If Andrews’ original 
assertion were true, then one could expect that in the earliest of circumstances involving 
the colonies and Great Britain—arguments of honor and principle would be enough to 
convince men to take up arms. However, history suggests this is not the case.  
 Chapter III determines that while some arguments are created using the same 
basic syllogistic principles, these arguments are not as effective as others. While 
Jefferson and Paine argue for the same end and use many of the same reasons as 
justification, Paine is successful because his argument is teeming with language that 
changes the way the audience interprets the material. Paine’s argument introduces the 
shadow of the future–the costs that future generations will incur– if immediate action is 
not taken. This immediacy inhibits the ability of the audience to rationally consider if 
war is in the best interest of the colonies. Instead, Common Sense has served as the 
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rallying cry for the American Revolution as well as the affect arguments of expediency 
have on convincing men to take up arms. 
 While the Chapters II and III suggest arguments of expediency are more likely to 
persuade men to take up arms, in Chapter IV, I extend my analysis to further test forms 
of expedient arguments. Instead of relying upon Andrews’ initial study on principled 
rhetoric, I differentiate between two forms of expedient arguments: arguments 
concerning domestic security, and arguments for the political and economic advantage 
of a state. This analysis determines whether the different forms of expedient arguments 
would still refute Andrews’ original claim. Prior to the American Revolution, Colonists 
welcomed protection provided by England and after the Treaty of Paris, the United 
States enjoyed relative security at home but suffered from the British threatening 
maritime operations. Upon the analysis of James Madison’s rhetoric toward England and 
France directly following the Chesapeake incident, Madison relied on principled rhetoric 
to characterize the decision made by his administration by not pursuing immediate 
action against England. As relations with England deteriorated and the United States 
declared war on Britain, Madison’s principled rhetoric changed to an argument of 
expediency–which initially emphasized the economic and political advantages the 
United States would gain from a war with England. Prior to the War of 1812, the 
security of the United States was not in jeopardy and Madison was unable to convince 
the necessity of war to the public, even if this provided future advantages for the United 
States. As Madison’s rhetoric changed from principled arguments with economic 
advantage, to an argument of expedience for securing the domestic and maritime affairs 
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of the country, I conclude that Madison is successful because of this shift in argument 
style. As Chapter IV examines, arguments of expediency served as a prime example of 
rhetoric that convinced men to take up arms whereas Andrews’ “American 
Adolescence” theory failed to address such examples.  
 The previous chapters focus on whether arguments concerning honor and 
principle, or arguments of expediency, are enough to convince men to enter into a 
conflict. Chapter V is introduced as a counter example in attempt to test the “American 
Adolescence” theory during an era later than Andrews’ initial theory. Can arguments of 
principle serve to neutralize arguments of expediency?  Chapter V focuses upon the 
writings of Henry David Thoreau to find examples of principled arguments against the 
Mexican-American War which would later amplify the tensions that lead to the Civil 
War. I demonstrate that while Thoreau’s principled rhetoric is unable to ultimately stop 
the Mexican-American War, Thoreau is able to form a common identity between 
dissenters of these conflicts. These dissenters are able to unify with one another and 
create limitations on how far a war could extend. So while Andrews’ theory about 
principled rhetoric convincing men to take up arms appears to be misinformed, perhaps 
these arguments of honor and principle can succeed in limiting war. 
 
Future Research 
 While the study of political theory and rhetoric is beginning to take root in the 
field of social science research, there are areas within this field that have yet to be 
cultivated. This particular dissertation predominantly focuses upon political theory and 
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rhetoric, however, there is a tinge of international relations contained herein. The 
examination of expediency and principled arguments, as they relate to convincing men 
to take up arms, can be explored in other time periods as well as laying groundwork for 
future quantitative studies. This dissertation suggests that argument of expediency have 
the potential to influence individuals to redefine their self-interests and pursue a call to 
arms. As war can often begin over any number of reasons, this particular area of research 
can begin to further explain the age-old question of “why can’t we be friends?”  
 Throughout this dissertation, I have oversimplified the study of rhetoric to create 
a streamlined analysis of only two types of arguments: expedient and principled. Most 
arguments and rhetoric are much richer and more nuanced and should be afforded deeper 
consideration than this dissertation affords. The Rhetoric of Conflict in Political Theory 
simply provides a canvas for future research to draw upon.  One of the first sketches that 
should be made on this canvas is a drawing that attempts to quantify the findings from 
these chapters. If Andrews’ original hypothesis was confirmed in his case studies and if 
this dissertation adds to and counters these original findings, then a more thoughtful and 
controlled analysis should be conducted to further tease out the influence of arguments 
of principle and arguments of expediency. Sometimes, it is not enough to simply 
acknowledge that words have power.   
 
Endnotes 
 
cccxiii See James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1991) for a more contemporary application of deliberative deliberation 
and how rhetoric can be used for the good of society. Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
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1996), John S. Dryzek, “Rhetoric in Democracy: A Systemic Appreciation,” Political 
Theory 38 (2010): 319-39. 
cccxiv For an excellent example, see Stephen John Hartnett and Jennifer R. Mercieca, 
“Rhetorical Norms of Republicanism in Post-Revolutionary America, 1798-1801,” 
Rhetoric & Public Affairs 9 (2006): 79–112. For Ivie’s notable work dealing with an 
examination of rhetoric, war language, and the decision to enter into conflict, please 
view: Ronald L. Hatzenbuehler and Robert L. Ivie, Congress Declares War: Rhetoric, 
Leadership, and Partisanship in the Early Republic (Kent, OH: The Kent State 
University Press, 1983); Robert L. Ivie, “Presidential Motives for War,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 60 (1974): 337–45; Robert L. Ivie, “Images of Savagery in American 
Justifications for War,” Communication Monographs (1980): 279–94; Robert L. Ivie, 
“The Metaphor of Force in Prowar Discourse: the Case of 1812,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 68 (1982): 240–53. And Jennifer R. Mercieca, “The Culture of Honor: How 
Slaveholders Responded to the Abolitionist Mail Crisis of 1835,” Rhetoric & Public 
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